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·CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND
In studying the Far East Agreements of the Yalta Conference, of
February 4-11, 1945, it is both vital and necessary to have an understanding of the history, and a "background of events and agreements
I leading up to this conference,

8S

primarily concerns China, Japan, and

the Soviet Union.
Early Sino-Russian Relations
Sino-Russian relations officially ,date from 1689.

In that year

China signed an agreement with Russia, the first ever between that
country and a European power.

The object of this treaty, concluded

September 9, 1689, was clearly stated 1n the preamble:
To repress the insolence of certain rovers, who, passing beyond .
the bounds of their lands to hunt, robbed, murdered and committed
other outrages ; as a Iso for setting the bounds of the two countries
"of China and Russia, and in $yort, to establish an everlasting
peace and good understanding.
""
.
The bounds of the two countries were "demarcated by the river
Kerbechi and the long chain of mountains below the source of the Kerbechi,
extending as far as the Eastern Sea.

All the rivers and banks, great or

small,. on the southern side of those Qlountains, as well as all the lands
and countries from the top of those mountains southward, were stipulated
.s"belonging to the Empire of China, and all the lands, countries,
rivers, and brooks on the other side of the mountains extending northward were stipulated as remaining the possession of the Empire of Russia.
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The territory lying between the said chain of mountains and the river
Udi was

undecided~

but was to be settled by ambassadors specially

designated for the purpose by letters when further detdils were avail.

2

able.
The other important articles of the treaty provided that the
fortress of Yaksa was to be completely demolished, that the hunters of
the respective empires were not, upon any account whatsoever, to pass
beyond the bounds settled above, that neither side was to receive any
fugitive or deserter, that persons with proper passports should be
suffered to come and go from the territories subject to either empire
I

into those of the other and to buy and sell whatever they should think
fit and to carryon a mutual trade, and finally that bygones were to be
b.ygones and that everything that' had passed before; of what nature
soever it may have been, was to be buried in everlasting oblivion.
This treaty. known

8S

3

the Treaty of Nertchinsk, while not as

precise in language as it could have been, marked the beginning of a
period of 170 years of peace on the Siberian-Manchurian border.
Thirty-eight years later Empress Catherine of Russia sent Count

Sava Vladeslavich to Peking.

Her embassy was the most successful and

.

fruitful of all up to that t1.me.

4 Prior to this, embassies were either

not allowed to enter China or not granted an audience by the Emperor of
China.

The result of Count Vladeslavich's work was the Treaty of

lCiakhta, of August 27, 1727, which

re~ained

in force until June, 1858,

one of the longest-lived treaties in the history of the world.

This

treaty fixed the boundary line between Mongolia and Siberia from the
Saian Mountains and Sapintabkhainin the west to the Argun River in the
east •. The valley of the Uda remained undecided.

~t1i

&&

liMA

It delimitated the

3

frontier from Kiakhta to the mouth of the Algun and westward from the
,ame point to Shabina Dabeg, a pass in the Sanyan Mountains.

5

I:
\)

This treaty was favorable to Russia in that by it China lost a

large part of the territory claimed by her between the Upper Irtysh and
the Saian Mountains and also the territory south-southwest of Lake
Baikal.

Count Vladislavich declared,

that the newly established frontier is highly advantageous to
Russia and that actually the Russian possessions have been extended
into ~ongoli8 a distance of sevgral days'march and in certain
sections of even several weeks.
For many years Russia had not been satisfied with the Treaty of
Nertchinsk because it checked her expansion to the east.

While she had

gained much by the Treaty of Ki.:akhta, she was also dissatisfied because
7
it limited her trade with China to a few places.
When the Opium War
and the Treaty of Nanking, between China" and Great Britain in 1842,
completely exposed the weaknesses of China, Russia's ambitions in the
Far East were revived and she wanted to get her share of the Chinese
spoils.

Prior to that, as long as the Chinese Empire was strong and

vigorous as under the reigns of Kang-hsi and Chienlung, or as it appeared
to be so after the beginning of the nineteenth century, Russia tolerated
, "
..
8
the treaty ag~eements she had made and kept friendly relations with China.
China, having just emerged from the throes of one of the greatest
rebellions in her history, and pressed by the British and the French on
her coast, had no desire to make an enemy of the Russians, with whom she
was anxious to preserve friendly relations.
It was this anxiety that induced the Chinese to sign their next
series of agreements with Russia.

Count Nicholas Maravev, Governor of

Siberia, on May 11, 1858, in a conference with Prince Shan', commander-'

4

in-chief of the Chinese forces of the Amur, presented a list of Russian
demands.

The Chinese at first showed no signs of yielding to the pro-

posala of Maravev, but they finally acceded to them upon the energetic
. 9
remonstrances of the Siberian governor.
With unusual rapidity, the negotiations (lasting only six days),
were consummated in the treaty signed on May 16, 1858, known as the
10
Treaty of Aigun.
By this treaty the· territory on the left bank of the
Amur was recognized as Russian, and the territory on the right bank as
jfer downstream as the Ussurri was recognized as Chinese, the territory
between the Us.urri and the sea was still to be left open for future
delimitation.

The rivers Amur, Sungari, and Ussurri were to be open for
11
navigation for Chinese and Russian vessels exclusiv~ly.
A week after the signature ·of the treaty of Aigun. Putiatin,
Russian Minister to Peking, negotiated with Chinese leaders, and then
signed the Treaty of Peac·e, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation at

Tientsin on June 13, 1858, which he signed in .ignorance of the Maravev12
Shan agreement.
This treaty was mainly commercial.

It provided that the Russians

might trade in the open ports, already opened to the nationals of other
.

.

couDtries; that Russian consuls might be appointed to such localities as
necessary; and that Russian vessels of war and other merchant ships might
13
be repaired and revictualed according to existing -regulations.
What was most important for
"most-favored-nation" treatment.

Russ~a

was that she would receive

Article XII of· this protocol gave to

Russia the most-favored nation treatment as to political, commercial,
. 14
and otherprivi1eges,hitherto granted to othernatiQQs.

5
Being unaware of the Treaty of Aigun. Putiatin also settled the
frontier with the Chinese leaders, not knowing that this had already
15
been done in the earlier treaty.
After the Convention of Peking. between China and Great Britain.

was signed on October 24, 1860, and that between China and France on the
following day, British and French troops withdrew from Peking.

General

Hiehib Ignatieff, Minister from Russia to Peking, succeeding Putiatin,
having helped settle the dispute between these countries, and actually
/boasting that he had saved the Manchu Dynasty by succeeding in getting
; - G

t h e troops to wit hd raw, made d emanda upon t h e Chinese

overnment.

16

Ignatieff had succeeded in getting the Treaty of Tientsin ratified
on April 24, 1860, but had failed to secure ratification of the Treaty

of Aigun, as the Emperor of China had previously discounted this agreemente

17

However, aa a reward for the performance of Ignatieff in the

Peking Convention, the Sino-Russian treaty of November 14, 1860, was
signe4.

By this treaty China gave her official sanction to the Treaty

of Aigun.
Ignatieff had demanded, besides the Treaty of Aigun territory, the
area between the Ussurri and the sea, and, aa the Manchu Government was
in no position to reject his demands, the Treaty of Peking was signed by
18
Prince Kung.
The Treaty of Peking made the Amur and the Ussurri rivers the
eastern boundary line between China and Russia.

By a stroke of the pen

the Amurand Ussurri regions ,with a total area of about 400,000 square
miles, was ceded to Russia.

The western boundary line was also fixed'as

following the mountains, great rivers and present line of Chinese
permanent pickets.

~----

It ran from the lighthouse at Shabin...Dabag

6

80uthwestward to Lake Zaisan, thence to the mountains as far as the
,

Kokan _ possessions.

19,

It was largely due to the combined operations of the French and the
British in the south, tying China's hands in the north, that the Russians
vere able to entrench themselves in the Amur, and it must be remembered
that it was through the dubious diplomacy of General Ignatieff in the
negotiations of the Treaty of Peking that China ceded to Russia the

Russia had now gained a far more advantageous' position in the Far
East than she had ever had previously.

Vladivostok was quickly estab-

1ished, in 1860, and the Russians began to build facilities there.

With

the completion of this port the Russians would turn. ever more to the idea
of a year-round warm water port, and they would ultimately make their way
south to the waters of the Gulf of Liaotung.
These three treaties - Aigun, Tientsin"Peking - unlike those of
Nertchinsk and Kiakhta, were. unequal trestie,s by which China had not
only lost vast territory, but had to concede privileges to Russia

\

unilaterally - which put Russia on the same basis as the Wester Powers.
For instance, Russia was to enjoy consular jurisdiction and the

\

most~

\

favored-nation treatment in China while the latter did not enjoy the same
privileges in Russia.

Consequently, the

relat~ons

I

I
j

between China and

r.
,I

Russia thereafter could no longer and
two equals, but those between

8

~

~ould,

no longer be those between
21
superior power and an inferior one.

)
,","""
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Though these treaties were unequal, it must be noted that China
was a fully independent nation, as recognized by international law, and
therefore fully responsible for any agreements which she saw fit to sign.

-
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Early Russian-Japanese Relations

\

!

II

\i

!

\

The Russians were also concerned with the Kuril Islands and the \

\

island of Sakhalin, in the Yalta Far East Agreements.

The Russians hadl

reached the Kuri1s early in the eighteenth century and by the end of
century began to reach toward Japan itself.

I

Sakhalin formerly belonged

J

to the Chinese Empire, but by early in the nineteenth century the
Japanese claimed full control of the island.

th~

In February, 1855, a

tr~aty

of friendship with Russia, known as the Treaty of Shimoda, was conc l.ked
following negotiations between Russian and Japanese representatives •.
This treaty clearly defined the territorial limits of both countries,
acknowledging that Kunashari, Etorofu, Babanai, and Shikotanwere part
of Japan proper, and that theKUrils north ofUrup .Island were under
Russian sovereignty., As. for Sakhalin, it was agreed not to define its
border line, but to continue to apply the customary practices of Japanese
occupation· of the southern portion and R.ussian occupation of the northern
portion.

Nearly twenty years late.r, in 1875, a treaty with the Russian

government was completed by the Japanese clarifying their positions.

Japan was to assume full control of the Kurils and RUBsia full control
Sakhalin.

~
of ~

Article two of this treaty stipulated that the Kuril Islands

extended north of Urup Island to Shimshu Island, or a cha in of eighteen. /
) I
22
islands.

J

,/

Russian Attempts to Expand
The' population of the regions acquired by Russia in the treaties
of 1858 and 1860, did not increase as rapidly as they had

expected~

"It was a huge emptiness, with no agricultu"re, no trade, no roads, and,

~.

-.

I!IllIIiM

_

8

of course, no industry."

23

For this reason, if for no other, Russia

.oon became dissatisfied with the acquisition of the Amur and Maritime
provinces and her eyes turned to the more populous and fertile lands to

1

the south - Manchuria and Korea.

'1

j

It was c lear that control of these two

I

areas was necessary if RU8sia was to become a dominant power in the Fat
East. 24

I

But, Russia had to wait for a proper moment to take action and had;

I

\

first to improve her system of communications in Siberia, so that her

\,

military might could be brought to the Far East ina comparatively short \
time.

Looking to the future, Tsar Alexander III ordered,in 1891, the
.
25
construction of the 3,500 mile long Trans-Siberian Railway.
In 1896, Russia and China concluded a secret treaty of alliance.
Japan, by defeating China in a war of short duration in 1894-95, had
acquired the Liaotung Peninsula.

This being a serious blow to Russian

ambitions in the Far East, Russia had persuaded Germany and France to
join her in advising Japan to

~bandon

Liaotung, which she did.

The

treaty signed between China and Russia was a result of the gratitude of'
China for the diplomacy of the Russians in ousting Japan from her main26
land.
'This secret treaty of alliance, signed in May of 1896, the official
text of which was not published until 1921, during the Disarmament
Conference at Washington D.C., contained, 8u11U'Q8rily the following:
Article I. The High Contracting Parties.engage to supporteacb
other reciprocally by all the land and sea forces at any aggression
directed by Japan against Russian territory in Eastern Asia, China,
and Korea.
.
Article II. No treaty of peace with an adverse party can be concluded by either of them without the consent
the other.
Article Ill. During military operations all Chinese ports shall
be open to Russian vessels.
.

of

9

Article IV o The Chinese Government consents to the construction
of a railway across the provinces of Amur and Kirin in the direction
of Vladivostok. The construction and exploitation of this railway
shall be accorded to the Russo-Chinese Bank. The contract shall be
concluded between the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg and the
Russo-Chinese Bank.
Article V. In time of war Russia shall have free use of the railway for the transport and provisioning of her troops. In time of
peace Russia shall have the same right for the transit of troops and
provisions.
Article VI. The present treaty shall come into force from the day
on which the contract stipulated in Article IV shall have been
confirmed. It shall have· force for fifteen years. 27
Also included in this treaty was a statement by the Chinese to the
effect that:
The juncture of this railway with the Russian railway shall not
serve asa pretext for any encroachment on Chinese territory nor for
any infringement of the rights of sovereignty of his majesty the
Emperor of China. 28
_
China was positive in her assertions not to allow the Russian Government
to build the railway, but the Emperor did consent to an agreement, as
indicated above, between China and the Russo-Chinese Bank for the
construction of this railway.
Before 1895, Manchuria was rarely visited by Russians.

However,

with the signing of -this agt;eement, Russians began survey work on the
railroad, but were delayed by bandit raids in this area.

Consequently,

in 1896 and 1897, Russian penetration of Manchuria was more theoretical
.

.29

than actual.

Nominally, the railway was to be jointly owned and operated, but
actually it would be a Russian railway, as it was intended by them.

The

Chinese president of the company was .. figurehead and all the administrative power would ultimately be in the hands of the Russian assistant
president.

The railway, upon its completion would serve as the instru-

ment of RU$sian penetration into Manchuria.

Following the humiliating Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895, China was
forced to cede the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan.
force

Jap~n

Russia had been able to

out with the support of Germany and France.

In 1898, when

the Germans moved into the Shangtung area, first occupying the port of
"
30
Kiaochow,
the Russians saw it as an opportunity for her to acquire
Port Arthur and Dairen.
obtaining a

twenty·fi~e

She expanded her influence in Manchuria by
year lease on the Liaotung Peninsula, the very

territory she had denied Japan earlier.

! was

On March 27, 1898, a convention

signed at Peking by which Port Arthur and Dairen, and its adjacent

territory, was leased to Russia:
Article I. For the purpose of ensuring that the Russian naval
forces shall possess an entirely secure base on the littoral of
northern China, the Emperor of China agrees to place at the disposal
of the Russian Government, on lease,the Ports Arthur and Ta-lien-wan.
together with water areas contiguous to those ports. This act of
lease, however, in no way violates the sovereign rights of the
Emperor of China to the above mentioned territory.
Article II. The frontier of the territory leased on the above
specified basis will extend northwards from the Bay ofTa-lien-wan
for such distance as it is necessary to secure proper defense of
this area on the land side •••• Upon the determination of this line of
demarcation, the Russian Government will enter into complete and
exclusive enjoyment of the whole area of the leased territory
together with the water area contiguous'to it.
Article III. • •• the term of the lease shall be twenty-five years
from the date of the signature.
Article IV. • •• the entire military connnand of the land and naval
forces and equally the supreme civil administration will be given
over to the Russian authorities ••••
Article VI. Both the Governments agree that Port Arthur, as an
exclusively military (naval) port, shall be used solely by Russian
and Chinese vessels and shall be considered as a closed port to all
war ships and merchant vessels of other states •••• Ta-lien-wan, shall
be considered open to foreign commerce and free entry will be granted
to the mer~hant vessels of all na~ions.
Article VIII. • •• the Chinese Eastern Railway Company ••• shsll be
extended to the connecting branch which is to be built from one of
the stations of the main line to Ta-lien-wan, and also. if deemed
necessary from the same line to another more convenient point on the
littoral of the Liaotung Peninsula •••• Consent to the construction of
the railway on the basis indica"ted shall never under any form serve
8S a pretext for the seizure of Chinese territory or for an encroachment on the sovereign rights ofChina. 3l

"

.

~
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The Treaty of Peking had two results, the significance of which is
sometimes overlooked:

it cut off China in Manchuria from any access to

the sea other than through Dairen and the inferior ports of Newchwang and
Hulutao, and it brought Russia face to face with Japan across a narrow
sea.

32

On the part of Russia,

a policy of respect for China as a great

and equal state had developed into a belief that China had become a
negligible factor-' merely a land to be exploited at such times and under
such conditions as the situation alloWed •. As practical statesmen,. the
leaders of Russia
Asia, Japan.

now turned their attention to a new power in Eastern

The Russian Government was controlled by leaders who

believed that Japan could be flouted as ruthlessly as China had been.

As

was soon to be evident. the Japanese Government was controlled by those
who believed that Japan's very existence could only be preserved through
war.
It was at this time that a group of Chinese fanatics, who resented
foreign encroachment, acting with patriotic motives, began a series of
anti-Christian, anti-foreigner revolts.

The Chinese Eastern and South

Manchurian railways. then under construction. were' seriously damaged by
Chinese rioters.

All the Russians in Manchuria were to withdraw either

to Siberia or to the leased territory in Liaotung until the news reached
Moscow.
This was looked upon by the government in Moscow as an opportunity
to occupy Manchuria, and the Russian Government subsequently sent
strong force into Manchuria.

8

The Chinese in Manchuria were no match for

the Russians, and by November of 1900, all Manchuria was under Russian
occupation.

The Chinese at that time negotiated and signed a temporary

12
~greement

at Port Arthur. on November II, 1900.

The Russians were

sranted the right to station guards to protect the construction of the
; I

II

.

railway. and cities occupied by the Russians were to be administered by
33
them until the complete pacification of the province.

When the Chinese attempted to negotiate for the return of Manchuria
in February. 1901, Rusaiapressed for even stronger concessions.

When

word of these demands reached other powers. they became alarmed and
advised the Manchu Government not to conclude a separate treaty with
RU8sia. 34 With this support, the Chinese refused to sign any agreement,
and forced the hand of the Russians.

The Russians in turn issued a

declaration blaming the interference of other powers in the Sino-Russian
negotiations and asserted:
We have promised to withdraw our troops from Manchuria only on the
restoration of complete order in China, and only if the actions of
other powers will not serve as obstacles to this withdrawal. From
our point of view, we cannot consider the restoration of normal
order guaranteed until the Court returns to Peking, which, in turn,
will be ~ossible only incase foreign troops quit the capital of the
Empire. 3 .
.
The separate negotiations the Russians were attempting with the
Chinese included the following provision:
.The Chinese Government will not grant in all the area·· of the
provinces adjacent to Russia, namely Manchuria and Mongolia, as well
as in.the area of the districts of Tarbagatai, Kuldja, l<ashgar,
Yarkend, Khotan, and Keri, in the provinces of Kansu, and Sinkiang
adjacent to Russia, any concessions for the constructionaf railroads, exploitation of mineral deposits, or any industrial enterpriseswhatsoever, to foreign powers and their subjects without the
consent of the Russian Government. In all the territory of the·above
mentioned provinces §ge Chinese G~ernmentwill not build.railroads
by its own means....
.
The Chinese, realizing they had support against such demands. did
. not make a counterproposal to the Russian terms but merely rejected most
of them.

Russian attempts to take immediate advantage. of the Boxer

Reb~llion by making a separate agreement with China failed. 37
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This failure ended the period of influence that Russia had enjoyed
in China after the war with Japan.

Russia had taken the lead in averting

the danger and humiliation that would have come from the establishment of
Japan in Manchuria, close to Peking, and she had further intimated that
she would stand between China and future encroachments on the part of the
Japanese.

Consequently, Russian influence became predominant at Peking
38
between 1895 and 1902.
Russian troops remained in Manchuria.

Japan realized that she

jwould be in 8 disadvantageous position if China should be partitioned
and, as Russia had done earlier, sought to alleviate the situation
diplomatically.

Japan's efforts resulted in the signing of the Anglo-

Japanese Alliance of January 30, 1902.

With these diplomatic developments

clearly aimed at her, Russia concluded an agreement with China on terms
which included little of the aggressive tendencies of earlier demand ••
Negotiations were concluded on April 8, 1902, in Peking.
In Article I, Russia agreed to the re-establishment of the authorlty of the Chinese Government in Manchuria, .and restored to them the

right to exercise governmental and administrative authority.

Article II

provided for the Russian evacuation of Manchuria in three six-month periods t beginning with the date of the convention. 39

Within the first· six months, the territory west of the Liaotung
and the railways between Shanghaikwan and Shinmingtlng were restored t·o
Chinese authority.

But when the

sec~~dperiodexpired in

April, 1903,

Russian troops failed to withdraw from the west of Shengking and Kirin.
Instead, Russia demanded new conditions for further withdrawal.
The exact terms, later
published officially.

&

kn~

as the Seven Demands, have never been

From what is known though, they contained the
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following provisions:
I. The territory evacuated by Russia should not be alienated through cession~ lease, or any other form, to any other
power o
.
2 0 The Chinese Government will not establish any new treaty
ports in Manchuria without the consent of Russia.
3. If China should appoint a foreigner to head any administrative organ, the affairs of the part of northern China where.
Russian interests predominate will be removed from that agency
and placed under a special agency headed by a Russian o
These points were essential for the Russians and were intended to
restore the status quo prior to the Boxer uprising.

The second group

of demands was of lesser consequence, and contained some measures of only
a temporary nature:
4 0 All rights acquired by the Russians during the occupation of Manchuria will be recognized after the evacuation o
In addition, Russia is empowered to take sanitary measures along
the railroad line o
50 Russia will retain for its military use the Port Arthur~
Inkou-Mukden telegraph line as long as the Peking-Inkou lines
exist.
. ..
6 0 The customs commissar and doctor at Inkoushall be a
Russian subject, and the administration and sanitary commission
composed of the consuls shall be retained o
7. After the evacuation of the Russian troops the Inkou
branch of the Russo-Chinese Bank will continue to function as
the agency of the customs.
8. The present form of administration in Mongolia will be
.
retained. 40 .
The United States, Japan, and Britain protested_to Russia over
such demands and warned China not to accept them o

The Russian Govern-

ment categorically denied them, but secretly pressed China for their
acceptance.

41 Encouraged by the firm attitude of the other powers, the

Manchu Government rejected the Russian demands 0

Then in September,

. Russia proposed. a. new agreement of a milder character but still retained
the provision that China would never cede to any power any part of the
three Manchurian provinces.

While China and Russia were still.negotiat-

tng about the evacuation of Russian troops, the Russo-Japanese War broke
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out in February, 1904.

II'

Japan, aod the Russo-Japanese War

\i

I

Prior to the Boxer Rebellion, Japan had desired to come to some
understanding with Russia in regard to Korea.

In 1898, Russia and Japan

had agreed upon principles regarding Korea, known as the Rosen-Nishi
Convention.

This agreement, signed in April, 1898, was described by

Baron Rosen, Russian Minister to Japan, as "s rather lame and pointless
convention.,,42

Not being able to come to any real understanding,this

agreement did little; both countries recognized the sovereignty and entire

f
f

independence of Korea, and pledged themselves not to interfere in her

I

international affairs, Russia agreeing not to interfere with the develop-

~'

mentaf the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea,
and both countries agreeing not to interfere with the development of the
commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea, and both
countries agreeing not to send advisers to Korea without the consent of
the other party.

43

While the primary interest of Russia was in Manchuria, that of
Japan was in Korea.

Japan had built up substantial canmercialand

'financial interests, and had a natural self-protective and strategic
interest, geographic in nature, in preventing Korea from coming under the
control of any other power, espec ia 11y such a strong and natura lly
expansive state as Russia.
Japan had shawn a desire to expand territorially on the Asiatic
mainland,to establish further, and protect her interests there, when it
had demanded the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula from China in 1895.
When ahe was stopped by the three powers' intervention, shew3s content

f

I
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to accept the status quo, though she naturally would have preferred it
otherwise.. But, when Russia was granted the lease to Port Arthur and
moved into Manchuria, it disturbed this status quo.

Every advance made

by Russia brought her into closer contact with Korea and through Korea,
with Japan.

Russia, on the Korean border and at Port Arthur menaced

Japan indirectly, posing a threat to her position in Korea.
Japan, in conjuncti()n with other powers, had repeatedly warned
Russia that her policies in China were not acceptable •. Japan's Korean

! policy was of a somewhat different nature. The only serious competition
Japan had in Korea was from the United States, and this did not prevent
her from establishing a dominant position as the U. S. interest was
primarily economic.

This being the situation, Japan was forced to act

independently in this area.
Little success had been attsined in Japanese-Russian negotiations
when Japan concluded her alliance with Great Britain.

This alliance,

signed January 30, 1902, offered Japan a certain amount of security which
. ahe had not had before.
cal,

8S

Article I had recognized Japan's special politi-

well as commercial, interests, and provided that if these interests

should be threatened, she should take measures to defend them by
of arms.

~

force

Article III provided that if a third power should attack Japan,

England would come to the aid of her ally.

44

The same provisions applied

to British interests in China.

Japan realized though, that if at all possible she should conclude
agreements with Russia to avoid future trouble.

With this in mind,

willing to give up any hopes in Manchuria in return for promises of the
same in Korea from Russia, she entered into final negotiations with Russia,
in August of 1903.

-
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The Japanese decision to negotiate had been prompted by the
reorganization of the Russian controlled province of Kwantung, with
Port Arthur on the Liaotung Peninsula, and the province of Amura8 a
vice-royalty.

This move was generally interpreted a8 evidence of Russia's

intention to use this as a base to annex the stretch of Manchuria that
8eparated the Kwantung and the Amur provinces.
In meetings at St. Petersburg,Japan submitted a series of proposals as a basis for discussion.
'follows:

(1)

that both countries

These proposals may be summarized as
ag~ee

to respect the independence and

territorial integrity of China and Korea, and to maintain the "open
door" principle in those countries; (2)

that Russia recognize Japan's

special interests in Korea, and concede her right (a) to develop those
interests further, and (b) to give advice to the Korean government in the
interests of reform.

In return, Japan would recognize Russia's special

railway interests in Manchuria and concede her the same right of future
'-

development within the limitations of the first stipulation.
The Russian counter-proposal provided:

(1)

4S

for a mutual agreement

to .respect the independence and integrity of Korea, omitting the similar
Japanese proposal as to China; (2)

for a Russian recognition of Japan's

superior interests in Korea, and of her right to assist in reforming the
civi~

administration; (3)

for an engagement by Russia not to interfere

with the development and protection of Japanese commercial and industrial
interests in the kingdom; (4)

for a ~utual agreement not to fortify on

the coasts of Korea so as to menace freedom of navigation in the Straits
of Korea, or to use any Korean territory for strategic purposes; (5)· for
the· erection of the portion of Korea north of the thirty-ninth parallel
into a neutral zone; and (6)

for recognition by Japan of Manchuria and

~
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I
I

I

lit. littoral as in all respects outside her sphere of interest.
Agreements could not be reached.

I

46

Japan, feeling that the last

Ii

I!attempts to negotiate their problems diplomatically had failed, decided
on a different course of action.

Feeiing that she would have the support

of the other powers - mainly Great Britain, with whom she had formed an
alliance, and the United States, who was avowedly pro-Japanese - she
broke diplomatic relations with Russia on February 6, 1904, and on
February 8, without a declaration or war, attacked the Russian fleet at
Port Arthur and Chemulpo.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, ended disastrously for Russia.
By the summer of 1905, circumstances forced St. Petersburg to accept

President Theodore Roosevelt's good offices in arranging peace negotiation..

A Russo-Japanese conference met in Portsmouth, New Hampshire,

in the United States, in August, 1905, and early in September-the peace
treaty was signed.
The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on September 5, 1905,. made clear,
in its own terms, that it was intended to be the first step toward

a_n~w

era of Russo-Japanese cooperation, through a definition of the respective
-

47

rights and interests of the parties in Northeastern Asia.-

By Article II, Russia not onlysnrrendered any claim to national
interest in Korea,but also acknowledged that in Korea, Japan "possesses
••• paramount political, military, and economic interests," and might
48
therein take "measures of guidance, pr~tection, and control."
By the
same article both-nations agreed to "abstain, on the Russo-Japanese frontier, from taking any military measures which may menace the security of
Russia-or Korean territory."

49

Thus, was drawn the first'solid line

delimiting Russo-Japanese spheres of interest on the Asiatic continent.
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By Article III, Russia and Japan settled the question of the
jKwantung leased territory.

Japan assumed control, the article stipulat-

\ i

\+ng that from then on Russia had no rights within a specified boundary;
from then on Japan had certain rights; exclusive to Japan, including the
right to maintain troops there and to exercise a certain jurisdiction
·50

within it.

Article V stipulated that the transfer from Russia to Japan of the
rights involved in the lease had to be confirmed by China as the original

I

I
I
~

~
t

I

lessor, and Article VI transferred, also subject to China's consent, that
51
portion of Russia's railroad south of Changchun. . Japan wasted little
, time, and on December, 22, 1905, signed with China a treaty whereby China
consented to the transfer.
Japan was now established on the mainland for the second time in a
decade, this time in a much firmer position.

However, it was not long

before both Russia and Japan realized that their best chance of exploiting Manchuria lay in cooperation against other powers, and not in
competition with each other.
Russo-Japanese Reconciliation
In a secret convention, lasting from July 17-30, 1907, the two
countries came to several understandings.

The preamble of the secret

convention defined the object of the entente,which was to "obviate for
the future all causes

o~

friction or misunderstanding with respect to

certain questions relating to Manchuria, Korea, and Mongolia."

52

Article I drew the line of demarcation •••• desirirtg to avoid all
complications which might arise from competition, Japan undertakes
not to seek to.obtain on its own· account, or for the ,benefit of
Japanese or other $ubjects,any concession in the way of railways or

£
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telegraphs in Manchuria to the north of aline defined in the
additional Article ••• and Russia ••• to the south of the above mentioned
line.
The Additional Article drew the line as follows:
Start"ing from the northwestern point of the Russo-Korean frontier
and forming a succession of straight line, the line runs, by way of
Hunchun and the northern extremity of Lake Pirteng, to Hsiushichan;
and thence it follows the Sungari to the mouth of the Nankiang,
thereupon ascending the course of that river to the confluence of the
Tola River • From that point, the line follows the course of that
river to its intersection with Meridian 122 degrees East of Greenwich.
Article II set aside Korea for special treatment, by the Japanese:
Russia, recognizing the relations of political solidarity' between
Japan and Korea resulting from the conventions and arrangements at
present in force between them ••• undertakes not to interfere with,
not to place any obstacle in the way of the further development of
those relations; and Japan, on its part, undertakes to extend in all
respe~ts most-favored-nation treatment, to the Russian Government •••
pending the conclusion of a definitive treaty.
Article III dealt with Outer Mongolia, setting it aside for the
Russians for special treatment:
The Imperial Government of Japan, recognizing the special interest
of Russia in Outer Mongolia, undertakes to refs3in from any interferencewhich might prejudice those interests.
Thus was

a new

line drawn on the map of Eastern Asia, this one

dividing Manchuria into north and south, and separating Outer from Inner
Mongolia.

While made secretly and without consultation with other nations,

which,by virtue of their treaties with China; also had rights and
interests in the territories, it was to be respected by the two parties
making it for over a decade.
Between the signing of this secret agreement

and 1910, a series of

events involving other interested powers made it clear that, unless
Russia and Japan took decisive steps to prevent it, the walls of special

I

privilege which they had sought to build up around their respective
spheres of interest might be broken down.

The Public Convention of 1910

l
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jtransferred into a public treaty obligations artd agreements already
I assumed

by the existing treaty of 1907.

Notice was being given to third

\:

I!parties whose interests might be involved.
"De8ir~ng to consolidate and develop "the provisions of the secret

Convention signed at St. Petersburg July. 17-30, 1907,,,54 Japan and
Russia agreed upon the following:
Article I. Russia and Japan recognize the line of
demarcation fixed by the Additional Article of the secret
Convention of 1907 as delimiting the respective spheres of
their special interests in Manchuria.
Article II. The two High Contracting Parties undertake to
respect reciprocally their special interests in the spheres
above indicated. They consequently recognize the right of
each, within its own sphere, freely to take all measures
necessary for the safeguarding and the defense of those
interests.
Article III. Each of the two High Contracting Parties undertakes not to hinder in any way. the consolidation and further
development of the special interests of the other Party within "
the limits of the above mentioned spheres.
Article IV. Each of the two High Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from all political activity within the sphere
of special interests of the other in Manchuria. It is furthermore understood that Russia will not seek in the Japanese
sphere- and Japan will not seek in the Russia~ sphere - any
privilege or any concession of a nature to prejudice their
reciprocal special interests, and that both the Russian and
Japanese Governments will respect all the rights acquired by
each of them within its sphere by virtue of the treaties, conventions or other arrangements mentioned in Article II of the
public Convention of today's date.
Article V. In order to insure t~e good working of their
reciprocal engagements, the two High Contracting Parties will
at all times frankly and loyally enter into communication with
regard to anything that concerns matters· affecting in common
their special interests in Manchuria. In the event that these
special interests should come to be threatened, the two High
Contracting Parties will agree upon the measures to be taken
with a view to common action or to the support to be accgsded
"for the" safeguarding and the defense of those interests.
Following the completion of the treaties of July 4, 1910, with a
promptness which leaves "little room for doubts ofa connection, Japan
~
56
proceeded to annex Korea,
and in 1911, Russia established a de facto
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protectorate over Outer Mongolia, taking advantage of the Chinese revolt
of the same year to do this.
The following year, Japan and Russia executed a new secret treaty.

July 8. 1912, 'representatives oftbe two countries signed an agreement
extending the line drawn in the secret treaty of 1907, precisely defining
the boundary between the added sphere of Russian and Japanese interest
in Inner Mongolia, as Russia was already, by prior designation,
dominating Outer Mongolia:
Article II. Inner Mongolia is divided into two parts; one to
the West, and the other to the East, of the meridian of Peking .
(116 degrees. 27 minutes East of Greenwich. ) The Imperial
Government of Russia undertakes to recognize and to respect the
Japanese special interests in the part of Inner Mongolia to the
Kastof the meridian above indicated, and the Imperial Government of Japan undertakes to recognize and to respect' the
Russian special interests in the parts of Inner Mongolia to the
West of the said meridian. 57
Effect of World War I in the Par East
The outbreak of World War I affected the situation in the Far East

as profoundlYtif not as sweepingly, as it did in Europe.

58

The

European powers' interests and attention had to be turned to more
immediate and pressing matters in their

own

areas and the further

development of Russian interests had to be indefinitely ·postponed.
Japan, alone of the world powers, could regard this struggle with

any degree of detachment.

Shew8s free, within the limits of existing

obligations, to proceed to obtain from the struggle whatever advantages
59
ahe could.
In 1911, and 1912, Russia had aided the revolt in Mongolia.

As a

result of this, Russia was in a technical position somewhat superior to
that of Japan, for with respect to the region in which Russian special

•.------------------------,~
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interests were located, Outer Mongolia, there existed a document, the
Russo-Mongolian Treaty of November 12, 1912, which confirmed some of the
RU88ian claims in that area.
In the region in which Japan's special interests lay, southeXD
Manchuria, Japan possessed no such documentary evidence in support of her
claims.

Legal justification was inadequate.

The first task which lay

before Japanese statesmen, therefore, once the menace of Germany in the
Far East was removed, was to remedy this deficiency by persuading the
Chinese Government to give formal and. specific recognition to these"
claims.

This was one motive for the presentation to China, on
"
60
. January 18, 1915, of the so-called Twenty-one Demands.
These demands finally resulted ina treaty between China and Japan
whieh was signed on May 25, 1915.

Group II of this treaty primarily

concerned Japanese demands re1atingto south
Inner Mongolia.

Manehu~la

and eastern

The lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and of the South

Manchurian and Antung-Mukden railway lines were to be extended to
ninety-nine years; that Japanese subjects might reside and travel in
South Manchuria, engage in business and manufacturing, or agricultural
purposes; that joint Chinese-Japanese enterprises might be undertaken;
that Japanese subjects would be accorded extra territorial rightsjthat

suitable places in eastern Inner Mongolia should be opened to residence
and trade; and that the Kirin-Changchun Railway loan agreement should be
61
revised in favor of Japan.
By separate notes China conceded that
.Japanese subjects should have the right to prospect for and to work
eertain coal and iron mines in specified regions in Fengtien and Kirin
provinces; that if China sought foreign capital for railway construction
in Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia. application would be made first

CMUE
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to Japan; and that if China found it necessary to employ foreign
financial, military, or police advisers in Manchuria, it would hire
Japanese.

62

Japan was now able to face the rest of the world with a document
of the kind usually regarded as an instrument in internation law.

On

this strengthened basis, Japan faced Russia in a final set of treaty
negotiations which were to mark the relations of those two countries
before the Russian Revolution.
'the preamble of the agreements .of June 20-July 3) 1916, stated
that:
I:

t
I.

t

The Imperial Government of Russia and the Imperial Government
of Japan, desiring to consolidate the sincerely friendly
relations established by their secret Conventions of July 17-30,
1907. June 2l-July4) 1910, and June 25-Ju1y 8, 1912, have agreed
on the following clauses designated to complete the above menioned
agreements.
Article I. The two High Contracting Parties, recognizing that
their vital interests demand that China should not fall under
the political domination of any third Power host.ile to. Russia or
Japan, will frankly and loyally enter into communication whenever circumstances may demand, and will agree upon the measures
to be taken to prevent a situation being brought about.
Article II. In the.event that, in consequence of the measures
taken by mutual agreement as provided in the preceding article,
war should be declared.between one of the Contracting Parties
and one of the third Powers contemplated by the preceding .
article, the other Con·tracting Party will, upon the demand of its
ally, come to its aid, and in that case each of the High Contracting Party will , upon the demand of its ally, come to its aid, and
in that case each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not
to make peace without a previous agreement with the other
Contracting Party.
Article III. The conditions in which each of the High Contracting Parties will lend its armed ~ooperation to the other ContractingParty, as stipulated in the preceding article, and the means
by which this cooperation will be effected, will be·extablished
by ,the competent authorities of the tvo High Contracting Parties.·
Article IV. It is fully understood, 'however, that neither of
the High Contracting Parties will be bound to lend its ally armed
8ssistancecontemplated by Article 11 of the present Convention
unless it·has assured itself of cooperation, on the part of its
allies, corresponding to the gravity of the impending conflict.
Article V. The Present Convention will come' into force imm~di
ately after the date of signature, and will continue in effect
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until July 1-14, 1921. In case neither of the High Contracting
Parties should have given notice, twelve months prior to the
expiration of that period, of its intention to bring the
effect.ivenes8 of the Convention to an end, it wi11continue in
force until the expiration of one year from the date on which
one or the other of the High Contracting Parties .hall have
denounced it. 63

The Japanese-Russo Agreements came to an end with the establishment of the Soviet regime in Russia, in October, 1917.

Japan had

join~d

the Allied Powers and the United States in recognizing the Kerensky
Provisional Government, which had announced that it would accept all the
engagements of the

Tsaristreg~e.

However, the Bolshevik break with

the past was to be international as well as internal.

the Bolsheviks

. made it clear that it would not accept the engagements of the Tsarists,
or anything that· had been in force prior to that

t~e,

except what they

would specify.

In the summer and early autumn of 1918, Japan secretly obtained
fresh Chinese commitments to certain of the Twenty-one Demands, of 1915.
The Chinese Government categorically agreed to the transfer to Japan' of

Kiaoehow and the German rights in. Shantung, on the understanding that
while Japan wasta restore the leasehold. it would retain and expand

the former German economic privileges in the province.

.a.

This contract

bound. by the Chinese Government'. acceptance of advance payments on

large Japanese railway loans.

64

After the First World War, Japan's ambition in China vas checked
by the Hine Power Treaty of 1921-1922, signed in WashingtOD D.C.

As

long as China was disunited, Japan was contented with the statuaquo in
Manchuria ,where her influence was now d'ominant.
The Nine Power Treaty, primarily.sponsored by the United States,
solemnly bound the signatories to respect the sovereignty, the independence,

26

and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

They further

pledged themselves to uphold the principles of the "open door" and to
65
assist China in forming a stable government.
The Soviet Union and the Far East
Questions and difficulties having arisen since the formulation of
the Soviet Government in Moscow, concerning Mongolia, Manchuria J and- the
Chinese Eastem Railroad, a series of negotiations between China and the
Soviet Union culminated in May, 1924,. in the re-establishment of normal
diplomatic and consular relations.

The Soviets also voided all Tsarist

, treaties with and relating to China, affecting her sovereign rights or
interests, together with similar Chinese treaties with respect to Russia.
The Soviet Government agreed tQ give up the rights of extra territoriality and consular jurisdiction.

The Soviet Government recognized that

Outer Mongolia was an integral part of China, and agreed to respect
66
China's sovereignty therein.
At this time Manchuria was practically independent of the Peking
Government.

Peking. orders were not obeyed in Manchuria.

The Soviet

Government, after the conclusion of the agreements· with Peking,
negotiated with representatives of the Autonomous Three Eastern
Provinces of China, at Mukden, and concluded an agreement with them.

It

embodies all the important. points' in the agreements concluded with the
Peking Government.

This agreement subsequently as approved in March, 1925,

by the Peking Government as a supplementary document to the Sino-Soviet
Agreement of 1924.
For her part, the Soviet Government, pending the final settlement,
was to receive the rights of the Tsarist Government in the Chinese
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'!Eastern Railway, as provided in the contract of August, 1896, which did
not conflict with the present agreements just signed.

In the agreement

I

\ signed with the Manchurian representatives, a provision was added whereby the Chinese government would enter gratis into possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway after sixty years instead of eighty

8S

originally

provided. 67
The concluding of these agreements forced Japan to conclude the
negotiations it had been carrying on intermittently with the Soviet
Union during 1923 and 1924.

On January 20, 1925, at Peking, Japanese

and Soviet representatives signed' an agreement.

This agreement provided

for the establishment of regular diplomatic and consular relations; recognized the validity of the Portsmouth Treaty, but voided all other treaties
made from 1905 to 1917, until they could be examined at a subsequent conference; and the disagreements over the island of Sakhalin were sett1ed. 68
The agreement withChiria, cQupled with the one with Japan at the
beginning of 1925,. restored the Russian position in Northern Manchuria.
And, while the 1924 agreement incorporated a recognition of Outer Mongolia as an integral part of China, and provided for a withdrawal of
the Soviet troops, it did not preclude the maintenance of a close
relationship and thus, it did not. result in a restoration of Chinese control. 69

Japan in China
.When in 1928, Manchuria was consolidated and leaders swore allegiance to the central Chinese Government, it caIIleback under a semblance
of control to the central government for the first time since 1917.
Fearing further consolidation in China, and, after the civil wars in
China during 1929 and 1930, Japan saw its chance and struck.

28

On September 18, 1931, Japanese troops in Manchuria provoked an
incident that was to set the Japanese military machine in motion.

This

occurrence·, know as the Mukden Incident, gave Japan a pretext to occupy
all of Manchuria, which they did quickly.

In March of 1932, they es-

tablished the independent state of Manchukuo, and in 1933, the province
.
70
of Jehol was brought under its control.
Along with the protocol signed
by Manchukuo, granting her recognition by the Japanese, went an agreement
stating that Manchukuo confirmed all rights and interests possessed by
Japan in Manchukuo at the time of the formation of Manchukuo and that
both parties agreed to cooperate in the maintenance of their national
. security.

71

The Japanese then approached China for a truce- which was

signed at Tanghu on May 31, 1933 - because time was needed by the
Japanese to consolidate and organize their base in Manchukuo.
The inability of the League of Nations to check aggression greatly
disappointed China.

The National. Government then turned to the Soviet

Union for possible help in China's struggle against Japan.

The Soviet

Union, as its own security was being threatened by the aggressive policy
of Japan, was quite willing to join china in this cooperative relationship.
While the Soviet Government was willing to cultivate China's friendship, its policy toward Japan had been extremely cautious since the Mukden
Incident.

72

After the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese treaty of 1925,

the relations between the two powers were marked by the absence of conflict.
Japan had promised to

l~it

her military activities to the southern

part of Manchuria, but did not keep her promises, and after-Liaotung had
be~n

occupied in southern Manchuria, marched her troops into northern

Manchuria.

For, despite the extremely cautious policy toward the Soviet

Union, the Japanese Government, which was not under the domination of
the militarists, was bent upon eliminating the Soviet influence

•

Sf

29
in Manchuria completely.

73

Japan's interest was centered on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The

Soviet Government. being aware of the possible seizure of the railway,
secretly ordered the Chinese Eastern Railway to gradually remove a large
part of the rolling stock into Siberia. When Japan heard of this she
.
74
ordered blockades, and demanded the return of the rolling stock.
Now the Soviet Government had to decide either to defend its
interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway with armed forces, as it had done
in 1929, or to withdraw from Manchuria completely.

The Soviet Govern-

ment was not willing to give up its sphere of influence in northern
.. Manchuria, which had existed for more than thirty years, yet it knew very

well that its military strength in the Far East was not yet strong enough,
and they were in no position to engage Japan in a military conflict.
As a consequence, the Soviet Union proposed to sell their interests
in the Chinese Eastern Railway.

After consideration, the Japanese

Government advised the Manchukuo regime to accept the Soviet offer.
After much negotiation over price, the Japanese Government gave its
guarantee to the payments by Manchukuo, and the agreement was signed at
Tokyo on March 23, 1935. 75

China protested this sale and refused to

recognize it as a valid transaction, but to no avail.

After the puppet

state of Manc:hukuoas8umed control, the Chinese Eastern Railway was
re-named the North Manchurian Railway, and incorporated into the South
Manchurian Railway CODtpany, removing

~the

Soviet Union from Manchuria,

and freeing Japan to move freely in that area.
The seizure of Manchuria and Jehol was the first step in Japan's
apparent plan gradually toeontrol all of China, and to establish a New
Order in Greater East Asia.

•

Step by step, Japan extended its
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dperations into Inner Mongolia and North China.
\,

The ChineseConnnunists had declared "war" on Japan

88

early as

\i

1932, though hundreds of miles separated them from the nearest
76
. '
Japanese troops.
Demands for a united frOnt became 8 factor in
Communist propaganda, but, at first they were willing to make no concessions to any group to make. possible a true 'united front against the
Japanese.
Internally China had been struggling with .the problem of unifieation during this time.

The Chinese Ccxmnunistshad steadily risen in

power, and were able to assume control of portions of northern China.
The National Government, recognized by the United States in 1928, was
engaged in the problem of suppressing
ing Manchuria.

Communism when Japan was occupy-

The Japanese actions aroused large sections of Chinese

opinion, and the cry for a united front against the Japanese arose.
After Chiang Kai-shek, head of the National Government, returned
from Sian, where he had been kidnapped by the Chinese Communists,
accompanied by his captor, Chang Hsueh-liang, the establishment of an
entente between the Chinese COttInunists and the Kuomintang moved rapidly

ahead.
After the incident at Marco Polo Bridge. July 7, 1937, which was
to be the focal point that brought Japanese intentions fully out in the
open, the Conmunist Central COtmlittee issued a declaration stating its
77
readiness to cope with the national crisis.
With this declaration
Chiang believed that the Chinese Communists had repented, and were sincere.
in their professed readiness to join the rest of the nation in the fight
against aggression.

=
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On April 18,1934, Japan announced that any effort by a Western
I

I'power to aid China would be opposed by Japan.

This, and subsequent

\ unsuccessful attempts by Japan to arrange for the secession of the
northern provinces of China, failed to evoke any serious response by any
of the powers with interests in the Far East, except for the Soviet
Union.
Only the Soviet Union acted in such a way as to indicate that it
might as some point resist further Japanese advances.

On March 12, 1936,

8-he '8igneda mutual defense pact with Outer Mongolia, and more important,
Stalin, in late 1937, recognized the Kuomintang Government and advised
, the Chinese Communists to make peace with the Central government and
form a common front.

She also extended what aid she could, and until

the summer of 1942, supplies were shipped across the Gobi Desert into
China, though in small amounts •
., I

Thus, on the eve of World War II, Chiang Kai-shek, as the symbol
of a new united China, stood firm against ,the Japanese_. Virtually unaided,
and standing alone, China,was to reach a peak of strength with its united
front that was never to be achieved again, and which did not last long.
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CHAPTER II

STRATEGIC CIRCUMSTANCES
AS OF

FEBRUARY 1945
The Soviet Union in Europe
In the autumn of 1944, Germany had only seventy-five divisions
i

with which to man a line six hundred miles long and prevent the Soviet
Army from advancing from Warsaw to Berlin.

Of all the fronts which

Hitler was endeavoring to hold, this was the most vulnerable

~ilitarily

and the most dangerous politically, and yet here the balance of strength
-

was most clearly in favor of his enemies.

1

In January 12, 1945, the Soviet offensive began on the frozen
plains of southern Poland.

The German defenses were thin, the reserves

weak, and the Russians quickly gained a clear break-through.
the first stroke of the greatest Soviet offensive of the war.

This was
The

Soviets had assembled in Poland and east Prussia 180 divisions and at
·2

the points where they chose to strike their superiority was overwhelming.
The

Sovi~t

winter offensive rapidly gathered momentum as fresh

armies took up the attack.

Crossing the Vistula on either side of

Warsaw, the Russian armies isolated the Polish capital and took it on
January 17.

Farther north Soviet armies broke through and drove north-

west toward the Gulf of Danzig.

Within a week the whole front had

become a seething battlefield-and Soviet armor, plunging westward, had
advanced nearly a hundred miles.

33

Throughout the second half of January, the Russians advanced with
!giant strides.
;,Ii

~he

In the north Soviet armies reached the Gulf of Danzing and
3

twenty-five German divisions in East Prussia were doomed o

In the

south Soviet armies broke into Upper Silesia and bore down upon Bres1au.
While Russian armies were crushing the German flanks, they were
also advancing at will through Central Poland,advancing two hundred
miles in two weeks astride the road that ran from Warsaw to Ber1in o

By

January 27, they had crossed the German frontier and were less than a
hundred miles from the German capital •
. Thus, on the Eastern Front, by early 1945, the Russian armies,
'having thwarted the German attempts to relieve Budapest, were only
eighty miles from Vienna; other Russian armies, having surrounded Bres1au
and secured bridgeheads west of the Oder, were only one hundred twenty
miles from Prague; and still a third Soviet army, having reached the
Oder at Kuestrin north of Frankfurt, was only forty-five miles from
Berlin.
At the time of the Yalta Conference, the Soviet armies stood with
all th~ capitals of Eastern Europe already in their hands, and the
three great capitals of central Europe within their grasp_
to be

~n

a solidly advantageous position.

only on the morrow of a severe

A11~ed

Stalin was

The Conference took place not

reverse" in the Ardennes, but at

the moment of the Soviet armies' greatest victories. 4
In February, 1945, it should be

st~ongly

emphasized that British

and American military prospects were still grim in both Europe and Asia.
They had hardly recovered from the shock of Hitler's counter-offensive
in the Ardennes in Europe, and in the Pacific no one

coul~

see the end o

Though the Allied armies stood poised along. the West Wall, ready· to

34
invade Germany itself, time and manpower were becoming crucial factors.
The British and Americans had almost reached the end of manpower
resources at the time of the Yalta Conference, with two wars of
incalculable duration still to win. 5· At this time it was clear that the
power of the Soviet army was the great central military fact of the war
in Europe.

Their advances in the East left little doubt that they had

made spectacular recoveries after suffering tremendous losses of both
men and territory early in the war at the hands of the Germans.
'Tbis buildup and development was primarily the result of the
I

Soviet Union's own abilities to recover and adjust" to the wartime
situation.

There can be little doubt that American lend-lease was of

great assistance to the Soviet Union.

There can also be no doubt that

this assistance was never the deciding factor in the success of the
Soviet Union.

To the end of the war the Russians managed to supply the

great bulk of the actual fighting tools used by her:

92.5 per cent of

the planes used;9l.5 per cent of the tanks; 98.5 per cent of the
artillery; 95.5 per cent of the shells; 94.5 per cent of the cartridges;
and 100 per cent of the rifles.

6

It was in transportation equipment that American and British aid
was most important.

I

1
,t

Some 421,284 trucks, 13,303 combat vehicles, and

35,110 motorcycles,- and 2,328 ordinance service vehicles.
jeeps were on a 11 Russian fronts.

American

Railroad equipment included 1,900

steam locomotives, sixty·six Diesel locomotives, 9,920 flat cars,
1,000 dump cars,_ 120 tank cars, and thirty-five heaVy machinery cars,
all manufactured for the Russian wide-guage roads.
worth of machinery went,

~,670,311

A billion dollars

tons of petroleum products, and

4,478,116 tons of foodstuffs,7 mostly consumed by the armies.

Vast

35
quantities of quartermaster items, medical supplies, industrial equipment and much else were also sent.
A total of approximately $11,000,000,000 was sent to the Soviet
Union as lend-lease from the United States.

This was unquestionably a

tremendous amount, but comparatively speaking it wasnd: large, as the
war was costing the United States a total of $8,000,000,000 a month
during 1944.
in the war.

Lend-lease definitely was not what kept the Soviet Union
Almost everyone had expected her to fall within a month

after.the Germans launched their invasion in June, 1941, but she did
not.

The Soviet Union kept herself in the war.

8

The Allied Powers in Western Europe
In May of 1941,with the surrender of the Axis forces iaTunis, no
Germans or Italians remained in arms in Africa.

A British-American

.,

campaign that had begun in November of 1942, was concluded successfully,
paving the way for invasions of the island of Sicily and Italy itself.
Si~ily

was invaded July 10,1943 and by August 17, all Axis resistance

had ceased.

In turn, Italy was invaded at a number of points by the

Allied forces, reaching Rome in .June, 1944.

German resistance in

northern Italy continued until the end of ·the war, but it was of little
. consequence strategically.
The defection of Rumania and Bulgaria made the position of Nazi
forces in Greece and the Aegean Islands precarious.
began to withdraw and move toward

Hungary~

In September they

To hasten the Nazi with-

drawal from Greece, British forces landed in early October, and were
greeted with wild enthusiasm.

British troops reached Athens on

October 18, and turned north.

With the help of Greek guerilla forces

36
I

"ost of the country was cleared of German troops by early November.
I

Meanwhile, the military forces of four countries had been
~ooperating

to drive the Germans out of Albania and Yugoslavia.

On

October 20, Belgrade was liberated, and by "the end of 1944, Albania,
most of the Dalmatian coast, and eastern and southern Yugoslavia, had
been freed from Nazi domination.

Only in the northwest, in Croatia and

Bosnia, did the Germans still retain control.
August 15, 1944, a second amphibious' landing was made in France,
this time in southern France.

The invasion was designed to prevent

German forces in the south from moving against the" Normandy forces, and
to provide the Allies with a supplementary line of supply through the
Mediterranean ports, particularly Marseille.

The invasion of southern

France and the subsequent drive north succeeded beyond all expectations.
After liberating southern France, the Allied force moved via the Rhone
and Danube valleys to the Belfort Gap.

It then joined with the Allied

armies in northwestern Europe, and 0m8under General Dwight D. Eisenhower's
cormnand.

By the end of 1944, the

~editerranean

Sea

was virtually an Allied

lake, and attentions could be centered on the Rhine area.
Having finally.successfully invaded the European continent in
France, on June 6, 1944, the British and
the Siegfried Line by September 1944.

j

Ame~ican

armies were approaching

Having rejected a plan for concen-

trating an an-out thrust across the north German plain, the Allies

<

deployed along a six hundred mile front on the Siegfried Line.

In pre-

invasion planning, General Eisenhower had decided to advance against
Germany on abroad front.

He planned to make his main "effort in the north

through Belgium, avoiding the forested Ardennes region, along the most
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direct route to the Ruhr

indu~trial

area, the vast collection of coal

mine. and factories which were the main source of German industrial
strength. 9 .
November and the early part of December were spent by the Allies
building up troop strength for their offensive, the Germans yielding
ground- very grudingly at this time.

The Allies had lessened their

8upply problem by opening the ScheIdt 80 that the extensive harbor
facilities and railway connections of Antwerp could be utilized by the
Allied armies facing the lower Rhineland.

They cleaned most of the

i

: Alaace and Lorraine areas of German troops and reached the upper Rhine
at Strasbourg.

They captured Aschen, and thus proved that important

bulwarks of the

Ge~an

West Wall could be taken.

With .this being the situation, the Allies threatening the West
Wall, Hitler gathered his last major reserves for a

counter-offensive~

It was launched in the weakly held. Ardennes sector, with the object of
driving to Antwerp, splitting the Allied armies and destroying those in
the north.

T~rough

surprise it had great initial success, but it was

stopped short of the Meuse River.

The Allied forces were successful in

regaining the original line by January3l, 1945. and they then resumed
10
preparations for the crossing of the Rhine.
The Battle of the Bulge,

8S

the Ardennes struggle came to be

known, was one of the greatest pitched battles of the Western Front.
The Germans had created a temporary bulge in the Allied lines seventy
miles wide and fifty miles deep at the western-most point.

This was to

be the last great Germanoffenaive of World War!I.

On the eve of the Yalta Conference, the Allied forces in the west,
having just .beaten back the last major German offensive, stood poised

38

all along the 8upposedly impregnable West Wall, ready to invade Germany
itself.

The Americans had captured the first of the Roer dams toward

which they had been attacking when the Germans began their counteroffensive in the Ardennes.

The forces of the Western Powers were now

ready to launch their long delayed assult on the Rhineland.
Military Strength
At the Yalta Conference, at·s meeting of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, explained to
Harshal Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union, that the Allies had never
possessed the same superiority in ground troops over the Germans that
the Russians did. ll

The Allied advance across France had been

accomplished with the same number ·of divisions as tne enemy had.

The

advance had been made possible by a combination of'ground and air power,
where the superiority of the Allies. was ovetwhelming.
Stalin

r~ported

12

in turn that on the central front in Poland the

Soviet army had enjoyed a superiority of one hundred divisions, 180 to .
eighty, over the Gennans as well as overwhelming artillery supremacyo
·He added that they had nine thousand tanks on the break through sector
on the central fronto I3
General Eisenhower would have approximately eighty-nine divisions
to cover the front from the Mediterranean to the Low Countries, not
including Italy, where there were approximately thirty-two enemy divisions
facing an approximately equal number of Allied divisions, though once
again the Allied forces would enjoy sup-eriority in fighteraircraft o He
further had ten thousand tanks and four thousand heavy bombers availableo 14
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Nine of Eisenhower's divisions were French and the rest either

1
t
~.

,British or American.

Situated along the Rhine, from north to south, .

\ were the First Canadian Army, the Second British Army, the United States

'

I

\

t

Ninth Army, ,the United States First Army, the United States Third Army,
~he

f

I

United States Seventh, and the First French Army.

IS

In comparison, the numerically superior Soviet armies were

t

advancing a10nga much larger front in the East. ,Of all Hitler's

J

mistakes his underestimation of the Soviet fighting forces was perhaps

I

the biggest.

J
~'

The fact that Russia had by this time a more powerful land

army than the combined Allied and Axis powers had long been recognized.

~

}

I

I
1

As early as the Quebec Conference of August, 1943, President
/

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the United States military strategic planners
were saying of Russia, " •••her post-war position in Europe will be a
daninent one.

With Germany crushed, there is not power in Europe to
. ',16
oppose her tremendous military forces.'
The 8triking power of the Russian forces in Poland and East Prussia

was at least twice as great as that of the Western Allies in France and
the Low Countries.

Before the Russian offensive began, the Soviets had

225 infantry divisions, twenty-two tank corps, twenty-nine other tank
formations, and three cavalry corps.

17

For the attack assembled in

Poland and East Prussia, Stalin had 180 divisions, and at the points

I
1

!

)

I
1

where he chose to strike, his superiority in men and armor was not
18
, threefold but sixfold.
The Russian front from the NiemenRiver to the Carpathians totaled

f

a distance of seven hundred miles.

J

Soviet annies:

1

~rsh811

Along this front advanced the main

General Cherniskhovskyadvanced toward Koenigsberg ;

Rokossovsky along the north bank of the Vistula cutting off

40

East Prussia from Central Germany; Marshal Zhukov, south of the Vistula
against Pozan; Marshal Konev against Chenstokhov..Breslau; and General
19
Petrov in the area of the Carpathians against Novo Torg.
Figures released at the end of the war demonstrated the superiority
of the Russians, and the Axis Powers, in total manpower, over the other
Allied Powers.

Germany with a prewar population of eighty million, was

mobilizing 313 divisions, Japan was putting 120 in the field; Italy
. R
i B u 1gar i a el.g
. h teen. 20
seventy; Hu ngary twenty-.t h ree;
uman a seventeen;

three hundred, though their divisional strength was often little more
than regimental according to Allied statistics.

The United States

was secondo£ the Allies in the mobilization of men and women for
military service, and third among all the belligerent nations.

The

Soviet war effort was putting twenty-two million men and women into the
fight.

By

million.

th~

time of their defeat, ·the Germans had mobilized seventeen

The United States' peak mobilization for the military services

was fourteen million.
21
China six million.

The British Empire mobilized twelve million;

The

Atomic Bomb

The entry of the United States in World War II caused the
abandonment of all projects aimed at developing atomic energy as a source
of power, and gave added impetus to the efforts to build an atomic bomb. 22
The basic American military interests in the bomb were twofold:

"to

provide our armed forces with a weapon that would end the war and do it
be f ore our enemies

COll

.
ld use it against us, .. 23 as it was known
t h at the

S&

z
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Germans were also carrying on experiments involving the use of atomic
energy.
At the time of the Yalta Conference "the atomic bomb was still an

unknown quantity.,,24

In 1941, the question of atomic energy was first

brought to the attention of Secretary of War Henry Stimson's attention •

. At that time, he was appointed toa committee that was to report
directly to the President. -He was to report later that "as time went on
it became clear that the weapon [atomic bomb] would not be available in
time for use in the Ruropean Theater, and the war was successfully ended
i
'by the use of conventional means" in that theater •. Furthermore, he also
stated that,"the exact circumstances in which the weapon might be used
were unknown to any of us until the middle of 1945.,,25
Declaration on Liberated Europe
Signed at the Yalta Conference was a Declaration on Liberated
Europe, designed to cover situations in liberated Nazi occupied countries.
As it read, and was signed, it represented a. merging of "confl:l.cting
-

expectations of East and West,"

26

_ The three powers, Great Britain,

United States, Soviet Union, consulted with each other "in the common
interest of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated
iurope.,,27
The Declaration reaffirmed, the principles of the Atlantic Charter,
mainly;
the right of alI peop les to choose the form of government under
which they will live -the rest'oration of sovereign rights and selfgovernment to those peop1p. who have been forcibly deprived of them
by the aggressor nations. 28 .

42

The Far East was not discussed in relation to this Declaration.
However, clearly the expectation of the Western Allies was that they
vouldbe able to democratize Japan and Korea, and to

s~e

a new China

. pattern itself after their institutions.

As time was to prove, the expectations of the declaration came
into conflict, and the interpretations were many and varied.

To expect

the rest of the world to make itself over in the image of the United
States and Great Britain was a mistake of a twofold nature.

First, only

the United States and Great Britain truly knew what free elections and
governments responsible to the will of the people were.

Secondly, the

Soviet Union had no intention, at any time of allowing governments
unfriendly to her to be formed anywhere on her borders.

Stalin had

stated his position on this many times.
Soviet Attempts to Stay Out of the War
In 1939, MoscOw,
deciding that 8 workable alliance with Great Britain and France
was unobtainable, that Soviet security might better be served by
peace than by war and that noninvolvement in the war to come could
best be achieved by a 'deal' with Hitler,
. 29
signed a. treaty of nonaggression with Germany •
This treaty, si.gned on
Auguat 23, 1939, pledged the two parties to "refrain from any act of
force, any aggressive act, and any attack against each other undertaken
either singly or.in conjunction with any other power."

30

This treaty

also forbid the joining of any third power against each other, in any
way.
Early in 1941, relations with Germany were deteriorating to the
point that an invasion of Russia would take place in June of that year,

• • • •·•
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Moscow, never-the-1ess, continued her policy of caution so as not to
provoke a conflict with Japan.

Every means was being used to forestall

a combined·attack by Japan and Germany.

As a result of diplomatic

negotiations between Molotov and the Japanese Foreign Minister,
Yosuke Matsuoka, a five year neutrality pact with the Japanese Government was concluded in Moscow on April 13, 1941, which somewhat relieved
the tension in the Far East.
However, this treaty, unlike the Soviet treaty with Gennany, was
one of neutrality. rather than nonaggression and friendship, and lacked
f the usual clause concerning mutual consultation.

It had three main

points:
I. Both.Contracting Parties undertake to maintain peaceful
and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the
territorial integrity and inviolability of the other Contracting Party.
II. Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object
of hostilities on the part of one of several third Powers, the
other Contracting Party will observe neutrality throughout the
duration of the conflict.
.
III. The present pact comes into force from the day of its
ratification' by both Contracting Parties and remains valid for
five years. 31
If one of the parties wished to void this pact they were to give
notice after which the treaty would remain in effect for only one year
from the point of notice.

This fact would become important after the

Yalta Conference, especially to the Japanese, and would cause the Soviets
some concern in turn.
China
At the time of the Yalta Conference, China was suffering from
"-internal disunity, economic instability (including severe inflation),
32
lack of supplies and general war weariness,"
all of which impeded
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China's war efforts.

Internal disunity was one of the major factors

hindering China's war efforts, and from 1941 to 1944, their contribu-.
tians to the Allied war efforts were almost negligible.
There were three Chinas at this time j Kuomintang, ChiDa, Communist
China, and the Wang Ching-wei puppet government installed in Nanking on
March 30, 1940.

Kuomintang China, under Chiang Kai-shek, was weakened

by dissident elements and widespread popular discontent.
China's materials and popular strength was growing.

Communist

The puppet Chinese

Government was under the control of the Japanese, and the other two were
loot working together against Japan for the good of China as a whole.
The Kuomintang Government had set up a strong military cordon
around the Chinese Communists in northwest China and was spending a
majority of its energies with this policy of containment.

However,

President Roosevelt believed at that time, February, 1945, that General
Albert C.

Wede~eyer,

American commanding general in China, replacing

General Joseph Stilwell, and the new Ambassador, General Patrick J. Hurley,
were having more success than their predecessors, and had made progress
in bringing the Communists in the North together with the Kuomintang
Government.

He further believed that the fault lay more with the

Kuomintangandthe Chungking" Government than with the Communists.

33

The Communists had earlier declared that they were willing to
submerge their differences with the Central Government and place their
troops under the personal command of General Joseph Stilwell, American
chief of "staff and field commander under Chiang Kai-shek, if Chiang
Kai-shek, also the military head of Nationalist Chinese fox:ces, would do
the same for all Nationalist troops in China. 34

45
Territory controlled by the Chinese Communists, covered large
portions of North China and disconnected areas to the east and south.,
!
\~he Communists claimed to have 500~OOO regular troops and two million
1
1

militia. 35

In late 1944, on paper, the Nationalist army cOClsisted of

324 divisions, sixty odd brigades and

eighty~nine

so-called guerilla

units of about two thousand men each •. This was misleading as to
Hatton_list China's strength as the average strength per division, was
less than five thousand men.

The troops were unpaid, unfed, and were

suffering from sickness and malnutrition.
inadequate, and unserviceable.

Their equipment was old,

Their training was almost nonexistent

and the officers were inadequate for the task they faced.

They had no

artillery, transportation, medical supplies,or other essentials. 36
In Anglo-American grand strategy, the war against Germany came
first.

Second came the great Utriphibious" movement aeros5the Pacific

toward the Japanese island empire.. The
poor third.

37

C~Burma-India

theater was a

Actually, the formation of this strategy was ,already

agreed upon before Pearl Harbor, in May, 1941.

The United States Joint

Army and Navy Basic WarP1an stated:

i
f
i

f'

I
r

Since Germany.is the predominant member of the Axis powers,
the Atlantic and European war is considered to be the decisive
theater. The principal United Statesmi1itaryeffort will be
exerted in that theater, and operations of United States forces
'in. other theaters will ~e conducted insu~h a manner as to
facilitate that effort. 8 , .
. ,
Whether this decision would have been the same had it been reached after
the Pearl Harbor attack may be questioned.

However, as it was,

strategically,the object of American policy in the Far East was "to
keep China in the war, and

to strengthen her that she might exact a
.
39
constantly growing price from the Japanese invader."
80
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As the situation developed, the reinforcement of China depended on
the maintenance of a line of supply through Burma, if necessary by air,
if possible by land.

As the war developed, the United States was forced

to send what aid possible over the IIBurma Hump" by air from India to
China.

The major portion of supplies sent over the "Hump" was given to

the maintaining of a considerable air .force there of some six hundred
planes..

It

wa~

expected that canmand of the air could be maintained in

China, and bases built from which the mainland of Japan could be bombed.
General Stilwell had argued that as soon as the Japanese felt the effect
i
: of attacks from bases in China, they would stage an attack to take the
bases from us, and that the Chinese troops available for protection
.
40
would not be competent ~o prevent it.
This proved to be the situation as the summer and autumn of 1944,

,
f

brought further Japanese advances in China.

As the year closed, it

appeared that China was desperately close to defeat, closer than at any
other

t~e

during the long years of the Japanese invasion andoecupation.

The Japanese offensive was aimed at kJ:locking out both China, and the
increasing American air power in that country.

By the end of the year

it looked as if this offensive was a success, as the American air bases
in East China. had been cut off from their source of supply in the west,
and in India.
a8

Moreover, a number of Ameriean bases had to be abandoned.

the Japanese advanced, and the protective Chinese armies in the east

were now disorganized unit..

41

The United States had losta1l its

bases east of Kunming, and had nothing to show for all the effort and
expense involved up to that time.

42

A loosely organized country, with little or no industry in most
parts, China had managed to hold out so far.
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time, China had yielded territory where necessary to save its armies. 43
There simply were no arterial centers which Japan could press and force
China to submit.

During the greater part of the war, occupied China,

exclusive of Manchuria, comprised about 500,000 square miles, which
stretched across North China and down the coast, and included most of
China's larger cities.

China had moved its capital whenever necessary,

and was now operating from Chungking •.
Nationalist China had seldom been in any condition to take the
offensive.

Until the Chinese forces trained in India by Americans

were transported back over the mountains, providing the only really
dependable, well-equipped fighting force in China, Chiang Kai-shek's
forces were able to do little

as

the Japanese almost cut China in half.

The Communist Chinese in the north, mainly with guerilla actiOll,were
having much more success, and were giving the Japanese considerable
trouble.
China had been almost a negligible factor to .this time.

The

Nationalists hated the Communists to the extent that often they did
nothing but watch them, the Nationalists fearing the Communists would
gain advantages in the government.

The result was .that they often

appeared to be engaged in an undeclared civil war continuing at the same
time, with neither appearing to care much about the war against Japan. 44.
In Stilwell' 8

opinion~

fight seriously.

Chiang Kai-shek would not make an effort to

He wanted to ufinish' the war coasting, with a big

supply of materials, so as to perpetuate his regime.

He had blocked us

for three years and will continue to do so," wrote Stilwell, just before.
,
d 45
h e was re I J.eve.

48
However, by February, 1945, General George Marshall, United States
Chief of Staff, was able to picture the Chinese situation as being
I
\

c\~siderably
'i

changed for the better as time passed.

He was able to point

out that well-trained Chinese troops were now in China, having been
transferred there from Burma.

Secondly, the opening of the Burma Road

had meant that artillery from the Allies for the Chinese army, had been
able to go through.

Thirdly, if operations in Burma continued to go

well, additional trained~ Chinese troops could move back to China, and
it was hoped that an effective reinforced Chinese corps would soon be
.
46
in existence.
Ultimately, the role China had been scheduled to play - i.e., to
maintain its territory as a strategic outpost, as the base from which
to bomb Japan, and as the battlefield on which the Allies supposed the
final confronting and defeat of the Japanese force would come - was
discovered to be unnecessary, as the naval war in the Pacific was now
going well.
In the conversations at Yalta, Prime Minister Churchill had
inquired of President Roosevelt, lIif he had not been somewhat disappointed
at the results accomplished by the Chinese?"

Presi~ent

Roosevelt replied

that, "three generations of education and training would be required
47
before China could become a serious factor. II .
If the armies and government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. -had
been finally defeated, Japan would have been left free to exploit the
tremendous resources of China without harassment.

It might have made

it. possible. when the United States and Britain had finished the wario
Europe, and assaulted the Japanese home islands, for the government to
flee to China and continue the war on a great and rich land mass. 48

To

49
prevent this, it was determined in 1943, that by means of a projected
Allied attack across the India-Burma frontier, it would be possible to
drive the Japanese from Northern Burma and achieve the objective of
reopening surface communications with China.
The preliminaries to this operation began in October, 1943, just
prior to the Conference of Cair9 and Tehran.

By May of 1944, the Allied

forces under General Stilwell
had fought their way into the airfield at
,
'

Myitkyina, the key to Northern Burma.

Patrols of Stilwell's forces and

summer of 1944, establishing limited control over Northern Burma for the
first time since the, Japanese had assumed control.
In the fall of 1944, it became obvious that the mission of
reestablishing communications with China, via Burma, could be accomplished,
and as the future objectives of the forces in Southwest Asia and China
were to grow continually more divergent, it appeared advisable to make
a'

clear division of the two theaters.

4'9

Accordingly, the theater area

of China-Burma-India was separated into the India-Burma, and the China
'theaters.

Lieutenant General Daniel Sultan, of' the British Army, was

given cOImJl8nd of the India-Burma Theater, and Major General
Albert

Wed~yer,

United States Army, was appointed commander of United

States forces in China, succeeding General Stilwell as Chiang Kai-shek'.
Chief of Staff.
The Burma campaign continued with intensity during the monsoon
season of 1944.

Chinese, American and British troops were disposed

along the Chindwin River, north of Kalewa and from the upper Irrawaddy
to Lungllng.

It was planned to drive southward through Central Burma to

so
Mandalay, and Admiral Louis Mountbatten, British commander, was pre.

paring operations to seize Rangoon amphibiously from the south.

50'

At the close of the monsoon season, Chinese, American and British
troops

~nder

the immediate command of General Sultan

advan~ed

southward

astride the Irawaddy River, captured Shwegu in early November,and by

December had cleared the projected tract of the supply road to Bhamo.
Sultan pressed on and made junction with the Yunnan armies on the old
Burma Road on January 20,' 1945.

The road from Ledo, in the Indian

proviqce of Assam, into North Burma and Kunming, China, known as ·the
Stilwell Road, was now clear.

en'January 28, 1945, a convoy of

American trucks and materials from India crossed the Burma-China
frontier. 5l

Communications reached the Yalta Confe~ence that land

communications had been
was rough,

littl~

~pened

through North Burma."Though the road

better than a path in part, motor. vehicles and guns

could now be delivered by that road to China.

I
I

I
i

I
!
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The Allied Adv4nce in the Pacific
. General Douglas MacArthur, of the United States, was in command
of operations in the South Pacific.

The advance across the Central

Pacific was placed under the command of Admiral Chester Nimitz, also of
the United States.

It was General MacArthur's intention to proceed by a

series of envelopments up the coast of New Guinea and into the Philippines.'
.. '
52
The United States now enjoyed 'superiority both on the sea and in the air.
Macarthur was therefore able to land his troops where the Japanese were
weakest, and confine their stronger forces in pockets, from which.
because of incredibly difficult
could never break out.

terrai~and

air and sea: superiority, they

"The enemy garrisons which have been by passed in

the Solomons and New Guinea represent no menace to current or -future
operations.

Their capacity for organized offensive had passed,"

. MacArthur reported to General Marshall as he prepared to invade the
Philippines.

53

At the time of the Yalta Conference, some 200,000 to

300,000 Japanese troops had been left trapped in these bypassed positions

and a comparable number could be considered as cut off in Malaya, the
54
Netherlands, East Indies, and even Burma.,
The conquest of the north coast of New Guinea was completed by
August, 1944.

This victory was the

journey to the Philippines.

f~rst

leg on MacArthur's long return

On October 20, 1944, he splashed ashore at

.
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Leyte- I -s I an d in t he sout hern Ph·l
1. ipp1.nes.

By December 26 , t he batt I e

of Leyte had ended, except for mopping up operations. 'During the later
stages of that battle, a land force was-sent into Southern Mindoro, an
island off the coast of Luzon.

Within twenty;"four hours of this land-

ing, American planes and PT boats were operating off the southern coast
of Luzon.

In the first week of January, 1945, a new American assult

force gathered east of Leyte, and proceeded to invade Luzon by effecting
a landing in Lingayen Gulf, its classic point of greatestvulnerabiltty.
Fighting continued throughout the month', with numerous other landings
being made on Luzon, until February 4, the 11th Airborne Division was
able to enter the northeast portion of Manila, the largest-and most
important city in the Phi1ippines. 56
Success crowned the Americ-an attacks 'on Japanese island strongholds in the Pacific.

In May and August, of 1943, Attu and Kiska in

the Aleutians were easily retaken.

In November, 1943, Tarawa and Makin,

both in the Gilbert Islands, came under Allied domination.

InJanuary

and February, 1944. the key outposts of the Marshall group succumbed.

~.
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After bitter resistance, the major islands of the Marianas fell in July
and August, 1944.

With these islands now available, the first sustained

air attacks on Japan were launched by bombers in November, 1944.
The gigantic naval battle of Leyte Gulf was concluded October 26, 1944,
after three days of battle.

By

these battles,

8S

Leyte Gulf encompassed

several actions, it was apparent that the Third and Seventh United States
57
fleets had virtually eliminated Japan 8S a sea power.
In this series
of battles the Japanese lost virtually their entire fleet.
Future Operations
The choice of future operations, as of February, 1945, was now
dependent on the results of present operations in Luzon and on the date
of the termination of the war in Europe, from the Allied standpoint. 58
During the three years of fighting that took place in the
southwest Pacific area, eight Japanese armies had been either defeated
or rendered powerless to conduct more than delaying actions. ,The advances
of the forces under MacArthur, and control of the sea by Admiral Nimitz,
had helplessly cut off large numbers of troops that constituted no
threat to an Allied drive toward Japan.
lCnowingthatinvasion was not long off, Japan began to husband
her now waning resources for the final battle.
any help from the southwest Pacific.

But she would not receive

General MacArthur stated that these

enemy troops, "were unable to conduct an orderly retreat. in classic
fashion, to fall .backon inner perimeters with forces intact for a last
defense of Japan's· main islands."
war.

It was a situation unique in modern

MacArthur stated, "never had such large numbers of troops been so

outnumbered, separated from each other, and left tactically impotent to

take an active part in the final battle for their homeland.,,59
President Roosevelt stated at the Yalta Conference that he hoped
it would not be necessary actually to invade the Japanese island, and
would do so only if absolutely necessary.
to plan for the invasion of the Japanese

However, the military continued
~islands,

would it be necessary.

The Japanese had 4,000,000 men in their a·rmyand he hoped by intensive
bombing to be able to destroy Japan and its army and thus save American
lives.

60
However, tentative plans were being prepared aiming at an attack

on Kyushu in September of 1945. and an invasion of the Tokyo Plain on the
main island of Honshu in December of 1945.

The actual dates of these

opera·tions were dependent on the defeat of Germany, as they involved the
use of forces which would have to be redeployed from Europe after the
Nazi defeat.

The length of time required for redeployment varied

between four and six months, depending on whether the t400PS involved
had actually been committed in Europe.

It was intended to use this

interval to obtain positions. designed to assist in the final defeat of
·61
Japan,
as subsequently was done.

Secretary of War Stimson described the Army's attitude on the
Japanese war, even

8S

late as July, 1945, in the following manner:.

••• there was a very strong possibility that the Japanese
Government might determine upon resistance to the end, in all
areas of the Far East under its control. In such an event,
the Allies would be faced with the enormous task of destroYing
an armed force of five million men 'and five thousand suicide
aircraft, belonging to a race which had already amply demonstrated its ability to fight literally to the death •••• The total
United States military and naval forces involved in this· grand
design [i.e •• invasion of the main islands] was of the order of
5,000,000 men ••• we estimated that if we should be forced to carry
this plan to its conclusion, the major fighting would not. end
until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. I was informed
that such operations might be expected to cost over a million

,
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c8sualities, to American forces alone. Additional large losses
might be expected among our allies •••• 62
Of almost equal concern to the military staffs were the Japanese troops
!

.

; in Manchuria.
Described as the cream of the Japanese Army, this selfcontained force, with its own autonomous command and industrial
base, was believed capable of prolonging the war even after the
islands of Japan had been subdued. 63
This was the situation on the eve of the Yalta Conference o

The

heads of the three Great Powers would meet February 4-11, 1945, at
Yalta, in the Crimea, to solidify final plans to bring about the defeat
of Germany, and to attempt to settle the problems that would come with
their final surrender o
The Far East problems were not discussed in any depth or at any
length, but before the conference ended, President Roosevelt and
Marshal Stalin would agree on the conditions for the entry of the Soviet
Union into the war against Japan.
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CHAPTER III
THE FAR EAST
AGREEMENTS
American Tradition and Policy
American interests in the Far East date from the eighteenth
(century.

Until World War II, American interests, unlike those of

Russia and Japan, were in large measure economic.

"The dream of four

hundred million customers fired American imagination," even though this
dream had persistently refused to come true.

1

The United States' policy toward China had been clearly stated on
numerous occasions since 1900.

The principles of "equal commercial

opportunity" and, 'the maintenance of the territorial and administrative
integrity of political independence of China" had guided American

.
2
po 1icy toward China for more than half a century.
The basic American
objectives in the Far East had been defined by Secretary of State
John Hay in the Open Door Notes of 1899 and 1900-'to preserve the
commercial Open Door, and the territorial integrity of China.

It was at

this time also that President Theodore Roosevelt and Hay came to the
conclusion that the American people would neither fight for the Open
Door and the territorial integrity of China, nor support a Far East
·3

policy based on the use of force.

Noninterference in internal Chinese

affairs thus came to be accepted 8satraditiona1 policy of the United
States.

1

•

if
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In 1922. the United States had succeeded in having the principles
of its policy toward China written into the Nine Power
Washington 'Conference, signed February 6, 1922.

~reaty,

at the,

This treaty proved to

be the only formal and specific affirmation of the Open Door ever agreed
to by the major powers, except for Russia and Germany, who did not take
part in the Washington Conference.
This treaty bound each power:

4

I. To respect the sovereignty, the independence,andthe
territorial and administrative integrity of Chins;
II. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an
effective and stable government;
III. To use their influence for the purpose of effectively
establishing and maintaining the principles of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
IV. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in
China in order to seek special rights or privileges which
would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly
States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security
of such States. 5
.
The United States clearly sympathized with the efforts of the
Chinese people to achieve those political institutions which would best

And in 1927, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg reaffirmed this aspect·
of American policy when he stated:
The United States had always desired the unity, the
independence and prosperity of the Chinese nation ••••The
Government of the United States has watched with sympathetic
interest the nationalistic awakening of China and welcomes
every advance made by the Chinese people toward recognizing
their system of government ••••The Government of the United
States had endeavored in every way to maintain an attitude of
the most careful and strict neutrality as among the several
'factions ~hat have disputed with one another for control of
China ••• ~
.
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The United States departed from the policy of "strict neutrality
among the several factions·
Ii

I
~

disp~ting

for control of Chins" in 192B, by

~ecognizing the Nationalist Government, on July 25, under the leader-

ship of Chiang Kai-shek, as it appeared that the situation there had
somewhat stabilized.
Secretary Kellogg's statement on the recognition of Nationalist
China once again confirmed the now traditional policy of the United
States with regard to China:
••• ~we do not believe in interference in their internal
affairs, we ask of them only that which we look for from every
nation with which we maintain friendly intercourse, specifically, proper and adequate protection of American citizens,
their property~ and their lawful rights, and in general, treatment in noway discriminatory as compared with the treatment
accorded to the interests of nationals of any other country.B.
Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, in February, 1932, firmly
stated that American policy with regard to China was based on the Nine
Power Treaty, of February, 1922.

In a letter to Senator William Borah,

of Idaho,chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he stated:
/

This treaty thus represents a earefullydeveloped and matured
international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure to
all of the contracting parties their rights and interests in
and with regard to China, and on the other hand, to assure to
people of China the fullest opportunity to develop without
molestation their sovereignty and independence according to
the modern and enlightened standards believed to maintain
among the peoples of this earth. 9
During the years of the undeclared war between China and Japan,
the United States, on numerous occasions, protested against the
violation of its rights in China by Japan.

But these all came to no

avail, and the United States was not willing, following the traditional
policy established during the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, at any
time to use force to see that Americans were assured of their rights.
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This policy of non-involvement in the Far East was clearly evident
with the sinking of the American gunboat Pansy, which was cruising on'
the Yangtze River when it was bombed and sunk with the loss of two lives
and thirty wounded, on December 12,1937,

The refusal of the United

States to do anything but protest to the Japanese government, and their
obvious unwillingness to become involved on the continent, was clearly
evident with this incident.
However, when the situation in China reached the point'where the
Chinese were in danger of succumbing to the Japanese, the decision was
/
'made to send lend-lease aid to China. The President, on May 6, 1939') in
accordance with the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act, declared the
10
defense of China to be vital to the defense of the United States.
This was to be the extent of United States involvement in China
to this time, even though there were further incidents after the Panay
Incident - mistreatment of American citizens and American property ·until

~uly,

when a American military mission was established in China,

and American fliers, known as Chennault's Flying tigers, were beginning
to fight the Japanese in China.

Though the United States would eventu-

ally go to war with Japan because they insisted on'maintaining their
policies, they would not take the first step and would become fully
involved militarily only after they were attacked at Pearl Harbor, on
December 7, 1941.
By the end of September, 1941, the Chinese Government was allowed

to hire one hundred volunteer American pilots and 181 American ground
pers.onnel to man and service one hundred P-40 airplanes provided under
lend-lease. l1

These were the beginning of attempts by the United States

Government to keep China in the war.

The extension of a half-billion
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dollar credit in 1942, the sending of supplies by air over the treacherous
Burma Hump, and the dispatch of military advisers to Chungking were all
manifestations of American good will.
Comparatively speaking, these were little more than manifestations
. 12
of good will.

The deeision had already been made by the Allied leaders

to concentrate on the war in Europe before turning full attention to the
Pacific, and the amount of supplies sent to China were totally inadequate
for China to present much of a military threat to Japan.

With the

situation in China becoming increasingly worse, and the difficulty,
after the closirig of the ground route to China from Burma, the ports
having been sealed off prior to this, in getting supplies into China, it
was not possible to strengthen and supply the Chinese armies adequately.
And the decision had been made that the majority of the supplies that
were flown in would go to maintaining an air foree in China.
In January, 1943, though, as a juridical declaration of independence for China, a pact was signed between the United States and China
that went far tawardputting her on an equal footing with the other
United Nations.

On January ll,thi. pact officially renounced American

extra-territorial rights in China.

l3

A further move on the part of the

United States to equate China with other powers was the removal of· long
standing discriminations against both Chinese immigrations, and the
right of Chinese to become citizens of the United States, with the
.
.
14
passage of an act to this effect on December 17, 1943. .
Throughout the war., President Roosevelt and his advisers were
maturing plans to strengthen China after the war and establish her as a
great power, even though Roosevelt realized that China would not be in a.
position to rightfully assume her place as a world power for some time. 1S
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IF was further realized that China would have to stabilize internally,
and establish a good working relationship with the Soviet Union.
I

ii
I!

\!

This-knowledge did not. deter President Roosevelt though, and steps

I

were taken whenever possible to demonstrate the intentions of the United
States to treat China as an equal among the major powers, and to see, as
best she could, that the other countries also did.

The United States in-

sisted that China be included as a signatory, together with the United
States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, of the Declaration of the
Four Powers on general security, signed in Moscow, on October 30, 1943.
".

This was done over the violent objections of the Soviet Union.

16

The President won Churchill's and Stalin's seeming approval 17 at
Cairo (November 22-26, 1943), and Tehran (November 28-December 1, 1943),
of the Cairo Declaration, issued on December 1, 1943.
of the Anglo-American

pol~cy

This definition

in the statement, which strongly influenced

the Department of State's subsequent work on the Far East peace, declared:
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and
punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is
their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in
the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning
of the firstWor~d War in 1914, and that all the territories
Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa,
and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.
Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which
she has taken by violence and greed. 18
China participated asa Great Power in the Dumbarton Oaks meetings
in the summer and fall of 1944, and was one of the sponsoring
Powers of the United Nations Conference of International Organization,
which met at San Francisco in April, 1945, and which formulated the
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Charter of the United Nations.

The Charter granted China a permanent

seat on the Security Council as one of the major powers of the world

~

all at the· insistence of the United States.
It is necessary to note at this point that neither Stalin or
Churchill shared Roosevelt's views on China, though he was able to
persuade them to go along with his plans.

Churchill·was to refer to

them as "the Great American Illusion," and stated in August of 1944:
That China is one of the world's four Great Powers is an
absolute farce. I have told the President I would be reasonably polite about this American obsession, but I cannot agree
that we should take a positive attitude on the matter ••••
while not opposing the President's wish, I should object very
much if we adopted other than a perfectly negative line, 19
leaving him [Chiang] to do the needful with the Russians.
The Yalta" Conference Briefing Book policy papers, prepared by the
State Department, contained statements that the United States desired a

,

"strong, stable and unified China with a government representative of
the wishes of the Chinese people,". and "the development of an integrated
and well-balanced Chinese economy and a fuller flaw of trade between China
and other countries."

20

The policy statement continued with the

recommendation that the United States "assume the leadership in assisting China to develop a strong, stable and unified government in order

I
I
~:

that she may become the principal stabilizing factor in the Far East,"
as "an unstable, divided and reactionary China would make stability and.
progress in the Far East impossible."

21

However, the State Department

also regarded "Sino-Soviet cooperation as a sine qua non of peace and

,

mistrust between China and the Soviet Union and in bringing about

r

close and friendly relations between them."

security in the Far East," and sought to "aid in removing the existing

And, it was stated, the

II
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United States would,
interpose no objection to arrangements voluntarily made by China
and th~ Soviet Union to facilitate the passage of Soviet trade
through Manchuria, includin the possible designation by the Chinese
Government of a free port. 2

2

J

Of significance is the following statement, included in the State
Department Briefing Book.

This belief would undoubtedly influence the

United States in refusing to interject itself into the Sino-Soviet
negotiations that would take place later that year.
We believe that China's territorial integrity should be
respected, including her claim to sovereign rights over
such outlaying territories as Tibet and Outer Mongolia. We
would not oppose, however, any agreement respecting those two
territories reached by process of amicable negotiation between
China and other interested governments. We hope that the
Chinese government will meet the aspirations of the native
peoples of such territories for local autonomy.23
These recommendations are of the utmost importance in understanding why' the United States would be able to make the Far East Agreement
with the Soviet Union.

And why these were not in conflict with tradi-

tional United States policy tOward China.
Japanese Strength and the Need for the Soviet Union
By February, 1945, the American and British military organizations.

were fairly certain that if need be they could defeat Japan without
Soviet assistance.

However, they were looking ahead and there was little

question but that it might be necessary to fight two extremely hard and
costly military campaigns:
islands; and, (2)

(1)

the invasion of the Japanese home

a campaign against large Japanese armies on the main-

land of Asia.
The amphibious operations of the spring, summer and autumn of 1944,
carried Allied Forces such great distances across the Pacific that in

r'~
111
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February, 1945, they were enabled to begin the assault upon the inner
defenses of the Japanese Empire itself.
General Marshall stated at the Far East hearings, to the Joint
Committee on Military Situations in the Far East in 1951, that:
The Japanese Kwantung army would put up a strong fight in
Manchuria and probably in Korea ••• that the American troops
were having a terrific fight in every island in the Pacific and
were having to exterminatesll the Japanese defenders; that the
Chiefs of Staff were then considering the landing in Japan,
where there were supposed to be two and a half million Japanese
troops; and that the United States seemed confronted with the
necessity of landing three army corps in three dtfferent places
with the anticipation of very heavy casua1ties. 24
The fight which the Japanese were making to hold the Pacific
islands was leaving its impression also on the American commander who
was to be in charge of the invasion of the Japanese home islands,
Genera 1 Douglas MacArthur.

At the cone lusion of the Japanese war, and

at the time of the surrender, he said ,. "nearly everywhere Japanese
soldiers had refused to give up until killed; the usual laws of war had
not been

complie~ wlth~

deadly traps had frequently been set."

25

January 22, 1945, prior to the Yalta Conference, the United States
Chiefs of Staff had prepared a memorandum for the President stating their
plan of operations for the defeat of Japan.

The agreed over-all objec- .

tives in the war were expressed as follows:
To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:
1. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength;
2. Invading and seizing objectives in the" indus"trial heart
of Japan.
The United States Chief of Staff adopted the following as a basis
for planning in the war against Japan.
main effort in the Pacific was to be:

The concept of operations for the
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a. Following the Okinawa operation, to seize additional
positions to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of
Japan in order to create a situation favorable to:
b. An assault of Kyushu for the purposes of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major
enemy forces and further intensifying the blockage and air
bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to:
c. A decisive invasio26ofthe industrial heart of Japan
through the Tokyo pIa in.
'
Plans were definitely being formulated to implement the intensified
sea and air blockade by November 1, 1945, at which time the southern
island of Kyushu was to be invaded, followed in turn by an invasion of
/the main island of Honshu, the Tokyo Plain referred to in the plan of
operations, in the spring of 1946.

27

A report submitted to President

Roosevelt on February 9, the fifth day of the conference, stated that
the Chiefs of Staff "recormnend that the planning date for the end of the
war against Japan should be set at eighteen months after the defeat of
Getmany.,,28
The total United States military and naval forces involved in
these plans were of the order of 5,000,000 men; if all those indirectly
"29

concerned were included, it was larger still.
The plans provided for a

three~pronged

by the United States Sixth Anny.

assault of southern Kyushu

The second phase of the Japanese

invasion, to be carried out in the early spring of 1946, involved the
Eighth and Tenth Armies.

They were to assault the Tokyo Plain of

eastern Honshu.

These two veteran Pacific armies were to be followed
30
ashore by armies redeployed from Europe.
July, 1945," intelligence reports of the United States War

Department General Staff estimated Japanese military strength as follows:
in the home islands, slightly under 2,000,000; in Korea, Manchuria,
China proper, and Formosa, slightly over 2,000,000; in French Iod"o-China,
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Thailand, and Burma, over 200,000; in the East Indies area, including
the Philippines, over
100,000.

sao,ooo;

in the by-passed Pacific islands, over,

The total strength of the Japanese army was estimated at about

5,000,000 men.
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There could not have been any fewer available troops

in February, at the time of the Yalta Conference.
Secretary of War Stimson believed that,
there was 8S yet no indication of any weakening in the Japanese
determinination to fight rather than accept unconditional
surrender. If she should persist3~n her fight to the end, she
had still a great military force.
As early as the Quebec Conferenee of August 11-24, 1943, it was
recognized that Russia's aid in the Pacific war would be invaluable.
Harry Hopkins, special aide to the P.resident, had with him a document
headed "Russia's Position," whiehwas described as a "very high level
United States military strategic estimate," but not otherwise identified.

It eontainedthe following statements:

••• the most important factor the United States has to
consider in relation to Russia is the prosecution of the war in
the Paeifie. With Russia as an ally in the war against Japan,
the war can be terminated in less time and at less expense of
life and resources than if the reverse were the case. Should
the war in the Pacific have to be carried on with an unfriendly
or a negative attitude on the part of Russia, the difficulties
will be immeasurably increased and operations might beeome
abortive. 33
This opinion by military leaders had not changed by the time of
the Yalta Conference, and it must be remembered that in all considerations of Far Eastern matters at the conferenee. Roosevelt's principal
concern was based on American war plans against Japan.
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The problem

would be, in dealing with the Soviet Union, to formulate plans
compatible with traditional American policy toward China.
State Edward Stetinius believed this strongly.

Secretary of

He said that,
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'~Military

considerations of the highest order dictated the President' 8

I

signing of the Far Eastern Agreement.

The military insisted the Soviet

I

~nion had to be brought into the Japanese war.,,35
I'

I

General MacArthur expressed his feelings on this subject to
Secretary of the Navy Forrestal as follows:
••• the help of the Chinese would be negligible. He
that we should secure the commitment of the
Russians to active and vigorous prosecution afa campaign
against the Japanese in Manchukuo of such proportions as to
pin down a very·large part of the Japanese army; that once
this campaign was engaged we should then launch an attack on
the horne islands •••• He felt that our strength should be
reserved for use in the Japanese mainland, on the plains of
Tokyo, and that this could not be done without the assurance
that the Japanese would be heavily engaged by the Russians in
Manchuria. He expressed doubt t1.lat the use of anything less
than sixty divisions by the Russians would be suffic.ient. 36
~MaeArthur]felt

('

There could be little doubt that this remained the belief of the
military, and that pressure was applied to Roosevelt consistent with
this desire.

The report prepared by the United States Joint Staff

planners, as of January 18, 1945, expressed this belief and included
the following:
b.

We should:

(1) State the basic principles
war against Japan as follows:

8S

to Russian entry into the

(a) Basic principles regarding our policy toward Russia's
entry into the war against Japan are:
i) we desire Russian entry at "the earliest possible
date consistent with her ability to engage in
offensive operations and are prepared to offer the
maximum support possible without prejudice tOOU1" main
effort against Japan.
ii). We consider that the mission of Russian Far Eastern
forces should be to conduct an all.;.out offensive against
Manchuria to contain Japanese forces and resources in
North China and·Manchuria that might otherwise be
employed in the defense of Japan; to conduct in conjunction with United States strategic air operations
.
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against Japan proper; and to interdict lines of communication between Japan and the mainland of Asia 37
The War Department had expressed similar beliefs, consistent with
those of the Chiefs of Staff.

I

Certainly reason enough for the United

States to try to gai~ all the.help possible.'

l

There were those who dissented from this view of the necessity of
having to have Russia's help against Japan.

They were sure that the air

and sea blockade and the air bombardments would soon force Japan to
8urrender,and that thereafter the Japanese armies in Asia would not
'j

;1oog be able to sustain their resistance.
and Admiral William

Le~hy

Fleet Admiral Earnest King

were the most outspoken in expression of this

belief, with Leahy stating that,

I
t

By the end of September, 1944, Japan was almost defeated
through a practically complete sea and air blockade. I believe
that a completely blockaded Japan would fall by its own weight. 38

At the Yalta Conference, Leahy said further,
I-was of the firm opinion that our war against Japan had
progressed to the point where their defeat was only a matter of
time and attrition. Therefore, we ~id not need Stalin's help
to defeat our enemy in the Pacific. 9
.
~ut

the Army and the Chiefs of Staff felt it essential to

the worst possibility.

40

p1a~

against

It was furthermore believed that the Japanese

troops on the mainland were considered to be "the cream of the Japanese
Army."

41

".

The atomic-bomb was a180 an unknown quantity at this time.

Even

though a bomber group was being trained to fly the mission of the
atomic bomb, it was . not .to be-tested until July 16, 1945. and the
military was certainly not "going to base their plans on a weapon of
which they had little knowledge. and even les8 comprehension.

l'
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Far East Negotiations and Agreements

Ii

I

\1

I

Moscow's pledge to join the Allies in the war a'gainst the Japanese

had already been made by Stalin to Ambassador Wo Averell Harriman, in
August ofl942. 42 and to Secretary of State Cordell Hull in Moscow, in
October, 1943,43

and reaffirmed by Stalin at the Tehran Conference.

Little more was said of this until October, 1944, when Ambassador
Harriman and General John Ro Deane, of the United States Military Mission
in the Soviet Union, had an opportunity to present and discuss ideas with
Stalin during Churchill's visit to Moscow at that time o
Harriman had presented a list of strategic objectives, drawn up by
General-Deane, and approved by United States Chiefs of Staff, of the

It

part they wished the Soviet Union to play in the war against Japan:
1) Securing the Tran-Siberian railroad and the Vladivostok
peninsula; 2) Setting up Soviet .andAmericanstrategic air
forces for operations against Japan from the Maritime
Provinces; 3) Securing the Pacific supply route in which
Russian participation would include: a) Making Petropavlovsk
available to the United States as a naval base o b) Neutralization by air of Southern Sakhalin and Hokkaido o c) Improvement
of port facilities of the Amur River. d) Military occupation
- of Southern Sakhalin. e) Soviet-American· naval cooperation as
the situation dictated. f) Defeat of the Japanese Army in
Manchuria. 44
General Deane reported that Stalin had concurred with these objectives,
except Stalin "thought the objectives we [the United States] envisioned
were limited too much to

Manchuria~"

Stalin then outlined far more

extensive operations, covering a larger area than was expected by the
United States Chiefs of Staff. 45
Stalin also infonned Harriman, at that time,that there would be
certain political considerations to be taken into account; however, he.
did not go into any detail during that meeting.
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considerations were not pursued further until December, when Harriman
!

again approached Stalin to find out what considerations he desired before
i

i,
~ntering
!:

the war against Japan.

In a report to President Roosevelt. on

December 15. 1944. Ambassador Harrima'n said', upon requesting a clarification of political questions, that Stalin had gone into the next room
and brought out.s map.
1) He said that the Kurile Islands and the lower Sakhalin
should be returned to Russia. He explained that the Japanese
now controlled the approaches to Vladivostok. that we consider
that the Russians were entitled to protection for their
communications to this important post and that 'all outlets to
the Pacific were now held or blocked by the enemy.'
2) He drew a line around the southern part of the Liaotung
Peninsula included Port Arthur and Dairen saying that the
Russians wished again to lease these ports and the surrounding
area.
-

3) Stalin said further that he wished to lease the ChineseEastern Railway. The line from Dairen to Harbin thence northward to Manchul! and east to Vladivostok. He specifically
reaffirmed that he did not intend to interfere with the sover·eignty of China in Manchuria.
4) He said the only consideration he had not mentioned at
Tehran was th~6recognition of the Outer-Mongolia as an in<;lependent identity.
. . '. '
.
It is clear from this that the Russian political conditions for entry
into the war aginst Japan were no surprise to President Roosevelt and
his advisers at Yalta.
No aspect of the Yalta negotiations

ref~ected

the dominance of

Roosevelt's personal diplomacy as clearly as did the Far Eastern
political discussions.

Most of the discussions were "top-level

eonferences" between Stalin and Roosevelt, and "most of the American
delegates present knew ~othing about these discussions, nor was the
question raised at the plenary sessions of the Big Three or at the
foreign ministers' meetings.,,47
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It was not, however, until the fifth day of the conference,
February 8, that Roosevelt and Stalin first discussed the Soviet
political conditions of their entry into the war against Japan, at the
conclusion of which Stalin suggested that before leaving Yalta these
conditions should be put down in writing, and they should contain the
statement, "the Heads of the Three Great Powers have agreed that these
claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after
Japan has been defeated.,,48

The President indicated that he thought

i this could be done.
I

Two days later, February 10, Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister,
gave to

Harri~n

a memo with the heading, "Draft of Marshal Stalin's

political conditions for Russia's entry in the war

~gainst

Japan o tt This

document read as follows:
The leaders of the Three Great Powers - the Soviet Union, the
United States of America, and Great Britain - have agreed that in
two or three months after Germany. has surrendered and the war
in Europe has ended the Soviet Union shall enter into the war
against Japan on the side of the Allies on the condition that:
'(1) The status quo. in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's
Republic) should be preserved;

(2) The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous
attack of Japan in 1904 should be restored viz:
(8) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the
islands adjacent to this part of Sakhalin should be
restored to the Soviet Union,
(b) Possession of Port Arthur and Dairen on lease should
be restored,

(c) The rights possessed by Russia before the RussoJapanese War to the operation of the Chinese-Eastern
Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad providing an
outlet to Dairen should be restored on the understanding
that China should continue to possess full sovereignty
in Manchuria;
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(3) The Kurile Islands should be handed over to the Soviet
Union.
The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims
of the Soviet Union should be unquestionably satisfied after Japan
has been defeated.
For its part the Soviet Union expresses its willingness to conclude
with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to
China with its armzd forces for the purpose of liberating China from
the Japanese Yoke. 9
In presenting these conditions Stalin relied ona very persuasive
argument, at least to the Americans:
Stalin said to Roosevelt that if his conditions were not met
it would be very difficult to explain to the Russian people why
they must go to war against Japan. He said that the Russian
people clearly understood that they must fight the German people
to defend the very existence of their homeland, but that they
could see no such threat from the Japanese. However, Stalin said,
if the required political conditions were met,then it would not
be difficult for him to explain to the Supreme Soviet and the
people just what was their stake in the Far Eastern war. 50
Clearly Stalin's memo and arguments contained
favorable to the Soviet Union.
~nd

fe~tures

The Soviet claims

~ere

that were highly
clearly outlined

justified by historical precedent. And it sought to obligate the

United States and Great Britain to support the Soviet claims unconditionally,with no mention.of China having to verify them.
When Roosevelt and Stalin had first discussed the agreements there
had seemed to be little doubt that the details could be worked out.
Stalin had explained what he wanted, the President discussed· these
matters briefly (Leahy was to say

l~ter

that .lfthe entire matter

consumed relatively very little time lf ),51 and made a remark to the effect
that he would like to have Chiang Kai-shek's views before dealing with
Mongolia, but that he was prepared to discuss the other points.

For,

though he had not discussed these exact matters with Chiang, Harriman
was to say later that Roosevelt had "already had certain general talks

'E.A
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with Chiang on some of the points involved, and knew of Chiang1s desire
to come to a permanent understanding with the Soviet Union."

52

The

President had also remarked that it was hard to discuss matters with the
Chinese as anything told them was known to the whole world in twentyfour hours.

Stalin was to continue on as if this did not really matter

and stated, as mentioned above, that he would like to have the agreements
in writing before the end of the "conference.
Two days later Molotov presented the Soviet draft of the agreements to Harriman.

Upon receiving the memo Harriman said at once that

be thought the President would object to three points in the draft:
1. That Port Arthur and Dairen should be international free
ports and not Soviet leaseholds.

2. That an alternative arrangement for the Manchurian railways should be specified - joint operations by a Chinese-Soviet
commission.
3. That he was sure the President would not wish to dispose
finally of these two matters in which China was interested
without the concurrence of the Generalissimo. 53
Harriman reported to the President and agreements were worked out concerning the three proposals.

The proposals were returned to Molotov the

same afternoon, February 10.
Later that afternoon Stalin met with Churchill.
him about Russian wishes in the Far East.

Churchill asked

Stalin said that the Soviet

Union wanted a naval base, such as Port Arthur.

Churchill knew the

Americans would prefer the ports to be under international control, but
the Russians wanted to have their interests safeguarded, and replied
"we [British] would welcome the appearance of Russian ships in the
Pacific, and were in favor of Russials losses in the Russo-Japanese War
b e i ng ma d e go.
ad .. 54

Kn owing t h
l ' s support and t hus
at he e
had l
hurchi

assured, Stalin told Roosevelt he was not satisfied and another compromise

sa

UllA&i.WRib .MtLJ &.£=£.IE1 tIIIJMIi!I_

. . . . . .1··

73
i

had to be worked out.

Further discussions between Stalin and President

R~osevelt decided that Dairen would be a free port under international
Ii
c~~tro1, bu"tthat Port Arthur was to be a Russian naval base, thus
requiring a lease.

Stalin, in turn, agreed that it would be more

appropriate for the Manchurian railways to be operated by a ChineseSoviet Commission.

And he also agreed on the need for getting Chiang's

concurrence with regard to the ports and railways.

Stalin also added

that he thought the Generalissimo should also give his concurrence to
the status quo in Outer-Mongolia.
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The only other discussions concerning the Far Eastern Agreement,
concerned how and when Chiang should be told of the accord.

It was

decided that the President would handle the matter, and that the subject
would be discussed with him whenever Stalin was ready to have this done.
56
They agreed that it would remain secret for the time being.
The secreey served several purposes:
1. The military one. If "Japan" had been sure that the Soviet
Union was going to enter the war, it might have closed the port
of Vladivostok. It ce~tainly would have hastened its counter
preparations to meet the Soviet attack in Manchuria and Korea.
However, had these things occurred, the Japanese retreat from
South China probably would have taken· place sooner and quicker.
Thus secrecy was a necessity and an advantage to the Soviet
Union, though not to China.
2. It postponed any possible·reaction ~o the agreement·by
either the Chinese government or the Chinese Communists.
3. It averted what almost certainly would
active debate within the United States about
agreement. Such a debate at that time might
unity of the Allies, not only in the Pacific

have been a very
the terms of th~
have impaired ~ge·
but in Europe.
.

President Roosevelt and Stalin decided that Stalin was to write
out the revisions of the agreements •. When he did, he added two
passages that had not been included in the first Soviet draft, and
apparently were not discussed.

In paragraph 2, part band c, the phrase

74
"the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded t
been added.

"

had

What exactly this phrase meant and how these interests were

to be safeguarded was apparently not discussed.

And the seemingly

contradictory phrases t "these claims 'of the' Soviet Union shall be
unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated," and, "the
agreements concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred
to above, will require CQncurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,"
were both included in the final draft.
It is doubtful that these were overlooked by anyone, and their
inclusion would seem to indicate that President Roosevelt was certain
that Chiang would concur, and thus fulfill the agreement and avoid any
problem with the Soviet Union.

As far as is known, no further discussions took place between the
three leaders, and the follOWing agreement was signed February 11, 1945,
by Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Churchill:

AGREEMENr REGARDING JAPAN
The leaders of t;he three Great Powers- the Soviet Union, the
United States of America and Great Britain - have agreed that in
two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in
Europe has terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into the war
against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:
1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (the Mongolian People's
Republic) shall be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous
. attack of Japan in 1904 shall be ~estored, viz.;
(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the
island adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet
. Union,
(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union
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in this port being safeguarded" and the lease of Port
Arthur 8S a navel base of the U.S.S.R. restored,
(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad, which provided an outlet to Dairen,
shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a
joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it ·being understood that
the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be
safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty
in Manchuria.
3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet
Union.
ltis understood that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia
and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will
take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from
Marshal Stalin.
The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these
claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled
after Japan has been defeated.
For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship
and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render
assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of
liberating China from the Japanese yoke. 58
This agreement was considered a separate accord, not as part of

the regular conference business.

It was thus not published with the

other papers, and was not made known to the public until a year later,
in February, 1946.
The Far East Agreement was primarily an agreement between the
Soviet Union and the United States, but Great ,Britain also signed, and
with little hesitation.

Prime Minister Churchill stated publicly that,

"neither I nor Eden took any part in the agreement, that it was
primarily an American matter.,,59

Yet Stettinius, Secretary of State at

yalta, later told that.; lithe Prime Minister said
document

he had signed the

in order that Great Britain might stay in the Far East," and

that he had. "declared that the whole position of the British Empire
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in the Far East might be at stake."
'ft~e
i'

Stettinius continued, stating that,

Prime Minister added that he had great faith in President Roosevelt
.

Jpd felt that he could rely completely on the President's judgment in
this matter.,,60

It would seem clear that the British had an interest in

this matter, and thus assumed equal responsibility with the United States.
·Influencing Factors and Considerations
Though there were some questions about granting the Soviet Union
most of what it desired, it should also be noted that this agreement also
limited them in what they could legally'do.

Roosevelt was less anxious

to deny Stalin's demands than to confine him to those he had mentioned.
President Roosevelt and the Chiefs of Staff wished to avoid

pr~mature

Russian entry into the war against Japan which might necessitate
,
.
61
American involvement on the mainland of Asia.
The President deemed it
important to secure Soviet entry in time to facilitate an American
invasion of the Japanese home islands, but, unlike the Chiefs of Staff,
his motivation was not exclusively military..

He apparently was fully.

aware of the danger that the Soviet Union might stand by until the United
States crushed Japan, at great cost in American lives, and then march
into Manchuria and northern China and establish "Peoples' Republics" in
Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

62

Secretary of State Dean Acheson testi-

fied to this same belief at the ·FarEast Hearings in 1951, stating,
"the grave danger was that they would really wait until the war was
.

over •••• and they would come in and do what they wished."

63

There was little question that the Soviet Union would be able to
establish themselves in a strong position in the Far East if they desired.
Certainly the provision regarding Outer-Mongolia, which had been a
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Chinese province until 1911, was not a concession as it had been
recognized as autonomous and an area of special interest to Russia since
that time, they being desirous to protect the long southern Siberian
border.

The Briefing Book Papers of the State Department had listed

among its recommendations, that "we believe China's territorial integrity
should be respected including her claim to sovereign rights over such
outlaying territories

as

Tibet and Outer-Mongo1ia. 1t

The Briefing Book

continued on to state that the State Department "would not oppose, however,
any agreement respecting those territories reached by a process of amicable negotiations between China and the other interested governments."
Because of these recommendations, and traditional American policy toward
China,. the agreements signed by President Roosevelt did not involve a
radical departure

fr~

what the United States had previously been trying

to accomplish with and for China.
While the other portions of the agreement, those not needing the
concurrence of Chiang, are more questionable, from the standpoint of the
security of the Soviet Union they were not unreasonable demands.

There

could be little question from any of the Allies that certain of these
concessions, as will be shown, were both vital and necessary to Soviet
aeeurity in this area.
The Soviets had made it clear that they would take Southern
Sakhalin unassisted by the United States.
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As the United States

military was agreeable, they would have undoubtedly been ina strong
position to demand acquisition of that territory, even if no agreement
had been made regarding it.
Sovereignty over Sakhalin had long been a 80urce of friction
between Russia and Japan.

In 1875, Japan had given up all claims to
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Sakhalin in exchange for full title to the Kurile Islands.

However, by

the treaty of Portsmouth, 1905, Japan was granted that portion of
Sakhalin south of the fifty degrees parallel o

Since that time Japan

had retained control of the southern portion, and for a time in the
twenties they had also occupied northern Sakhalin o

In March of 1944,

during the war, Russia and Japan had signed a treaty whereby Japanese
operation of its concessions, gained earlier, in northern Sakhalin
ceased,and Japanese fishing rights were restricted o
This last agreement, of 1944, did not help Sino-Soviet relationso
The Chinese were highly suspicious of this, as they took it to preclude
the possibility that the two powers had agreed not to go to war against
one another.

The United States was able to convince Chiang ,that this

was not the case, and that he must make an effort to get along with the
Soviet Union for the sake of the war effort. 65
It was noted in a State Department Briefing Book study, prepared.
prior to the Yalta Conference, ·that the Japanese character of the
population of Southern Sakhlin, its close economic integration with
Japan proper, and its unquestionable strategic value if Japan was
disarmed, would seem to be logical reasons for its. retention by Japan,
but that political factors might make such a solution impossibleo 66
Opposed to this view was the knowledge that it was also of
unquestioned strategic importance to the Soviet Union, Sakhalin lay
across the most direct airline to Shanghai and Singapore from
San Francisco via Dutch Hnrbor, Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok.

It

commands the approaches from the northeast to the Japan Sea, the Maritime
Provinces and the Soviet Union and Vladivostok.
With these factors in mind, the United States Department of
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Territorial Studies had made the following recommendations:
It is recommended that:
1) If the Soviet Union demands the retrocession of Karafuto
(Japanese Sakhalin) either (a) as a prerequisite to the Soviet
Union's entering the war against Japan, or (b) having entered
the war against Japan, as 8 recompense for the Soviet Union's
military contribution, the United States should endeavor to
satisfy the Soviet Union with the promise of United States
support at the peace table as a trust area and placed under the
authority of the projected international organization with
which would appoint the Soviet Union as administering authority.
2) If the Soviet Unianin circumstances outlined under 1) is
not satisfied with the proposed disposition in paragraph 1) or
if the Soviet Union makes demands for the retrocession without
having entered the war against Japan and without having offered
commitments in regard thereto the position of the United States
should depend upon circumstances existing at that time.

I

3) If the Soviet Union does not press demands for the retrocession of Japanese Karafuto, whether or not it enters the war.
against Japan, Japanese Karafuto should be reta.ined by Japan as
subject to the principles of disarmament to be applied to the
whole Japanese Empire and to the following provisions.
(a) the United Nations to be given facilities for civil aviation,
(b) La Perouse Strait should continue to be open to international
shipping at all times. 67
The Kurile Islands were treated in much the same manner by the
Department of Territorial. Studies.

The basic factors stated by this

Department included the following:

If

The Kurile Islands have strategic

importance to Japan, the Soviet Union and the United: States.
have appreciable economic value for Japan."

They also
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Russia had withdrawn from the Kuriles in 1875, in return for
Japan's withdrawal from Southern Sakhalin.

The Kuriles had been

considered to be a part of Japan proper and for administrative purposes
they had been

un~er

the Hokkaido prefecture.

The Kuriles were important

. strategically to both Japan and the Soviet Union, because they are a
connection chain between the two countries, and provide bases for both
defense and attack.' They are also important to the Soviet Union because

r
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they form

8

military screen to the ocean approach to the Okhotsk Sea

and the Maritime Provinces.
The islands could also prove important to the United States,
because they are near the Aleutians, and form part of the land-bridge
between Japan and Alaska, and are situated on the great circle route
between the United States and Japan.

However, it is highly improbable

that United States' claims of this nature were even considered, other
than perhaps as the possibility for the location of a naval base
somewhere in the islands.
The Department of Territorial Studiesoffeted several possible

1

I

solutions.
1.

Japan.

Japan has a strong claim to the southern group of the Kuriles
on the basis of nationality, self-determination, geographic
propinquity, economic need and historic possession.
Japan's claim to the central islands is based almost solely on
the grounds of possessiori. If, as may be assumed, the southern
and central islands should be demilitarized and subject for such
8 period as may appear adequate to a system of military inspection
by an international agency, their retention by Japan would appear
not to constitute a threat to other states.
To the northern group Japan's claim is based primarily on its
need to retain the fishing industry centered on those islands.
Ownership of the islands would be more, satisfactory to Japan
than a grant of fishing rights in territory under control of one
or more other powers. However, whatever disposition may be made
of the Kuriles J Japan might be permitted to continue to carryon
its fishing industry throughout the islands.
2.

f

They were as follows:

The Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has a substantial claim to the northern group,
Shimushu, Paramushiro and Araito, on the grounds of propinquity
and the consequent desirability of co~trolling these islands to
prevent them from becoming a military menace if in the possession
of a hostile power.
The Soviet government may ask not only for the northern islands
but also for the central and possibly even for the southern
group. Possession of the northern and central islands would give
the Soviet Union control of the passages into the Okhotsk Sea
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which are practically ice-free throughout the year. There would
seem, however, to be few factors which would justify a Soviet
claim to the Southern islands; this transfer to the Soviet
Union would create a situation which a future Japan would find
difficult to accept as a pennanent solution. It \liould deprive
Japan of islands which are historically and ethnically Japanese
and of waters which are valuable 'for fishing. If the southern
islands should be fortified they would be a continuing menace to
Japan.
The situation may be complicated by a Soviet demand that the
other United Nations agree to the transfer to the Soviet Union
of the northern group or of both the northern and central groups
as a quid pro quo for the Soviet Union's entering the war against
Japan.

3.

The United States.

The United States Navy wishes a base on the Kuriles which it
might use in case of naval operations in this area. It is not
clear whether such a base would be under international administration or whether it would be a Russian base open to American
ships and planes under designated conditions.

4.

I
i

The Projected International Orgainzation.

The northern group or both the northern and central groups
might be placed under the authority of the projected international
organization. This solution would almost completely remove the
military menace from their use by anyone power. It would also
make possible the establishment on the northern group, which is
of particular strategic importance, of an international base or
bases.
The international organization might designate as administering authority either an international mixed commission, or more
likely the Soviet Union. In the latter case, the Soviet Union
would doubtless establish the base or b~ses which, it is hoped
would be available for the use of the United States and other
United Nations.
It would appear undesirable for the United States to be sale
administrator of -these islands or to have sole possession of
bases, since it would place this country' in a distant and
da'ngerous position in case of future difficulties with the Soviet
Union.
If the northern and central groups should beplaced.under the
projected international organization rather than given to the
Soviet Union in full sovereignty it would be more likely that
Japan might obtain the right to continue to carryon the fishing
industry in and around the northern islands, and important factor
in Japan's economy; and, it would be easier to obtain general
American support· for the recommendations that Japan's Mandated
Islands and Marcus Islands be placed under the authority of the
projectg~ international organization and administered· by the United
States.
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It was noted, but reasons were not given, in The Conferences at
Malta and Yalta papers that these two studies, on the Kurile Islands'
and Southern Sakhalin, were not included in the Yalta Conference Brifing Papers that were taken to Yalta, and it is not known if President
Roosevelt saw these prior to leaving for the conference.

In any case,

the discussions did not go into this much detail, and there does not
seem to be any indication that there was any discussion concerning either
making separate agreements - such as dividing the island - or disignat,ing them to be placed under control of the projected international
,I

. organization.
The requests for, and discussions concerning, Port Arthur and
Dairen, and the railways, were viewed in a different light than were the
Kuri1e Islands and Southern Sakhalin.

The Soviet Union had formerly had

the rights of joint use of the railways and leases for the Ports Arthur
and Dairen, granted them in treatles with China in 1896, and 1898, until
turned over to the Japanese in the Treaty of Portsmouth, in 1905.

Stalin

had desired that the ports be leased directly to them, as had been done
prior to 1905, and that the rights possessed by them prior to the RussoJapanese War should be restored in their entirety.
R.ooseve1t was able to turn these demands aside partially, and a
compromise was worked out o

Harriman had observed in December of 1944, .

that "there is no doubt that with control of the railroad operations and
with the probability of Russian troops to protect the railroad, Soviet
70
influence will be great"
That this would probably prove true seemed
to.have little to do 'With the situation, and the agreements were signed o
The agreements did include the provision that Chiang was to concur

f

with these agreements, at Roosevelt's insistence, as Stalin had originally
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intended no such provision, in order that the agreements be fulfilled,
but again this would have seemed to do little to lessen the probablity
of Soviet influence in

I
I
-',

Manchuria~

When first discussing the ports, the President had suggested that
arrangements might be made in either one of two ways:

the ports might

be made into free ports with some form of international control, or

j

they might be leased outright to the Soviet Union.

Of the two, the

President was said to have preferred the free port arrangement.
it worked out, the President was able to gain a compromise on

f

I
!

I

I

whereby Stalin gained his wish with Port Arthur.
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As

D~iren,

The President mentioned

to Stalin at Tehran the possibility of a free port in the Far East, with
Dairen as a poSSibility,72 and was able to successfully follow this
idea through at Yalta.

However, there had been no mention of Port

Arthur at Tehran.
A Briefing Book had been prepared by the State Department concerning Korea, but no written agreements were signed regarding this area.
Discussions had been held prior to Yalta, at the Cairo Conference.

At

Yalta provisional understanding was reached whereby in due course Korea
would become a free and independent nation, but that in the meantime a
trusteeship would be established to prepare the people for self-

I
f

government.

It was also. decided that no foreign troops would be

stationed in Korea.
decided upon.
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But beyond that no final or definite plans were

Plans that perhaps could have prevented the Korean

conflict of the e.arly 1950' s.

The Cairo Declaration had contained the

statement, "The aforesaid three Great Powers. mindful of the enslavement
of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall
become free and independent." 74
plan.

But. this did not constitute any concrete
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State Department planners had recommended that an agreement could
and should be reached

~hereby

in due course, as in the Cairo Declaration,

Korea would become free and independent, and that an Jnterim international
administration or trusteeship should'be established until such time as
self-government would be possible.
I~ilitary

It was further stated that,

occupation in Korea by any single state alone, might have

far-reaching political consequences," and that,
with the completion of military operation in Korea, there
should be, so far as possible, Allied representation in the army
of occupation and in military government in Korea, and that such
military government should be organized on the principal of
centralized administration, with all of Korea .administered as a
single unit and not as separate zones o 75
No such agreements were reached, and the results were clearly evident
in the following years.
It was quite clear to some that President Roosevelt had been
prepared, prior to Yalta, and even before the Tehran Conference, to
agree to the legitimacy of most, if not all, of the Soviet claims in the
Far East, as they involved the restoration of possessions and privileges
76
taken by the Japanese from the" Russians in·the Russo-Japanese war o

Secretary of State Stettinius was told by Harry Hopkins in the days just
before the conference, tlthat good headway had already been made on the
question."

Stettinius was later to state that the "Far Eastern agree-

ment was carefully ~orked out and was not a snap decision made at Yaltao~·77
If this was true, and it certainly seemed to be, then the agreements need no explanation as to why "the President did not follow the
State Department "recommendations, or spend more time discussing the
agreements.

At the conference, Stettinius,upon hearing of the Far
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Eastern discussions, asked the President, Itwhether or not there was
anything in connection with this matter that he wished the State
Department· delegation to pursue."

The President answered that,

since it was primarily a military matter and since Mr. Harriman
had had many private discussions about it with him and with
representatives of the Soviet Union over a period of time, he
thought it had best remain on a purely military level,78
though it clearly was not intended to be only a military matter.

It was

also clear that Roosevelt intended to handle his own diplomacy, as had
often been the case in the past, and not involve the State Department.
President Roosevelt sought at the Yalta Conference to reduce the
general assurances which Stalin had previously given, to specific undertaking for the early entry of Russia in the Pacific war.

He further

wanted to limit Soviet expansion in the East and to gain Soviet support
for the Nationalist Government of China.
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With the signing of the

Far East Agreement, Roosevelt, and others, thought they had accomplished
these goals.

.

)

CHAPTER IV
SINO-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS
AND
AGREEMENTS
Sino-Soviet Opening Negotiations
On June 15, 1945, Ambassador Hurley informed Chiang of· the pro-

visions of the Yalta Agreement, pursuant to instructions from President
Harry Truman of June 9, 1945 (President Roosevelt having died April 12,
1945).

Following talks with Dr. T. V. Soong, Chinese Foreign Minister,

President Truman had cabled the following message to Ambassador Hurley:
You are aware of an agreement made in February that the
President would take measu"res to obtain from Chiang Kai-shek his
concurrence in the understanding of the Soviet Government stated
herewith following.
Stalin wishes· to discuss his proposals directly with Soong in
Moscow before the first of July.
1. Stalin has made to usa categorical statement that he will
do everything he can to promote unification under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.

2.

That this leadership would continue after the war.
...J

3. That he wants a unified stable China and wants China to
control all of Manchuria as a part of a United China.
4. That he has no territorial claims against China, and that
he will respect Chinese sovereignty in all areas his troops
enter to fight the Japanese.
5. That he will welcome representatives of the Generalissimo
to be with his troops in Manchuria in order to facilitate the
organization of Chinese administration in Manchuria.
6. That he agrees with America's "open door" policy in
China •

•
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7. That he agrees to a trusteeship for Korea under China, Great
Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States.
The conditions for Soviet participation in the war against Japan
are as· follows, and if these conditions are met, a Soviet attack
will be made in August:
[The Text of the Far East Agreements as signed at Yalta was included in the message at this point.]
Inform Chiang Kai-shek that President Roosevelt agreed to support
these Soviet claims upon the entry of Russia in the war against
Japan. I am also in agreement.
T. V. Soong has been given this information.
You are hereby directed to take up this matter with Chiang on June
fifteenth and to make every effort to obtain his approval. l
Chiang Kai-shek had long been desirous of formulating a series
of agreements with the Soviet Union to protect China's interests in
Manchuria and the border area,and to reach agreements concerning the
Chinese Communists.

He would now have the opportunity to negotiate

for these agreements.
Dr. T. V. Soong, who had learned of the Yalta Agreement from President Truman just prior to the time Chiang was informed in Chungking,
was sent to negotiate with the Soviet Government, after reviewing the
agreements with Chiang and Ambassador Hurley.

If the Soviet negotia-

tionswould follow the pattern ot" understandings as Truman cabled them
to Hurley, then China might have been at least partially optimistic on
the eve of the coming negotiations.

Soong's talks with Stalin and

Molotov had begun, with a definite knowledge of impending events, on
June 30, 1945.

It was known that in about a month, Soviet troops

might be

down through Mongolia and Manchuria into China and

com~ng

Korea, within easy reach of the Chinese Communist zone.
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Harry Hopkin, special aide to the President, talked with Stalin
in May, 1945, and had been told that Soviet armies would be in a sufficient state of preparedness and in position by August 8, 1945, to move
against the Japanese.

However, as to the actual date of operations

Stalin felt that would depend on the execution of the agreement made
at Yalta concerning Soviet desires.

Stalin said it was necessary to

have these agreements in order to justify entry into the Pacific war. 2
It was also known that Stalin would be meeting with Truman and
Churchill in the near future and would be formulating final plans for
their entrance into the Pacific War.
At the beginning of the negotiations Stalin, without scruple,
demanded rights and privileges in Manchuria that went well beyond any
claims revealed before or at the Yalta Conference.

The Soviet Union

asked (1) for a controlling interest in the Chinese Eastern and South
Manchurian Railways; (2) that the boundaries of the Dairen and Port
Arthur leases be those of the Kwantung Peninsula lease prior to the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904; and (3) the recognition of the independence
of Outer-Mongolia. 3

Stalin had also made it clear that all other

questions would have to be settled in advance before the Soviet Union
would enter into a pact of friendship with the Chinese Government. 4 )
Soong was then presented with three Soviet prepared drafts of
agreements: . A Treaty of Friendship and Alliance; An Agreement Regarding the Ports of Dairen and Port Arthur; An Agreement Regarding the
Manchurian Railroads.

The first offered Chiang Kai-shek what he

80

eagerly wanted, but there remained a wide diversion of opinion between
Soviet desires, snd what the Chinese were willing to surrender in re-

f

turn for the first agreement.

Stalin was also demanding Chinese

J
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recognition of Outer-Mongolia, another strong point of contention o
Soong's first and immediate concern was for Outer-Mongolia o
Though Stalin was demanding independence for this area, Soong considered it nothing less than a direct cession of territory and was
concerned, "that it would complicate the question of Tibet, and that
no government of China would last if it ceded Outer-Mongo1ia. ItS

Soong

later told Harriman,
that this was a matter of principle that was deeply embedded in
Chinese psychology, and that although they realized that they
could not then exercise sovereignty over Outer-Mongolia the Chinese
would be unwilling to support a government which gave up for all time
Chinese claims to this territory.6
Nevertheless, Soong translated these drafts and sent them to
Chiang, and received at the same time a message from him which set down
the maximum concessions which he thought China ought to be called upon
to make.

They were far less than what Russia had set down.

Ambassador

Hurley transmitted these maximum concessions to President Truman,
July 7.

They were as follows:

China will agree to recognize the independence of the Mongolian
People's Republic after the war if the "Soviets agree fully to respect the sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity.
The Soviet would be offered the joint use of Port Arthur but not
joint control. Dairenwill be made a free port but under Chinese
administration o The two railroads will be jointly operated, but
remain under Chinese ownership and sovereignty. The Soviet agrees
not to give any support
the" Chinese Communists or to rebellious
elements in Sinkiang....
"

;0

Negotiations continued along these lines until July 12, at which
time Soong told Ambassador Harriamn that he had come to an understanding of all
ports.

matte~s

except forsorne P?ints concerning the railroads and

Soong and Stalin had agreed on the recognition of Outer-Mongolia

after the war, and Stalin had offered Soong satisfactory conditions for

L
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I

Ithe Treaty of Friendship, and they had agreed on civil affairs during
military period in Manchuria, and finally Stalin had assured Soong
that he would withhold support from the insurgents in Sinkiang and the
Chinese Communists PartYo8
Stalin had given in on such points as agreeing that all guards
on the railroad would be Chinese, and that the Soviet Union would not
have rights to move troops in Manchuria in peacetime.

The final point

not agreed to regarding the railroads was control of the management.
Stalin wanted a majority of the directors but Soong had resisted. 9
Stalin was also insisting that the military zone which would be under
Russian control should include Dairen as well as Port Arthur, and that
there should be a naval base within Dairen o Soong offered Port Arthur
and the area south of Dairen as a military zone, but maintained Dairen
should be a free port under Chinese management, with certain docks and
storage yards leased to the Soviets on a commercial basis for their
through shipments. lO
The following night Soong met once again with Stalin and Holotov,
prepared toout1ine in detail the maximum concessions he was authorized
to make concerning the railroads and ports.

He planned to return to

Chungking to consult with Chiang if the meeting did not reach any
agreement.

Ina telegram to the President and Secretary of State, sent
July 13,

Ambassad~r

Harriman, who was kept fully informed of the talks by

Soong and who reported them to the President, reported the final negotiations, before the Potsdam Conference, as follows:
As toe the management of the railroads he [Soong] proposed equal
number of directors with Chinese to be Chairman without administrative authority as a courtesy to China; the manager of the

'bAwaaulJ£&&

)

91.
Chinese Eastern to be Russian and the Assistant Manager Chinese;
the Manager of the South Manchurian to be Chinese with a Russian
as Assistant Manager. He proposed that the port of Dairen should
be a free port under Chinese management. but offered the Soviets
docks and storage areas under commercial lease for the through
traffic. He explained for obvious reasons he could not agree to
the port of Dairen or the conneiting r~ilroad to be ina Soviet
military zone or to be used as a Soviet naval base. Soong offered Port Arthur as a naval base for joint use but under Soviet
control. There does not appear to be any differences regarding
Port Arthur but Stalin told Soong that his proposals regarding
the port of Dairen and the railroads were unsatisfactory. Stalin
did not offer any further concessions in his demands for the controlof the railroads and for the inclusion of Dairen in the military zone substantially under Soviet control. Soong then said he
felt he should return to Chungking to consult with Chiang,but
would be prepared to come to Moscow again at any time Stalin
wished. II
After the meeting with Stalin, Soong told Harriman that:
He did not press Stalin further on any point as he was anxious
to leave the subjects open in order to obtain your [ President
Truman's Jviews. He is hopeful that you will be able to get
Stalin to accept the Chinese position at the forthcoming conference or that you will be able to work out a compromise which
the Generalissimo can accept. He did not, however, say this to
Stalin, although from a political standpoint he feels that China
has made a serious concession in agreeing to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia. He feels that the discussions here
have made important progress in the establishment of friendly
relations between his government and the Kremlin and is satisfied with the understandings reached on questions other than
those still at issue. l2
Harrtmanreported the following to Truman on the portion of the
talks that concerned Korea:
As to Korea, Stalin confirmed to Soong his agreement toestablishing a four power trusteeship. Molotov interjected that this
was an unusual arrangement with no parallel and that therefore
it would be necessary to come to a detailed understanding. Stalin
stated that there should be no foreign troops oi foreign policy in
Korea, Soong understands that the Russians have 2 Korean divisions
trained in Siberia. He believes that these troops witl be left in
Korea and that there will be Soviet trairted personnel who will also
be brought into the country. Under these conditions he is fearful
that even with a four power trusteeShip the Saviets will obtain
domination of Korean affairs. 13
Thus,.on the eve of the Potsdam Conference, accord was in sight
except in regard to the treatment of the Manchurian ports and railways.

)
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The issue in these cases was, in all reality, who would be in actual
control.

Stalin stood firm" stating that he wanted to settle these

1ssuesbefore leaving for Berlin, the insinuation being he wanted them
settled before he would enter the war against Japan.

Soongw8s not to

be intimidated and returned to Chungking, and Stalin left for the Potsdam Conference.
Soong returned to Chungking and discussed the negotiations with
Chiang Kai-shek..

On July 19, 'he sent a message to Harriman, through

Hurley, stating that, "I am convinced that we have gone as far as we
possibly could in meeting

S~viet de~ands ...14

On July 20, Chiang sent

a message to President Truman, including in the message a letter he had
sent to Stalin, stating China's position.

Realizing that they were a1-

. most at an impasse unless someone proved willing to give in to the
other's desires, he appealed to Truman for help, stating,
I trust in your conversation with Generalissimo Stalin you would
impress himon.the eminently reasonable stand we have taken, so
that he will not insist ·on the impossib1e. 1I1S
"Though wish1ngto". see thesenegotiat,ionseoncluded, President
Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes, who had succeeded Edward
Stettinius on July 3, did not want to become any more involved than
they were at the present time, and did not comply with Chiang's request.

On July 23, President Truman telegraphed the following message

"from Berlin to Chiang in Chungking:
I asked that you carry out the Yalta agreement, but I had not
asked ~hat you make any concession in excess of that agreement.
If you and Generalissimo Stalin differ as to the correct interpretation of the yalta agreement,I hope you will arrange for Soong
to return to Moscow and continue your efforts to reach complete
understanding. 16
•
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Final Negotiations and Agreements
With this thought in mind, Soong and Wang Shih-chieh17 returned

I
i

j

I'

to Moscow to await Sta1ins's return from Potsdam.
to give in more to the Soviet exactions.

Chiang had decided

He had authorii'ed Soong to

grant the Soviet Union a military' zone north of the

K~antungPenin-

aula to the line of the former Russian Tsarist lease, but excluding
Dairen and the connecting railway.18
In their first talk. August 7, Stalin had shown that he was dete~ined

to have still more:

to get under one guise or another control

of the port of Dairen, and the route leading into and out of it.

To

these he had added the demand that China should agree not to fortify
any islands for a hundred miles south of Port Arthur. 19
This demand China was determined to reject, and subsequently dido
Stalin also raised the question of "war trophies" at this time, Harriman
reported, and indicated that some of the Japanese properties, including
the shares of some Japanese enterprises, should be considered as Soviet
war trophies in areas occupied by the Soviet armies.

Soong inquired

exactly what Stalin had in mind, but Stalin was evasive on this point and

•

left the matter for future discussion.
up for discussion again.

20

It ultimately

~as

never brought

However, in light of subsequent events, it should

have been, as the Soviet Union dismantled and "removed 'virtually all Japanese industries and enterprises in Manchuria 9 after the war.
The United States intervened in the negotiations at this point
when Harriman wrote a note to Molotov and discussed the matter with
Stalin o

j
·1:
......·

..

Harriman had been advised by Secretary Brynes, acting on Truman's

instructions.

Harriman was to tell Stalin, at that time, that the United
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States believed Soong had already met the yalta requirements.

The

United States requested that no agreement be made involving further
concessions by China, "particularly with reference to the inclusion
of the Port of Dairen in the Soviet military zone, without consultationwith us.,,21

With this limited pressure being brought to bear,

Stalin compromised, to a limited extent,with Soong, but Harriman
reported that Soong's resistance was wearing down. 22
In return for a promise that the Soviet Union would not exercise,
in time of peace, military authority in the city, port, or connecting
railways, Soong agreed that Dairen might be within the Soviet military
zone.

Soong gave in samewhatmore regarding details of the management

of the Manchurian railways.

He accepted, after long argument, wording

he knew to be not as clear and conclusive as it might be in the Soviet.
pledge to support the Nationalist Government, and withhold aid from
dissident elements in occupied territory,23
Soong's giving in on these points was undoubtedly closely related to Stalin's announcement, "that the Chinese government had better
come to an agreement quickly or the Cormnunistswould get into Manchuria.,,24 The fact that the remaining points of difference, settled
·quickly,were concluded after the Soviet declaration of war on Japan,
and their subsequent invasion of Manchuria, certainly had much to do
with China's positIon.
While the news of the Japanese surrender spread. the final Treaty
of Friendship and related agreements were signed. on August 14, 1945)
wi.th Molotov signing for the Soviet Union
and wang for the Nationalist
,.
Government of China.

I
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The treaty and corresponding agreements were as

follo~s:

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE U.S.S .R.
AUGUST 14, 1945
The President of the National Government of the Republic of China
and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.,
Desirous of strengthening the friendly relations that have always
existed between China and the U.S.S.R., through an alliance and
good neighborly post-war collaboration,
Determined to assist each other in the struggle against aggression
on the part of the enemies of the United Nations in this world war,
and to collaborate in the common war against Japan until her unconditional surrender,
Expressing their unswerving aspiration to cooperate in the cause
of maintaining peace and security for the benefit of the peoples of
both countries and of all the peace-loving nations.
Acting upon the principles enunciated in the joint declaration of
the United Nations of January 1, 1942, in the Four Power Declaration
signed in Moscow on October 30, 1943, and in the Charter of the International Organization of the United Nations,
Have decided to conclude the present Treaty to this effect and
appointed as their plenipotentaries: [ Signatures of the plenipotentiaries followed here]
Who, after exchanging their Full Powers, found in good ·and due
form, have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties undertake in association with the
other United Nations to wage war against Japan until final victory
is won. The High Contracting parties undertake mutually to render
to one another all necessary military~nd other assistance and support in thi~ war.
.-ARTICLE II

The High Contracting parties ~ndertake not to enter into separate
negotiations with Japan and not toconc1.ude, without mutual consent,
any armistice or peace treaty either with the present Japanese
Government
with any other government or authority setup in Japan
which do not renounce aLl aggressJ.ve intentions.

or
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ARTICLE III
The High Contracting Parties undertake after th~termination of
the war against Japan to take jointly all measures in their power
to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of
the peace by Japan.
.
In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties becoming involved in hostilities with Japan in consequence of an attack by
the latter against the said Contracting Party, the other Hi~h Contracting Party shall at once give to the Contracting Party so involved in hostilities all the military and other support and ass istancewith the means in its power o
This article shall remain in force until such time as the organization "The United Nations" may on request of the two High Contracting Parties be charged with the responsibility of preventing further
aggression by.Japano
ARTICLE V
The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests'of
the security and economic development of each of them, agree to
work together inclose and friendly collaboration after the coming
of peace and to act according to the principles of mutual respect
for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other Contracting PartYo
ARTICLE VI
The High Contracting Parties agree to renderench other very
possible economic assistance in the post-war period with a view
to facilitating and accelerating reconstruction in both countries
and to contributing to the cause of world prosperity.
ARTICLE VII
Nothing in the treaty shall be so construed as may affect the
rights or obligations of the High Contracting Parties as members of
the organization "The United Nations o "
ARTICLE VIII
The present Treaty shall be ratified in' the shortest possible
time.· l'he exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take
place as soon as possible in Chungking o
The Treaty comes into force immediately upon its ratification
and shall remain in force for a term of thirty years.
?

If neither of the High Contracting Parties h~s given notice, a
year before the expiration of the term, of its desire to terminate

.i·
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the Treaty, it shall remain valid for an unlimited time, each of the
qigh Contracting Parties being able to terminate its operation by
gtving notice to the effect one year in advance. 25
This· Treaty, along with the exchange of notes. as follows. relating to the Treaty, was what Chiang Kai.-shek desired, and was willing to
make concessions to gain.
The exchange of notes relating to the Treaty of Friendship and
Alliance, as part of the Agreements were as follows:
The People' 8 Commissar for Foreign Affairs, [Molotov] to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs [wang] •
Your Excellency, With reference to the Treaty of Friendship and
Alliance signed today between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R.,
I have the honor to put on record the understanding between the High
Contracting Parties as follows:
1. In accordance with the spirit of the aforementioned Treaty. and
in order to put into effect its aims and purposes, the Govemmentof
the U.S.S.R. agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies to be entirely given to the National Government as the
central government of China.
2. In the course of conversations regarding Dairenand Port Arthur
and regarding the joint operation of the Chinese 'Changchun Railway.
the Government of the U.S.S.R. regarded the Three Eastern Provinces as
part of China and reaffirmed its respect for China's full sovereignty
over the Three Eastern Provinces and recognize their territorial and
administrative integrity_
3. As for the recent development in Sinkiang the Soviet Government
confirms that, as stated in Article V of the Treaty of Friendship and
Alliance, it has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs
of China.
If your Excellency will be 80 good aa to confirm that the understanding is correct as set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the
present note and Your Excellency's reply thereto will constitute a
part of the aforementioned Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.
The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs [wang] to the People's
Commissar for Foreign Affairs [ Molotov] .'
Your Excellency: I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of
Your Excellency's Note of today's date reading as follows:
.

[s~e

Molotov' s note above ] .

]
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I have the honour to confirm that: the understanding is correct
as set forth above o
The next exchange of notes referred to Outer-Monglia o
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs [Wang] to the People' s
Commissar for Foreign Affairs [ Nolotov ] •
Your Excellency: In view of the desire repeatedly expressed by
the people of Outer-Mongolia for their independence, the Chinese
goverrnnent declares that after the defeat of Japan should a plebiscite.
of the Outer-Mongolian people confirm the desire, the Chinese Government with the existing boundary as its boundaryo
The above declaration will become binding upon the ratification of
the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China
and the U.S.S.R. signed on August 14, 1945.

The People' s Commissar for FOI'eign Affairs [ Molotov] to the Chinese
Minister for Foreign Affairs [ Wang] •
Your Excellency: I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your
Excelleney's Note reading as follows: [ see Wang's Note above] .
The Soviet Govern..-nent has duly taken note of the above communication of the Government of the Chinese Republic and hereby expresses
its satisfaction therewith, and it further states.thatth~ Soviet
Government will respect the political independence andterritori~l
integrity of the People's Republic of Mongolia (Outer-Mongolia). 6
The above two exchanges of notes concluded that portion of the
treaty.

The following series of agreements concluded the final ne-

gotiations signed August 14, 1945:
AGREEMENT CONCERNING DAIREN

In view of a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance having been concluded between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R o and of the
pledge by the latter that it will respect Chinese sovereignty in
the control of all of Manchuria as an integral part of China; and
with the object of ensuring that the U~S.S.R.·s interest iri Dairen
as a port of entry and exit for its goods shall be safeguarded, the
Republic of China agrees:
1 0 To declare Dairen a free port open to the commerce and shipping
of all nations.
2. The Chinese government agre~sto apportion in the mentioned
port for lease to U.S.SoR o ,,-'arfs tlnd warehouses on the basis of
separate agreement.
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3.

The Administration of Dairen shall belong to China.

The·harbor-master and deputy harbor-master will be appointed by
the Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchurian Railway in agreement with the Mayor. The deputy harbor-master sha~l be a Chinese
national.
4. In peace t~e Dairen is not included in the sphere of efficacy of the naval base regulations, determined by the Agreement on
Port Arthur of August 14, 1945. and shall be subject to the military supervision or control established in this zone only in case
of war against Japan.

5. Goods entering the free port from abroad for through transit
to Soviet territory on the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian
Railways and goods coming frornSoviet territory on the said railways into the freeport for export shall be free from customs
duties. Such goods shall be transported in sealed cars.

I
t
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Goods entering China from the free port shall pay· the Chinese
and goods going out of other parts of China into
the free port shall pay the Chinese export duties as long as they
continue to be collected.
~portdut~es,

6. The term of this agreement shall be thirty years and this
Agreement shall come into force upon its ratification.
The following Protocol to the Agreement on Dairen

is

the separate

agreement .referred to in point two of the above agreement:
PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT ON DAlREN

1. At the request of the U.S.S.R. the Chinese Government leases·
to the U.S.S.R. free of charge one half of allport installments
and equipment. The term of lease shall be thirty years. The remaining half of port installments and equipment shall be reserved
for the use of China.
The expansion or re-equipment of the port shall be made by agreement between China and the U.S.S.R.
2. It is agreed that the sections of the Chinese Changchun Railway running from Dairen to Mukden that lie within the region of the
Port Arthur naval base. shall not be subject to any military supervision or control established in this region.
AGREEMENt ON PORT ARTHUR

In conformity with and for the implementation of the Treaty of
Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China .and the U.S .S.R.,
the High Contracting Parties have agreed as follows:
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Article I. With a view to strengthening the security of China
and the U.S.S.R. against further aggression by J~pan, the Government of the Republic of China agrees to the joint use by the two
count~ies of Port Arthur as a naval base.
Article II. The precise boundary of the ~rea provided in Article
I is described in the.Annex and shown in ~he map [map not included
in this paper]
Article III. The High Contracting Parties agree that Port Arthur."
as an exclusive naval base, will be used only by Chinese and Soviet
military and commercial vessels.
There shall be established a Sino-Soviet Military Commission to
handle the above-mentioned naval base. "The Commission shall consist of two Chinese and three Soviet representatives. The Chairman of the Commission shall be appointed by the Soviet side and
the Vice-Chairman shall be appointed by the Chinese side.
Article IV. The Chinese Government entrusts to the Soviet
Government the defense of the naval base. The Soviet Government
may erect at its own expense such installations as are necessary
for the defense of the naval base.
Article
Chinese.
appointed
interests

V. The Civil Administration of the whole area will be
The leading posts of the Civil Administration will be
by the Chinese Government taking into account Soviet
in the area.

The leading posts of the civil administration in the city of
Port Arthur are appointed and dismissed by the Chinese Government
in agreement with the Soviet .military command.
The proposals which the Soviet military commander in that area
may address to the Chinese civil administration in order to safeguard security and defense will be fulfilled by the said administration. In cases of disagreement, such cases shall be submitted
to the Sino-Soviet military commission for consideration and decision.
Article VI. The Government of theU.8.8. R. have the rights to
. maintain in region mentioned in Article II, their army; navy, and
. air force and to determine their location.
Article VII. The Government of the U.S.S.R. also undertakes to
establish and keep up lighthouses and other installations and signs
of necessary security for navigat ion of the area •.
Article VIII. After the termination of this agreement all the
installations and public property installed or constructed by the
U.S.S.R. in the area shall revert without compensation to the
Chinese Government.
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Article IX. The present agreement is conclud~d for thirty years.
It comes into force on the day of ratification.

!

The appendix to the above Agreement on Port Arthur contained a
detailed description of the area to be. taken into account in Article II.
A map was also included with these agreements. 28

To prove of ulttmate importance in the future of Nationalist China
were the agreements regarding Soviet troops in the

'~hree

Eastern

Provinces" of China, after the entry of these troops into China. Chiang
had been extremely worried about the Chinese Communists in areas liberated by the Soviet troops.

These agTeements were as follows:

The President of the National Governmento£ China and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, desirous that relationS between the Chinese Administration and the Commander-tn-Chief of the Soviet forces after the
entry of the Soviet troops into the ''Three Eastern Provinces" of
China during the present joint military operations against Japan
should be governed by the spirit of friendship and alliance existing between the two countries, have agreed on the following:
1. After the Soviet troops enter the ''Three Eastern Provinces If
of China as a result of military operations, the supreme authority
and responsibility ·in all matters relating to the prosecution of
the war will be.vested in the zone of operations for the time required for the operations, in the Commander-In-Chief of the Soviet
forces.

2. A Chinese Nation~l Government representative and staff will
be appointed for the recovered territory, whose duties will be:
(a)

China,

To establish and direct, in accordance with the laws of
an administration for the territory cleared of the enemy.

(b) To establish the cooperation between the Chinese armed
forces, both regular and irregular, and the Soviet forces in recovered territory.
(b) To ensure the active cooperation of the Chinese administration with theCommander.oin-Chief of the Soviet forces and, specifically~ to give the local authorities direttions to this effect,
being guided by the requirements,and wishes of the Commander-inChief of the Soviet forcc$.
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3. To ensure contact between the Connnander-in-Chief of the Soviet
forces and the Chinese National Government representative a Chinese
military mission will be appointed to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Soviet forces.

I
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4. In the zones under the supreme authority of the Commander-inChief of the Soviet forces, the Chinese National Government administration for the recovered territory will maintain contact with the
Commande·r-in-Chief of the Soviet forces through the Chinese National
Government representatives.
5. As soon as any part of the liberated territory ceases to be a
zone of immediate military operations, the Chinese National Government will assume full authority in the direction of public affairs
and will render the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces every
assistance and support through its civil and military forces.
6. All persons belonging to the Soviet forces on Chinese territory
will be under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces. All Chinese, whether civilian or militarYt will be under.
Chinese jurisdiction. This jurisdiction will also extend to the civilian population on Chinese territory even in the case of offenses
against the Soviet armed forces, with the exception of offenses
committed in the zone of military operations under the jurisdiction of
the Commander-in-Chiefof the Soviet forces, such cases corning under
the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces.

7. With regard to currency matters after the entry of Soviet
troops into the "Three Eastern Provinces" of China, a separate
agreet.nent·shall be reached.
8. The present Agreement comes into force immediately upon the
ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China
and theU~S.S.R. signed this day.29
The last of the agreements concerned the Chinese Changchun Railway
and has proved to be one of the strongest focal points of present-day
criticism.

The final agreement was as follows:

Article I. After the Japanese armed forces are driven out of
the Three Eastern Provinces of China the main trunk line of the
Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway from
Manchuli toSuifenho and from Harbin to Dairen and Port Arthur
united into one railway under the name "Chinese Railway" shall be
in joint ownership of the U.S .S·.R. and the Republic of China and
shall be operated by them jointly.
There shall be joint ownership ,and. operation only of those lands
acquired and railway auxilary lines built by~he Chinese Eastern
Railway during the time of Russian and Joint Sino-Soviet
Administration and by the South Manchurian Railway during the
time of Russian administration and which are designed for direct
needs of the railways as well as the subsidiary enterprises built
during the said periods and directly serving these railways. All
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other railway branches, subsidiary enterprises and lands shall be in
the complete ownership of the Chinese Government.
The joint operation of the aforementioned railway shall be undertaken bOy a single management under Chinese sovereignty and as a
purely connnercial transportation enterprise.
Article 11 0 The High Contracting Parties agree that their joint
ownership in the railway shall be in equal shares and shall not be
alienable in whole or in part o
Articles III through VIII concerned the administration of the railway and how it should be organized.
Article IX. The Chinese Government will bear the responsibility
for the protection of the said RailwaYeeoe
Article Xo Only during the time of war against Japan may the
railway be used for the transportation of Soviet troops. The Soviet
Government has the right to transport by the above-mentioned railway
for transit purposes military goods in sealed cars without customs
inspection.
The remaining Articles, XI through XVIII, concerned administration
and clarifying aspects of the joint ownership; Article XVII did state
that the terms were to be for thirty years, at which time the Chinese
Changchun Railway, with all its properties, was to be transferred. without compensation, to the ownership of the Republic of China o 30
The Role of the United States in the
Sino-Soviet Negotiations
After President Truman received word from Hopkins that Stalin was
. now ready to talk to the Chinese t he talked with Soong on the 9th, and
on the 14th. and repeated to him the results of the Hopkins-Stalin visit
at the end of May, 1945, concerning the Yalta Agreement and the Far East.
Soong expressed his gratification, and pointed out that. even though the
Yalta Agreement referred of the re-establishment of Russian rights lost
in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, by the Sino-Soviet Treaty and related

I
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agreements of May 31, 1924, and the agreement of September 30, 1924,

t

Russia had renounced special concessions, including extra-territori-'

t

a1ity_

t

It

He said these points would have to be clarified._ 31

On June 15, 1945,Ambassador Hurley informed Chiang Kai-shek, as
mentioned previously, of.the provisions of the Yalta Agreement,pursuant to instruction from President Truman on June 9, 1945.

At the same

time the Ambassador communicated to him Marshal Stalin's categorical
assurances regarding Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, and his oral

I

concurrence to the principle of the Open Door in China, both of which
Stalin had given to the President via Harry Hopkins. 32
Chiang Kai-shek inmediately offered three suggestions concerning

what Hurley was discussing with him:
1. That the United States and Great Britain should become
parties to whatever agreement China might sign with the Soviet
Union. This, he said, would make it more certain that the
Soviet Union would comply.with its terms.
2. That Port Arthur should be designated as a joint naval
base, for four powers: China, Soviet Union, United States,
and Great Britain.
3. That the transfer of Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the
Soviet Union should be discussed by the same four powers rather
than by China and the Soviet Union 41one.

However, Hurley made it plain to Chiang that the United States
Government

~ould

not become a cosponsor.

Hurley was told to tell Chiang

that the American Government could not consent either to share in the
. joint use of Port Arthur. as a naval base or to become 'a party to whatever
agreement the Chinese government might decide to sign with the Soviet
Union.

He was also told that it seemed very doubtful whether the Soviet

Union would consent to the arrangement that Chiang had in mind, since the·
purpose of the pact with China would be regulating Sino-Soviet relations. 34
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Hurley reviewed with Soong his mission as envoy to Stalin and
repeated, ina talk with Chiang and Soong on June 22. that President
Truman approved and supported the Yalta decision even though the United
States had declined to become cosponsors of any agreements between China
and the Soviet Union.

Soong. after one of the first talks with Stalin, had tried to quiz
the American Government about the intended meaning of parts of the agreement which Roosevelt had signed at Yalta.
Stettinius.as

Secreta~

Byrnes, who had just succeeded

of State. answered through Harriman.

Byrnes'

position was that both he and the President thought it was unwise for
the United States Government to act as interpreter.

However, Byrnes

told Harriman that he could "informally" confide to Soong his understanding that in so far as the United States was concerned, there was

no discussion of interpretation of the wording of the Yalta decision
: relating to the status quo of Outer-Mongolia, and that in the absence
of such discussion the accepted meaning of the words as written should
be that the present factual and juridlcial status quo of Outer-Mongolia

was to be preserved. 35
~:

Byrnes further believed that he understood that

the railways should be jointly owned and operated by the Soviet Union
.and China, and that while the United States Government did not wish to

share in the control of administration of the port of Dairen, it would
expect to have free and equal access to the ports as well as to the
36
railways.
Ambassador Harriman also told both ·the Soviet Government

and Soong that. the American Government expected to be consulted before
37
any agreement was finally made.
)'

Harrtman reported to the President and

Secretar~

of State, on July

9, that it seemed doubtful that Soong wriuldbesuccessful in reaching
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agreement with Stalino

He recommended that immediate steps be taken

to prepare, for'useat Berlin, a study of American interpretations of
the Yalta Agreement,
specifically the terms which we believe China should grant the
Soviet Government in regard to the ports and railroads and what
action should be expected of China at this time, in co~gection
with preservation of the status quo in Outer-Mongolia.
He further recommended that President Truman should discuss the issues
with Stalin when they met at Potsdam.
Following

Harrim~n's

recoonnendation, the State Department pre-

pared a document clarifying the United States position in regard to
the Yalta Agreement, made such recommendations as they thought necessary,

I
I
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and reached the following conclusions:
•• o.it would thus appear that while de jure China has sovereignty
over Outer-Mongolia, de facto sovereignty has not been exercised
since 1911.
1£ the future status of Outer-Mongolia is decided on the basis of
self-determination of peoples, then there is little doubt that
that territory would separate itself from China, and as an independent nation or ~therwise, enter the Soviet orbit. Mongolians have
been traditionally antipathetic to the Chinese, and, so far as can
be judged, have been willing adherents. to the Soviet ideologies a~d
influence. In light of 'realities'of the situation, it .is believed
that the Chinese Government would be well advised to give formal
recognition to a situation which has long existed in fact and at
the same time endeavor to capitalize upon the good-wi.1l of the
Soviet Union thereby gained to obtain firm commitments from the
Soviet Govern~ent which will confirm and strengthen the Chinese
position in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. o • •
••••The provisions are clearly more advantageous to China than
would be terms calling for the complete restoration of the rights
possessed by Russia in Manchuria prior to the Russo-Japanese war •••
[however] the provisions of the proposed agreements are less advantageous to China than would be terms based upon anonnal construction taken by themselves ••••
There is an undoubted inconsistency between Soviet commitments to
respect Chinese sovereignty and ~roposals under which for even a
limited period of years Russia would exercise virtual control over
the main railways of Manchuria and enjoy predominant administrative
rights and exclusive administrative rights in Port Arthur ••••

I
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Accordingly, it should be possible for this Government, either
singly or in conjunction with Great Britain, to influence the
Soviet Government toward a modification in favor of China (and
of other countries) of the terms relating to Dairen and the
railways, it is believed that we should rMke the effort o There
would seem warrented for such an approach to the Soviet Government on the ground that it was not our understanding of the
Yalta Agreement that "internationalization" of Dairen meant
. transfer of predominent administrative rights to the Soviet
Union or that joint operation of the railways called for transfer of exclusive crwnership to the Soviet Union and for vesting
Russia with a predominant position in management o If through
such an approach the Soviet Union could be influenced to make
substantial ~odification in these proposals it would be very
welcome from out point of viewo At the same time the facts
cannot be lost sight of that National Government of China
stands to gain much by Russian participation in the war against
Japan and by Russian agreement not to support the Chinese objections to such otherwise reasonable concessions as are not inimical to American interest or in contradiction of American
policy.
0 ••

I
)

In respect to any arrangements which maybe made between the
Soviet Union and the Chinese Government regarding Manchuria we
.should.obtain explicit commitments from both governments that
the principle of nondiscrimination in international intercourse
will be respected in all areas and operations which may be the
subject of agreement.oo.
With regard to the proposed arrangements for Port Arthur it
is believed that the Chinese could afford and would be well
advised to grant to the Russians privil~ges at least no less
liberal than those granted to us by Great Britain in connection with the lease of certain naval and air bases in British
territory.
There is no reference in the Potsdam Conference papers that President Truman discussed this matter with Stalin in as much detail as the
State Department memo suggested.

Secretary of State Byrnes, in his

book Spending Frankly, did mention the fact that when Truman and Stalin
discussed Soviet entry into the war against Japan, on July 17, that
The Generalissimo said he had not yet succeeded in reaching an
agreement ~ith the Chinese - a prerequisite to the. Soviet declaration of war. He told the President that his negotiations with
Premier To V. Soong would be resumed again after the Conference 0
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Among the questions still unsettled was a regime for the port of
Dairen. President Truman declared that the United States wanted
to make sure Dairen was maintained as an open port. Stalin replied that, if the Soviet Union obtained control of the port, it
would have that status. I pointed out that under the agreement,
President Roosevel~ had·entered into at yalta China was to retain
control of Dairen. 0
From July 9 to July 13. Harriman had daily talks with Soong, who
reported to bimall the details of his negotiations with Stalin and
Molotov.

On

July 12, Truman received a message from Chiang, via Hurley,

expressing his gratitude for the interest shown by Truman and promising

to keep htm constantly informed of the progress of the negotiations.
Included in this message was a request for aid and advice:

As this is a matter of grave concern not only between China and
Russia but also the interestoaf peace and security of the world
at large, I earnestly request you to continue to bestow your great 41
attention on it and enlighten me with your views from t~e to time.
On July 19, Chiang sent another message to Truman, after discussing

with Soong the Moscow negotiations.

f
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Throughout the Sino-Soviet negotiations Ambassador Harriman had
been urging the United States Government and State Department to act in
a more positive manner to help the Chinese.

On July 20, a memorandum was

prepared for Secretary Byrnes by the State Department, on Harriman's
advice.

This memorandum made the following recommendations:

If Russia does not bring the Chinese negotiations up, we should
do so and emphasize our firm position•. 50 far as possible, we
should avoid any development in China such as haveoccured in
Poland. Accordingly, we should, in advance of any entrance by
Russia into the Japanese war, make clear what our position is and
shall be with reference to the territorial· integrity of China and
the maintenance of our traditional "open-door"policy there, without special privileges to any nation •••• l-le should live up to our
commitments· at yalta. But we should stand firm and counsel China
to stand firm against any concessions which go beyond the yalta
Commitments. 43
" . .
Continuing his policy of urging the United States' to support China

I

against excessive demands. and to beware of Soviet intentions, Harriman,
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on July 28. urged the Secretary of State to obtain in writing Soviet
reaffirmation of the verbal assurance of Stalin to support our "open
door" policy, and specifically in its application in Manchuria. 44
July 31. he again made a request to the Secretary of State.

On

Restated

that unless the Chinese gave in. or unless the United States took a
firm position on the interpretation of the Yalta

Agree~nt

the negoti-

ations would break down and the Chinese-Soviet relations would be
severely strained.

As he knew it would be contrary to the interests of

the United States for Soong to go "beyond his previous proposals. he reecommended that he be instructed to inform Stalin at the time an impasse
seemed to have been reached:
1. th~t at yalta, President Roosevelt declined to agree to
Stalin's original proposal for a soviet lease of the port of
Dalren and insisted upon its internationalism as a commercial
free port;
2. that we cannot agree to the inclusion of the port in the
Soviet military zone or its use as a Soviet naval base; and

3. that if Stalin does not agree to Soong's proposals for a
free port under Chinese administration with a commercial lease
of a certain section of the port for Soviet transit traffic, we
propose the creation of an internation31 commiss~on consisting
of representatives of the Chinese, Soviet, United States, and
possibly Britis~5governments to supervise the operation of Dairen
as a free port.
"
"
Harriman expressed the opinion that the differences regarding the
o~eration

of the railroads was not as fundamental as were the port issues.

and he thought Soong and Stalin would work those out.

He also reaffirmed

his opinion that Stalin would give written assurance of the open door
46
policy in Manchuria.
With the Potsdam Declaration issued and agreement between American
and Soviet military staffs completed, the United States began to feel that
it was now important, more than ever now, to have the Sino-Soviet
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negotiations completed.

In conversation with Forrestal, Secretary of

the Navy,
Bymes said he was most anxious to get the Japanese affair over
with before the Russians got in, [ with] particular reference to.
Dairen and Port Arthur. 9nce in there, he felt, it would not be
easy to get them out •••• 4
On the 28th, Byrnes sent a message to Hurley stating this, and con~.

eluding that it was important that Soong should communicate with Stalin,

asking a chance to resume talks.

Harr~

had now returned to his post

in Moscow, and was keeping the President informed of the negotiations.
As a result of these reports, President Truman instructed Secretary
Byrnes, on August 5, to send new directions to Ambassador Harriman:

I.

f

I [Truman] asked that Harriman tell Stalin that we believe Soong
had already met the Yalta requirements, and we would request that
no.agreement be made involving further concessions by China ••••
that might adversely affect our interests "particularly with reference to the inclusion of the Port of Dairen in the Soviet military zone, without consultation with us. 48
Truman did not feel too hopeful about
Soong and Stalin, at this time.

49

th~

renewed talks between

Ambassador Hurley. in Chungking, re-

ported to Truman that Stalin had added new demands·.

Harriman also

reported the new demands expressed by Stalin. 50
Harriman concluded his message with a request for further instruc-

tion as to the United States' position on the question of war reparations,
one of the new demands raised by

I

Stalin~

particularly if Stalin should raise this matter withrne. This is
another case where Stalin has increased his appetite and! reco-...=nend
that we resist his demands for shares of stock of Japanese enterprises
and restrict the definition of war booty to material that has been
historically so regarded in accordance with the United State' definition submitted at Potsdam. As to reparations, I recommend that our
position should be that all Japanese property, whether in Manchuria
or elsewhere, should be available to all countries who have suffered
damage by Japanese aggrcDsion to be allocated by agreement between the
powers. As this subject hos now been raised, I am fearful that unless
we make our position plain at this time, the Soviets will contend that
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that they have the right. to define unilaterally war. trophies within
the areas occupied by the Red Army. I have consglted Ambassador
pauley, and he concurs in the8e recommendations. 1
I
\I
I

Harriman continued his protests to Stalin, speaking vigorously

'i

!

against Soviet claims.

He denied that the term "preeminent" was in-

tended to support Soviet demands,52

and continuously reminded him that

the president expected to be consulted before any final decisions were
made that might affect American interests and policies.

Stalin was not

too pleased with Harriman's protest, or the Chinese position.

Harriman

reported.innediately after the Soviet declaration of war, "that Stalin
complained that the Chinese regarded the Soviet Union as an unwelcome
guest and that he was. angry at .their refusal toaceept his terms."

Har-

rimanbelieved that Stalin expected Soviet forces to be regarded as
liberators.

53

With the Soviet declaration of war, it became apparent that Soong
was weakening seriously in his negotiations with Stalin, as the Chinese
were desirous of concluding the agreements before the Soviet forces advanced too far into Manchuria.

With this being the situation, Harriman,

acting on instruction,. informed Soong, as a matter of record, that the
United States Government considered that the proposals which he had
already made fulfilled the Yalta Agreement, and that any further coIl cession would be with the understanding that; they.were made by the
Chinese Government because of the value it attached to obtaining Soviet
support in other directions.

Harriman reported that Soong, "thoroughly

understood and accepted the correctness of this. position."

Harriman·

further reported that Soong had state4 that he was,
very grateful· for our support and is convinced that unless we had
ta.ken an active.part in the n otiations he would have had to concede to all Stalin's demands. S4
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Throughout the Sino-Soviet negotiations, the United States, by
continuous injection of its opinion. kept tn-ing to insure that any
accord that was signed would conform to its views of what was conceived at yalta, and continuously requested written reaffirmation by
.Soviets of the Open Door Policy in Manchuria.

Though there can be

little doubt that Stalin's compromises were partially due to American
watch over the negotiations, the final treaty and agreements that were
signed between the Chinese Government and the Soviet Union did not conform entirely with the stated American position, and no signed statement by the Soviets on the Open Door was ever forthcoming.

The Soviet Union and International Law
At Potsdam, Stalin wanted to secure his position regarding international law.

From a purely legalistic point of view, the Soviet war

on Japan would constitute a breach of the neutralist pact, which had
been renounced in April, but was still operative for another year.
Molotov suggested, on July 29, that the United States, Great Britain,

and other Allies address·a formal request to the Soviet Government to
enter the war.

It was suggested by the S.oviets that they

consider that the best method would be for the United States,
England and other allies in the Far Eastern war to address a formal
request to the Soviet Government for its entry into the war. He
said that this would be based on the refusal of the Japanese to
accept the recent ultimatum to surrender and made on the basis of
Shortening the war and saving of lives.
Molotov added inmediately that this would be so "assuming that the agree-

ment with the Chinese would be signed before the Soviet Union entered the
I
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war."

If the pact was to be broken .. Stalin would prefer to have the
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support of the other powers for this violation of international
law.
President Truman was later to say,

The proposal came as a surprise to me. I told Molotov that I
would have to give the Soviet suggestion careful examination ••••
I did not like this proposal for one important reason. I saw in
it a cynical diplomatic move to make Russia's entry at
time
appear to be the decisive factor to bring about victory.

tgts

Truman's fears proved to be true as Soviet historians would later
claim that their intervention was the decisive factor in bringing the
Japanese war to an end, but Truman decided to prepare a reply, against
the advice of Admiral Leahy, who said,
I told h~I did not believe he should place uS un4er a permanent
obligation which would be attached· to such a request, and I did not
think he·should even consider complying. 57
Truman's reply was based upon using the declaration signed at Moscow,
October 30, 1943, and the proposed Charter of the United Nations to
comply with Stalin's request:
paragraph 5 of the Declaration signed at Moscow October 30, 1943
by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and

China, provides:

"5. That for the pur~ose of maintaining international peace and
security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with
one another and as occasion requires with other members of the
United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of. the community of· nations."
Article 106 of the proposed Charter of the United Nations provides:
"Pending the coming int·o force of such special agreements referred
to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it
to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the
parties to Four-Nation Declaration signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943,
and France, shall, in accordance.with the provisions of paragraph 5
of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires
with other members of the United Nations with a view to such joint
action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security."

I
"
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Article 103 of the Charter provides:

"In the event of a conflict between the obligations' of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."
If

I
f

Though the Charter has not been formally ratified, at San Francisco it was agreed to by the Representatives of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the Soviet government will be one of the
permanentmemhers of the Security Council.
It seems to me that under the terms of the Moscow Declaration and
the provisions of the Charter, above referred to, it would be proper
for the Soviet Union to indicate its willingness to consult and cooperate with other great powers now at war with Japan with a view to
joint action on behalf of the community of nations to maintain peace
and security..
'
Sent with this reply to Stalin's request, on July 31, was another
note, from Truman to Stalin, stating:

t

j
I

I

In response to your suggestion that I write you a letter as to the
Far Eastern situation, I am attaching a form letter which I propose
to send you at your convenience after you notify me you have reached
an agreement with the Government ofChina~ If this is satisfactory
to you, you can let me know immediately when you have reached such
agreement, and I will wire you a letter, to be used as you see fit.
I will also send you, by fastest courier the official letter signed
by me. If you decide to use it, it will be all right. However, if
you decide to issue a statement basing your action on other grounds
or prefer for any other reasons not to use this letter~itwill be
satisfactory to me. I leave it to your good judgment •.:>8

This note, and the form letter that was attached to it, accomplished
two purposes, though Stalin 'expressed his great appreciation of the messages.

In the first place, the form letter was not actually a formal request to
the Soviet Governmentfor its entry into the war against Japan.

It mere-

t,

1y pointed out the Soviet Union's duty under the Moscow and United Nations,
agreements in preserving world peace.

In the second place, the note

attached. to this' form letter clearly expressed Truman's position in

regard to Soviet entry into the war before they had concluded their
negotiations with China.

The note made it quite clear that there would

115
be no official, signed, form letter until then.

However, following the

Hiroshima bombing, and realizing the situation, the Soviet Union, knowing that time was short and that they must act immediately if they were
to declare war on Japan before her surrender, did not bother going
through the process necessary to enact Truman's form letter.

Nor did

they wait to conclude the Chinese negotiations, as they had so many
times insisted would be necessary, before officially declaring war

against the Japanese.

CHAPTER· V
THE MONTHS

BETWEEN:

Februaryll to August 14, 1945
The End of the War in Europe
The combined Anglo-American armies began their crossing of the
Rhine on March 24, 1945.

Montgomery's British forces in the north, and

Bradley's American forces in the center, had converged by April I to
encircle the Ruhr, and trap more than 300,000 German troopsol
Montgomery wanted to drive straight to Berlin.

General

But General Eisenhower,

supreme Allied Commander, for what seemed to be sound military reasons,
decided to push his main force from the Kassel-Frankfurt area to the
Elbe, split the German forces, cut off Berlin from the so called "National
Redoubt" area· (The Bavarian Mountains, where Hitler was reputed to be
preparing for a last stand), and, then turn his forces directly to the
north and to the southwest of the Elbe o

These maneuvers would enable

him to seize ports on the North Sea and the Baltic, and also clean up
the area to the south before the enemy could assemble a force there.
Furthermore, he was to state that "Berlin itself is no longer a
particularly important objective o ,,2
EisenhOwer relayed his decision, to Stalin directly in March 28,
under arrangements made in January, and approved by the Combined Chiefs.
of Staffo

Stalin was pleased, but Churfhil1 was greatly disturbed o 3

Churchill wrote directly to Eisenhower, asking,

I
f

I
t
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•••• why should we not cross the Elba and advance as far eastward
as possible? This has an important political bearing, as the Russian armies of the south seem certain to enter Vienna and overrun
AustrI-a. If we deliberately leave Berlin to them, even if "it should
be in our grasp. the double event may strengthen their conviction
that they have done everything •••• I do not consider myself that Berlin has yet lost its military and certainly not its political significance. 4

Eisenhower, however, argued that his plan was sound on military
grounds; and he had the firm support of other American field generals.

I

that would offset the need for quick destruction of the German Army on

t

our front, It General Bradley la ter wrote. 5

t't

"I could see no political advantage accruing from the capture of Berlin

When the American army reached the Elbe, only fifty-three miles
from Berlin, the Russians were on the banks of the Oder, thirty to forty
miles fram the German capital.
Roosevelt to act,6

Churchill continued to argue, urging

but Roosevelt, who"had not long to live, was in no

condition to argue strenuously

wi~h

anyone.

Soviet Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov began a massive offensive across
the Oder on April 15, that reached" the suburbs of Berlin a week later.
American and Russian troops met on the Elbe near Torgau on April 27.
Italian Partisans captured and shot Mussolini on the following day.
Hitler, realizing the situation, appointed Admiral Karl Doenitz his
"7
8uccessoron April 29, and committed suicide on the next day.

By March 23, Germany had lost more thana third of the forces which
had been guarding the western frontier six weeks earlier.

8

By May 2,

nearly one million German troops in northern Italy and Austria surrendered.
Two days later, "German troops in northwest Germany, Holland, Schleswig-

,

Holstein, and Denmark laid down their arms.

Then Colonel General Afred
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Alfred Jikl surrendered unconditionally the remants of the German Army,
air force, and navy at Eisenhower's headquarters at Rheims on May 7 •.
All hostilities ceased at midnight, May 8, 1945. 9
The War in the Pacific
From any rational point of view, Japan was already defeated by
earlyl945.

It was known that the American conquest of the Philippines

would spell the doom of the Empire because it would cut communication
between Japan and Indo-China, Malaya, and the East Indies.
.I

When the

Japanese navy was virtually destroyed at the Battle of Leyete Gulf, it
became a matter of time and resources how fast the Allies could move,
and when they would begin the actual assault of the Japanese home islands.

"The day of final reckoning for a treacherous enemy was now at

hand,'" reported General Marshall.

10

Air attacks continued to greatly reduce the productive capacity
of Japan, as it had become almost impossible for them to receive any
raw materials by sea.

While MacArthur continued in his liberation of

the Philippines, American forces were capturing lwo Jima, 750 miles
from Japan, and on April I, the invasion of Okinawa began.
This large island in the Ryukus group was only 350 miles south
of Japan, and both American and Japanese leaders knew that the fall of
Okinawa-would spell the early doom of the Japanese Empire.

A

~tragegic

base within the shadow of the Japanese homeland would be established,
the first along·the<main Japanese Archipelago bordering the East China
Sea.

Realizing their fate, the Japanese fought frantically, and the
\

battle of Okinawa did not end until June 21.

I

.

Only 7,871 out of 117,500
. .

.

Japanese troops who defended the island survived to surrender.

11

I
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By this time the main question was whether Japan would collapse
internally before the Americans had launched their final invasion of
the island empirc o

American aircraft from Iwo Jima and Okinawa began

to rain a shower of death and destruction on the Japanese home islands
unlike anything seen before.

American battleships and heavy cruisers

joined the attack in mid-July, by shelling industrial targets on the
- mainland, and oy heavy attacks upon Japanese shipping.

By early August,

little was left standing in the three urban areas that supported Japan's
war effort - Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokoham..1 ., Nogoya, -and Osaka-Kobe-.

Most of

the essential industrial plants in the smaller towns had been damaged
ordestroyed o

Transit of men and goods in and out of Japan, and even

between the ports of_Japan, had diminished to almost nothingo

American

aircraft launched from land bases and naval carriers, were able to fly
unopposed 'over any -part of Japa.n. 12
Japanese peace feelers had been sent out as early as September
and December of 1944, when Chiang Kai-shek had been approached regardingsurrender possibilities.

General Wedemeyer reported, at the

Far East Hearings in 1951, that in the winter of 1944-45 that he, "persona1ly saw overtures proffered by the Japanese for surrender submitted
to the Chinese government."

He stated that, "the Generalissimo showed

them to me," and that he, "saw two on two different occasions, and the
terms of the surrender were very favorable to the Chinese Nationalist
. ,,13
Government o • • o ·

But these early

~aneuvers

only ended in failure but also resulted in

toward Chungking, "had not

~evere

repercussions within

Japan itself. u14
.\

I

I

It should also be noted that as early as. September, 1944, in discussions in the Japanese Government, Foreign MinistcrShigemitsu was

I
I
~
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I

: suggesting that the Japanese Government should be prepared, upon Soviet

I

: insistence, to recognize a sphere of interest for the Soviet Union in
I'
\1 Manchuria and Inner-Mongolia; to give the Kremlin title to Southern
I

Sakhalin; the northern Kuri1es, and the North Manchurian Railway; to

acquiesce in the peaceful activities of the Soviet Union in China,
Inner-Mongolia, Manchuria, and other parts of Greater East Asia; and to
accept an abrogation of Japanese fishing rights in Soviet Far Eastern

waters;
success.

and to make whatever other sacrifices were necessary to insure
These measures were being discussed should a deterioration

occur in Soviet-Japanese relations. and should Japan wish to guard

1

against a Soviet attack. IS

t

situation and what their position would be shortly and, while not willing

The Japanese were obviously aware of the

to surrender, were prepared to bargain if necessary, and from an inferior
position, to maintain what they could of the gains they had made since

the early 1930's.
Japanese Attempts to Negotiate Peace
Stalin, on May 28, 1945. told Harry Hopkins, during Hopkins'
mission to Moscow, that he thought that Japan was doomed, and that
the Japanese knew it.

Since peace feelers were being put out by

certain elements in Japan. he believed the ~imehad come to "con-

eider together our joint attitude and act in concert about the surrender of Japan. 'oJ 16

lie feared that Japan would try to divide the

Allies, and he did not want that.
Attempted Japanese negotiations,with the Soviet Union in the

early part of 1945. were undertaken only tentatively and no concrete

offers were made by the Japanese.

The Japanese idea at this time was
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to use Russian mediation in order toforesta11 a Soviet attack, since
the Manchurian army had been considerably weakened by the transfer of
• part of it for the defense of the Japanese home islands. 17

Dean

Acheson, Under-Secretary of State in 1945, testified to this effect at

the Far East ltearings in 1951, stating that,
Japanese peace overtures of February 1945 were maneuvers by the
Japanese to bring the Russians in as mediators, which was regarded
as a mere move on their part to end the war inpossessi.on of all
the gains which they illegally acquired before hand and wasn'is
regarded as any serious effort at peace, but a mere maneuver.
However, on April 5. the Soviet Government informed the Japanese
Government that the Neutrality pact between them

'~as

lost its meaning,

and the continuance of this pact has become impossible.,,19

By this

pact'. terms, which were agreed upon and signed in April, 1941, the
agreements were to remain in effect for a year after such notice.

But

there were obvious signs-i.e., movement of troops fram the European
theater of operations to the Far East,a·that the Soviet Union did not
intend to observe this stipulation.
German

surrend~rt,Russian

Almost fram the moment of the

troops, now freed for other conquests, began

moving to the Far East in impressive numbers.
The possibility of the Soviet Union entering the Pacific war now
became a sharp reality to the Japanese, and it was questionable whether
or not the Soviets wou1d,observe the terms to the letter of the agreement.

Molotov, in response to an inquiry from Japanese Ambassador Sate

in late April,

1945,aff~rmed

that in spite of the Soviet Union's announce-

ment of April 5, his government would continue to abide by the provision

of the Neutrality Pact, and would enj9Y neutral relations for the durations of the Pact's validity.20
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The Japanese had considered Sweden and Switzerland as possibly
being used to arrange a conditional peace, before turning to the Soviet
Union, but had discarded the idea when there was some question as to
whether either of the countries 'wouldhave made a serious effort, and
in addition they did not have the influence with the Allies that the
Soviet Union had. 2l "
In turning to the Soviet Union as their most logical and hopeful
peace negotiator, it was thought in Japan that the Soviet Union's participation in the Anglo-American alliance was more a matter ofnecesaity, consummated only after Germany chose to invade the Soviet Union,
than an arrangement by choice.

Japan was thinking that the Soviet Union

might prefer to act on her own, believing that, since the war in Europe
had ended, the Soviet Union would not fight if she could gain a dominant
position in the Far East merely by acting as "'Japan's diplomatic broker,
not knowing that the Soviet Union had already made other arrangements
22
at yalta •.
In mid-May. 1945. former Japa.nesePremier and one-time Ambassador

to Moscow, Koko Hirota, was ordered to undertake to approach the Soviet
ambassador to Japan, Jacob A. Malik, to attempt to improve the very poor
and unstable relations then existing between Japan and Russia, and to
convince the Soviet Union to renew the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact
beyond its expiration date in April, 1946.

The Suzuki Cabinet in the

Japanese Government had been formed on April 7, 1945, with the specific
..

mandate to terminate the war,

23

. and this was to be their first serious

attempt to fulfill their mandate.

Thc!'meetings took place on June 3-4,

but, as no conc.rete proposals were offered
. .

. .

.

the Soviets, these. attempted
.

preliminary negotiations did not come to any conclusion.

24

I
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On June 24, Hirota called on Malik again in an attempt to press on

by the Soviet Union o

Malik was unimpressed and made statements to the

effect and its terms were being honored. 25
Hirota made further tentative offers, but Malik did not respond
at all, and implied that further discussions were useless until Japan
would present some concrete plans.

I

solicit the interest of the Soviet Union.

l

proposals in writing;

I

Five days later, on June 29, Hirota made one final vain attempt to
This time he submitted concrete

Japan would grant Manchuria her independence, would

relinquish Japanese fishing concessions in Soviet Far Eastern waters (in
return for oil from the Soviet Union), and would 'be willing to consider
any other matters the Soviet Government might wish to place on the agenda;

I

I
I
I!'

if the

~oviet

.

Union would enter into a nonagression treaty with Japan.

26

These offers were considerably more liberal than were those discussed in
September of 1944, but then the situation in Japan was not the same as it
was at that time.

Malik promised that these proposals would be

report~d

to Moscow, and that further negotiations would be resumed as soon as an
answer had arrived.

This ended the negotiations as Malik refused to see

Hirota again, and negotiations ceased along this line.
It had now become clear to the Japanese Foreign Office that new and
more drastic steps would have to betaken, or else Japan's effort to obtain Soviet good offices would certainly fail. On July ll,theJapanese
•
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Togo, telegraphed the Japanese Ambassador
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in the Soviet Union, Sato, that the situation now demanded more drastic
action:
The foreign and donestic situation for the Empire is very serious,
and even the termination of the war is now being considered privately.

Conversations are not being limited solely to the objective of
closer relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, but we are
also sounding out the extent to which we might employ the U.SoS.R.
in the connection with the termination of the war ••••
Therefore, although we of course wish the completion of an
agreement from the Malik-Hirota negotiations, on the other hand,
sounding out' the Soviets as to the manner in which they might be
used to terminate the war is also desired. We would like to
learn qUickly the intentions of the Soviet Government regarding
the above. 27
Sato was to see Molotov in regard to the above, and find out what he
could.
July 12, Togo sent a following message that Satowas to convey to
the Soviet Government before the Soviet leaders left for the conference
in Berlin:
His Majesty the Emperor is greatly concerned over the daily increasing calamities and sacrifices forced by the citizens of the
various belligerent ~ountries in the present war, and it is His
Majesty's heart's desire to see the swift termination·ofthe war o
In the Great East Asia Wart however, as long as America and
England insist on unconditional surrender, our country has no
alternative but to see it through in an all-out effort for the
sake of the survival and the nonor of the homelando ••• he intends
to dispatch Prin~~ Fuminaro Konoye as a special envoy to the
Soviet Union. ooo
.
Sato was to obtain Soviet permission for the entry of the envoy, and to
'arrange transportation for Konoye to Moscow.

Molotov was too busy to

see Sato, but Sato was able to arrange an interview with Vice-Foreign
Cormnissar Lozovskyinstead, at which time he presented his proposals.

,

Sato did not receive a reply to his proposals, and sent a message on July
15, to Togo, stating that Stalin and Molotov had left for the conference
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without giving a definite answer.

Sato also took this opportunity to

explain once again to Togo his belief that nothing less than a concrete
proposal would receive any attention from the Soviet Union and that the
mission, "should be nothing other than a proposal for peace and termination of hostilities.'

,29

Satodid not receive a reply from the So.viet Government until
July 18, at which time he telegraphed the Soviet answer to Toto:
[reply of the Soviet to envoy ]
By the order of the Government of the U.S.S.R e • I have the honor
to call your attention to·the fact that the Imperial views stated
in the message of the Emperor of Japan are general in form and contain no concrete proposal. The mission of Prince Konoye, special
envoy, is also not clear to the Government of the U.S.S.R.
The Government of the U.S.S.R., accordingly, is unable to give
any definite "reply either as to the message of the Emperor of
Japan or to the d{spatch of prinaeKonoye as special envoy mentioned in your note of July 13. 3
On July 21, Togo dispatched another cable to Sato in

w~ich

he en-

deavored to define the Konoye mission in terms which could leave no doubt
in Soviet minds as to Japan's intent and purpose.

In a second telegram,

sent the same day, Togo further spelled out for Sato's benefit the poOsition of the government in Tokyo:

Japan could not accept "unconditional

surrender under any circumstances." That as long as such a demand remained, the Japanese people would fight on as one man.

At the same time,

in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor, Japan hoped through the
~ood

offices of the Soviet Union to bring about peace on terms other than

unconditional surrender.

It was highly important, according to Togo, that

. Sato make every·effort to insure that the United States and Great Britain
understand this point. 31
Togo further explained that because of the situation.both at home
and abroad that Japan could not set forth actual peace terms, but that

1
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1

~rance

Konoyewould be sent to present the concrete intentions of the

Japanese Government.
i

i

Togo was not above using other means in an at-

.

itempt to achieve his purposes.

He told Sato to make a personal appeal

to Stalin's vanity, to use this as

a bargaining

point in the

negotiations~

This telegram included the following statement:

••• request the good offices of the Soviet Union and that the
sending of the envoy to the Soviet Union would enable Stalin to
acquire the position of advocate of world peace. Also make it
clear that we are fully prepared to recognize the wishes of. the
Soviet Union in the Far East. 32
This telegram did not arrive, for unknown reasons, in Moscow until
July 24, a1: which time Sato again managed to see Lozovsky.

This time

his instructions enabled him to specifically sta.te that Japan was
seeking the good offices of the Soviet Union in order to bring the war
to an end, and it was for this purpose Japan desired to send Prince
Konoye.

The Soviet Union sent a letter to Sato stating that the char-

acter of the last proposal was so general, contained no specific.proposal, and therefore it was impossible to give a definite reply.33
Stalin'reported these overtures to Presi~ent Harry Truman at the
Potsdam Conference.

At the first meeting of Truman and Stalin on July

18, Stalin toldo'f the Japanese proposals and gave Truman a copy of the,
Emperor's message of July 12.

Stalin had ,then inquired if Truman

thought the message worthwhile answering, to'which Truman answered in
34

the negative.'

Truman mentioned peace feelers from the Japanese through

Sweden at this time, but did not make any other reference .to them. 35
It is certain' that the United States knew of the Japanese overtures
•
to the Russians, prior to the conference. By early July, Washington had
. intercepted messages from Japan to the Japanese

ambassad~rin Moseow.
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Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal, recorded in his diary on July 13,
that,
The first real evidence of a Japanese desire to get out of the
war came today through intercepted messages from Togo, Foreign
Minister, to Sato, Jap Ambassador in Moscow •••• 36
Further entries in Forrestal's diary indicate that messages were also
intercepted on -July 15 and July 24.

(However, the historians who com-

piled the Potsdam Conference papers could find no evidence that the
United States representatives knew of ,the Japanese overtures to the
Soviet Union made after the opening of the

conference~)

On July 28, Stalin said he wished to make an announcement before

the business

of the regular meeting started.

Stalin then had read

the latest message they had received from Japan.

After the inter-

pretor finished reading the Japanese message to Russia, Stalin declared
that there is nothing rtew in it except that it was more definite
than the previous approach and that itwould receive a more definite
answer than was th case last time. The answer would be in the
negative, he said. 37
On

July 30, Sato again called upon Vice-Foreign Commissar tozovsky

in the hope, this time, of obtaining a clear statement of MOscow's intentions.

tozovskywas noncommittal, promising only to irtformMolotov

that the ambassador had come seeking a reply.
each day in Moscow for a reply.

Ambassador Sato waited

On August 5, upon hearing that Molotov

had returned from Berlin, Satoformally requested an interview with him.
Two days later, on August 7, he was notified that Molotov would be able
to see him the next day, August 8.

At the appointed hour Sato arrived

at the Kremlin. - He wasimnediately informed that Molotov had anotifi-

cation to the Japanese Government.

After waiting a week Sato received

an answer from the Soviet Union, he was handed the Sovietdetlaration of
war:

I
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After the defeat and capitulation of Hitlerite Germany,·Japan
remained the only great power which still stands for the continuation of the war.
The demand "of the three powers. the United States, Great Britain,
and China, of July 26 for the unconditional surrender of the Japaneese armed forces was rejected by Japan. Thus the proposal made by
the Japanese Government to the Soviet Union for mediation in the
Far East has lost all foundation.

Taking into account the refusal of Japan to capitulate, the
Allies approached the Soviet Government with a proposal to join
the war against Japanese aggression and thus shorten the duration of the war, reduce the number of casualties and contribute toward the most speedy restoration of peace.
True to its obligation as an Ally, the Soviet Government has
accepted the proposal of the All~es and has jointed the declaration of the Allied powers of July 26.
The Soviet Government considers that this policy is the only
means able to bring peace nearer, to free the people from further sacrifice and suffering and to give the Japanese people
the opportunity of avoiding the danger of destruction suffered
by Germany after her refusal to accept unconditional surrender.
In view of the above, the Soviet Government declares that from
tomorrow, that is from August 9, the Soviet Union will consider
herself in a state of war against Japan. 38 .
The End of the War in the Pacific
Word came to the American leaders, on July l6,that an atomic bomb
had been exploded in New Mexico, when Secretary of War Stimson brought
39
President Truman the news.
Knowing that the bomb was finally a reality,

and· its use might avert the necessity
~:

I

J~pan,

of a

long and bloody campaign in

Truman now concentrated on a public warning to Japan.

warning, known as the Potsdam

Decla~ation,

This public

was issued on July 26, under

Truman's, Churchill's •. and Chiang's signatures.

Stalin did not sign as

the Soviet Union was not yet at war wj.th Japan.

Paragraph thirteen of

this declaration stated:

I

We call upon the government of Jnpan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces ••••

'~-~"&"''''''''''fWMii.'\I
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•••4The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction. 0
This declaration was published and broadcast to the world, but
strangely enough no evidence has been found in the Department of State
files to indicate that the test of the Potsdam Conference Declaration
w8stransmitted to the Japanese Government through neutral diplomatic
channels.
The leaders of the Suzuki Government in Tokyo agreed to accept
the Potsdam Declaration, but with qualifications; mainly concerning
the position of the Emperor, and the position of the Japanese military.
It was the military in Japan that so strongly opposed unconditional
surrender, preferring to fight to the very end rather than be forced
to give up their position in Japan •

. On July 28, United States radio monitors reported that Radio
Tokyo had reaffirmed the Japanese Government's determination to fight.
The Potsdam Declaration had been referred to as "unworthy of consideration," "absurd," and "presumptuous.,,4l

A press conference statement

by Prime Minister Suzuki immediately after the Potsdam Declaration was

broadcast. contained the following statement:
I believe the Joint Proclamation by the three countries is
nothing but a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. As for the Government, it does not find any important value in it, and there is
no other recourse but to ignore it completely an~ resolutely
fight for the successful conclusion of the war. 4 .
President Truman and his advisers took this as a refusal and decided to use

~he

new weapon, the atomic bomb.

President Truman was

later to say that this decision was based on the following reasons:
On July 28 Tokyo·announcedthat the Japanese government would
continue to fight. There w~s no formal reply to the joint ultimatumof the United States, the United Kingdom and China. There
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was no alternative now. The bomb was 8chcduledto be dro~ped
after August 3 unless Japan surrendered before that d aYo 4
An invasion would undoubtedly have been successful but at a great
cost in human lives to both sides.

Truman did not hesitate - "I re-

garded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it
should be used,,44 - and on August 6, a lone B-29 bomber flew over
Hiroshima and dropped the first atomic bomb o
President Truman received word - "Big Bomb dropped on
August 5 at 7:15 p.moWashington time o

First reports

Hiroshi~~

indica~e

complete

success which was even more conspicuous than earlier test,,45 - aboard ship
on the journey home from Berlin the same day from Secretary of War
Stimson o

He

promptly anncunced the news to the world, stating "we are now

prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city," and warned the Japanese that, "If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of
ruin from the air, the like of which has .never been seen on this earth.,,46
Still the Japanese army refused to surrendero· The civil government
and the military in Japan were clearly in disagreement and had been for
some time o
hand.

It was really a question of who had the power and the upper-

This was a rather unique situation, summed up quite well by

Toshikazu Kase, in his book Journey to the Missouri:

In order to safeguard her precarious independence under constant
foreign pressure, it was an urgent necessity for Japan to create
a modern national defense force with the utmost speed. Military
affairs therefore took precedence over other business·of government, a fact which tended inevitably to strengthen the position
of the military. Moreover, the Supreme Military Command enjoyed
extraordinary prerogatives under the Constitution, making it en·tircly independent of. the civil government. These prerogatives
were considered unimpeachable andunqu~8tion3bl~o Byexploiting
them the fighting services consolidated an unassailable position
which was no less than that of a state within a state. 47
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Then, on August 8, the Soviet Union issued their declaration of
war on Japan.

Molotov sent for Ambassador Harriman the same day, and

announced to htm that the Soviet Union would consider itself at war
with Japan as of August 9.

The following day Harriman reported to

washington further on the Russian decision:
When Molotov informed the British Ambassador and me last evening
that the Soviet Union would consider itself in a state of war with
Japan as of August 9, he emphasized that although at one time it
was thought that this action. would not take place until mid-August
the Soviet Government had now strictly lived up to its promise
48
to enter the Pacific War three months after the defeat of Germany.
Plans had been gone over
pation in the war.

caref~lly

at Potsdam for Russian partici-

American leaders still welcomed Russian intervention

even though they were by no means as eager for it as they had been earlier.

I

Russian troops quickly began to advance into Manchuria, meeting only
slight opposition from the Japanese troops there.
August 9, the United States dropped a second atomic bomb on Naga-

I

saki, and, when hurried conferences failed to yield agreement to accept.

the Potsdam ultimatum, tbeEmperor of Japan made the decision for peace.
The Japanese Government informed the Washington Government on the following day that it accepted the Potsdam terms, provided that the status of

the Emperor would not be changed.

The military and naval leaders of

Japan balked when Washington replied on August1l, that the Emperor must
be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.

But the

Emperor insisted, and the Japanese Government formally accepted the Allied
demands on August 14, 1945. 49

CHAPTER VI

c OOCLUSION
With the final signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship
and Alliance, and the exchange of notes completed between the signatories, on August 14, 1945, the Yalta Agreement concerning the Far East
was completed.

A closer look at the final agreements is now in order.

A comparison and evaluation of the Yalta Agreement' and the Sino-Soviet
0/

treaty and agreements is perhaps the best manner in which to accomplish

1

I

this.

~

i
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i

The Yalta Far East Agreements and the Sino-Soviet Agreements

Il
'f
i~

The opening statement of the Yalta Agreement pledged the Soviet
Union to enter the war against Japan.

Marshal Stalin told

l'

i

1

i
¥

Harry Hopkins, May 26, that the Soviet armies would be in position to
engage the Japanese in China and Manchuria by August 8,1 and though the
,.

Soviets maintained that they would not be ready until lateAugust, and.
not then unless the final Chinese negotiations were finalized, they
were ready on time.

The Soviet declarationpf war was presented to the

Jap'anese on August 8, to be effective August 9.

As this lived up

to

their exact pledge of the Yalta Agreement,theSovtets were quick to
. point this out to the AmertcaJls.

Regardless of what else may be said of,

their later actions, the Soviets honored this military commitment, as
they ha.d consistently honored military commitments thoughout the war.
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The Soviet military men at Potsdam had maintained that they would
not be in position to move until late August, and they had continuously
stressed the need to finalize the Chinese negotiations in order "to
justify entry into the Pacific War in· the eyes of the Soviet people."

2

The obvious speculation at the "premature" entry of the Soviets into
the war is that they wanted to make sure they would be in position, if
the surrender

shoul~

occur immediately after the dropping of the atomic

bomb, to make good the claims that they had been negotiating for with
the Chinese.

Clearly they would have difficulty justifying any claims

I
: they had if they did not make any contribution to the war effort in the

Pacific.

This obvious baste did not enable them to use the letter they

had requested of President Truman, though their declaration of war would
state otherwise.
It was believed that the Japanese could not have held out much
longer, and would soon surrender, and that the Soviet Union need not
have expended their forces to invade Manchuria.

And of course, the

Soviet Union did officially enter the war five days before the final
negotiations with the Chinese were completed.
There has always remained thequestioothat perhaps Stalin and
the Russians could have moved sooner into Manchuria than they did.
making the atomic boob unnecessary, and ending the war sooner.

Admiral

King offered the following speculation at the Far East Hearings in 1951:
My expectation was that the Soviets would enter the conflict
in the Far East sooner than they did, but perhaps Stalin and
company were getting back at the Allies for not opening up the
second front °io Europe soo;er tharithey did. 3

There was also some c()ncern on the part of the Americans that the
Soviet Union "would wait until the war was over, and until we had expended

\
II
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our effort and blood to win the war," and then come in and do as they
wished. 4

The question was being asked "whether they would come in early

enough to be of any help to us and to save American lives. uS

Though it

must be said again that the Sovietsjinhondring vital military
connnitments prior to that time, had "built up favorable opinion among
6
the peoples of the United States and the other western allies.~
The .secondpart of the Yalta Agreement that concerned a Soviet
pledge was its readiness, and willingness, to cOl\clude with Nationalist
China, a pact of friendship and alliance.

This pledge was fulfilled

with the final signing of the treaty and agreements- of August 14.
Though the Soviet promise of aid and assistance was somewhat late,

as the war did not last long enough for them to provide much military
assistance or support, it was technically in time as the Soviet
declaration of war did come before the Japanese surrender.
Article III of the August 14th agreein~ntconcluded an alliance
.~

I

against Japan.

With the conclusion of this. portion of the agreement the:

Soviet Union had seemingly given Nationalist China what they had long
desired.

The two countries had pledged mutual respect for their

sovereignty and territorial integrity, and of non-interference in the
internal affairs of the other.

The Soviet Union further recognized the

National Chinese Government as the central government of China, and her

full sovereignty over the Three Eastern Provinces.

As of.August14, the Soviets ha4 unquestionably fulfilled its

..

pledges made at the Yalta Conference.

In fact, looking at the Sino-

Soviet agreements so far, there can be little doubt that the Soviet
Union made solid commitments and promises.
. long desired by the Chinese.

The

Chines~

Commitments and promises
were so pleased with these
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Iportions of the Sino-Soviet agreements, that the subsequent concessions
i

;they were to make were made because of this desire and the long felt,
,need for such agreements.
The last portion of the yalta Agreement requiring the Soviet
Union to act, was the provision that the ports and railway agreements
needed the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek before being
completed.

This concurrence was gained in the notes exchanged following

. the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.

It is these subsequent notes'

and agreements which will not be examined.
The first of the Soviet conditions was that the status quo
in Outer-Mongolia should be maintained.

This point, as was men-

tioned earlier, caused much discussion, debate, and disagreement early
in the negotiations as the Chinese were determined not to cede any
of China's territory away, and the Soviet Union, as a result of the
insertion

(liThe Mongolian People's Republic") in the yalta Agree-

ment,claimed this .provision meant independence.

However, Chiang

authorized this concession early in the negotiations, and it ceased
to be a point of contention.
The exact position taken by the United States Government concerningOuter-Mongolia is somewhat confusing.

Ina State Department

memorandum prepared at Harriman's request, the recommendation was made
that it would be wise for the Chinese Government to give formal recognition to a situation Which had long existed.

However, earlier, on

July 4, Truman had instructed Byrnes to inform Harriman that he could
4

Uinformally" confirm to Soong that his understanding was that in so far
8S

the United States was concerned there was no discussion of. interpre-

. tation of the '<lording of the yalta

deci~ion,

thatstntus quo was just
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that and not independence.

7

Truman's message was sent before the State

Department made its recommendation, and the issue was settled before then
~-,

~

f

anyway, but there was definitely contradiction within the ranks of the

i

American leaders.

However, as the United States had officially refused

f,-

to act as interpreter. Soong and Chiang did what they had to in the
reality of the situation.

Realizing they were making a concession, but

also realizing the situation, and at the samp- time wanting to save face,
they agreed that the question of independence would be settled by a

I

I
I
~-

plebiscite of the people.
I

This undoubtedly went beyond the Yalta understanding, as only the
status quo was agreed upon in the original agreement.
though should have been clarified at the time the

The wording

ag~eement

was made.

In all reality though,China had not exerted any measure of control over
this area for many years, and with the situation being what it
could hardly have expected to then.

was~

she

Had the Chinese not made this

agreement it seems unquestionable that the Soviets would have aided any
attempt by the people of Outer-Mongolia to free themselves of any
semblance of Chinese rule had they chosen to make an issue of it.
The Soviets

we~e

also willing to state, with respect to the

province of Sinkiang, that they had no intention of "interfering in the
internal affairs of China."

That this provision wss mentioned specifically

is cause for some speculation.

Undoubtedly the Chinese wanted this

included as protection fromsny designs the SoViet Union might have in
this area.

This must have bean the topic'of some discussion as it must

have been a very real possibility

t~

the Chinese that they could lose

the entire northern portion of their country if they
against such actions.

di~

not safeguard
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The two items of the yalta Agreement concerning the southern part
of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands were the most easily disposed of in
the Sino-Soviet negotiations.

The Chinese did not need to be consulted,

and their concurrence was not part of the original agreement.

Tradi-

tiona11y and historically, the Chinese did not have any interests in these
areas, and a Harriman memorandum to Secretary Byrnes July 1B, 1945, stated
that, "China raises no objection and accepted the retu.rn to Russia of the
southern part of Sakhalin and the accession of the Kurile Islands,uB so
apparently this was at least mentioned in passing during the Sino-Soviet
negotiations, and was never a point

of

contention.

Chiang had attempted

to bring these areas under the control of a four power commission, but had
given up the idea when the United States had not shown an interest.
The remainder of the yalta Agreement, concerning the ports and
the railroads, proved to be the focal point of the majority of the SinoSoviet disputes during their negotiation.
Difficulties over the interpretation of the Yalta Agreement arose'
from the very beginning, with the Soviet Union interpreting the
agreement to suit its own purposes. 9
When ,Molotov first presented Harriman with the Soviet drafts of
the proposed yalta Agreement, it contained no mention of the "preeminent interests of the Soviet Union being safeguarded,"

and it was

not until further discussion had clarified other points in dispute,
and the final draft written out by the Soviet Union, that this phrase
appeared.

This phrase, to which Pre$ident Roosevelt apparently made

no protest, proved to be the point
upon which the Soviet
Union based
4
.
their arguments in the negotiations with the Chinese.
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It is not known if any discussion took place concerning this
~hrase

at Yalta.

Harriman, who was directly involved in the discussion

i,

I~

at Yalta, and was in elose contact with Soong all during the Sino-Soviet
negotiations, was to express the following opinion in his statement to
the Senate Corrmittee at the Far East Hearings in 1951:
I can personally state that neither Roosevelt nor Stalin
intended that the phrase 'preeminent interests' should go
beyond Soviet interests in the free transit of exports to and
imports from the Soviet Union. President Roosevelt had told
me at Yalta that this was his interpretation and when I took
this position with Stalin in August, 1~45, he agreed. lO
But there was to be considerable difference in what. Stalin said, and in
what he did.
Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had discussed at the Tehran
Conference the possibility that the Soviet Union be given the "use of a
warm-water port at the end of the t-!anchurian railway, possibly at Dairen ,
on the Kwantung Peninsula," knowing that this was a long-time Soviet
wish. 11 With this as a basis for discussion, the Yalta Agreement included
the provision that Dairen be internationalized.
The final agreement concerning Dairen signed by the Chinese followed
this closely.

In point one they agreed·that Dairen would be a free port

open to the commerce and shipping of all nations; point three agreed
that the administration in Dairen would belong to China; point five
provided satisfactory customs agreements; andpointtwQ of the Protocol
to the Agreement stated that all of t:-he railways would not be subject to

any military supervision or control other than by the Chinese.· These
.:a

arr~ngements

were all highly satisfactory to the Chinese.

However, the remainder of the Dairen agreement highly favored the
Soviet Union, and, as subsequent events proved, gave the'Soviet Union·
virtual control of this port

0

The "preeminent interests" of the Soviet

II
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Unlonwere protected to the sum of one half of all the port installations
and equipment, on lease, free of charge.
That the restoration of Manchuria to the National Government would
take place through this, the only major port available to the Chinese

it

,
i

I

I

into Manchuria, would undoubtedly work an undue hardship on the Chinese.
But then, Stalin had wanted all of Dairen on lease, and had also wanted
'to include a naval base there, and the Chinese had-at least half of the
facilities at their disposal, which was more than they had had for the
past fifty years, and all of the port would not be under Soviet dominktton, as they had feared, and ~ould have been the case had no agreement
been made.

f

I

II
r

A ·portion of the agreement that would cause much trouble as was
quickly seen, was the provision that in case of war against Japan the
port was to be subject to the military supervision or control of the
Soviets

8S

determined by the Agreement on Port Arthur.

Soong had managed

to resist Stalin's demands as long as possible, but ultimately did give
in to the provision that Dairen be included within the Soviet military
zone, but he had hoped that he had protected Chinese interests with the
provision about no Soviet control except in war time~

It

i
fI

On this last point it is interesting to note that Dairen was not

opened to the commercial vessels of the world-in the months following
the surrender of Japan, and upon protests by the United States, the
Soviet Unionreplied,- referring to the provision of the agreement
regarding Dairen, that in case of war with Japan, Dairenwas to come
~

under the control of the military regime authorized for the
Naval Base area.

j

!

~ort

Arthur

They continued in their replies to state that "in as

. much as the. war with Japan had not been terminated, there being no peace

140
treaty, Dairen came under the administration of Port Arthur."

The Soviet

Union also stated that it saw no basis for a change of the regime, and
the port remained closed to commercial intercourse with other countries o

12

The Yalta Agreement provided for the lease of Port Arthur as a
naval base of the Soviet Union be restored.

Stalin had argued for this

lease, and President Roosevelt had given "in when Stalin showed willingness to compromise on the port of Dairen and the railroad.

In all

reality it would have been difficult to argue against a great power like
the Soviet Union not being in control of a port in this area.

Especially

in light of the threat Japan had just·posed to the Pacific countries.
With the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet negotiations, the Soviets
not only had a lease of the Port Arthur area, but also had managed to
create a military zone that extended north on the Kwantung Peninsula,
but excluding Dairen and the connecting railways.

It was agreed that

the naval base would be for the joint use of the two countries, to be
used only by Chinese and Soviet military and commercial vessels.
This was to be the sole Chinese benefit under this arrangement,
and it was clear that the port would be in joint use on paper only.
There could be little doubt that whatever lise the

~hinese

would make of

the port, would be that which the Soviets allowed them, there would be
no equality.

But then, this agreement was clearly intended by the

signatories to predicate Soviet domination.
.~heyhad

And, though the agreements

made were much more conciliatory, the United States had eon-

.

,eluded similar agreements with other countries for bases •
'

The lease of Port Arthur was the one portion of the Sino-Soviet
agreements that would seem to be unquestionable.,

That the Soviet Union

did not have an ice-free port on the Pacific was a long,felt need and
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desire of the Soviet Union.

For their needs in this area an internation-

a'lized port would not entirely serve their needs.
!i.

Had the lease been

~or only Port Arthur, no one would have either questioned it or disputed

it.

However, in view of the fact that the United States saw this

arrangement similar to privileges which they had negotiated with other
countries for the mutual security of two friendly nations, the Soviet
appetite in this area was far too large, and they subsequently far
overstepped what they could legitimately have expected as theirdue o
The last portion of the Yalta Agreement that required concessions
by the Chinese was the provision concerning the Chinese Changchun.
Railway.

The Yalta Agreement had provided that the Chinese Eastern and

the South Manchurian railways, providing an outlet to Dairen, should be
jointly operated by the establishmentofajoint Soviet-Chinese Company.
The remainder of this agreement should also have been satisfactory
to the Chinese, as long

I

a~

the Yalta Agreement had been made, and the

need felt for the concluding of the Sino-Soviet agreements.

The Chinese

Government would bear the responsibility for the protection of the rai1way, and only during the time of war against Japan would tl:ie Soviets
have the right to transport troops.
These agreements, on paper, would seem to avoid any. infringement
on Chinese sovereignty; they would not have complete control of the
railroad,. but they had never had that ,nor had they even built the major
portion of it.

They were certainly in a much more favorable position

._than when the railroad was or'ginally built.
was sound.

Logically the agreement

Due to the geographic location of the Soviet maritime

provinces, this arrangement was highly desirable to that country. ·The
railway had been under joint ownership, though under Soviet domination,
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I

since its construction, until the time Japan assumed control of the area

t

through the puppet state of Mnnchulqjoo A successful working agreement

~

would have done much to solidify the working relationship between the
two countries, and greatly lessen tensions.
Taking into consideration repeated affinnations by the Soviets,
and there were many, to guarantee Chinese sovereignty in these areas, the
fact that the Nationalist Chinese Government did not have the area
directly under their control, and had not for some time, the fact that
the area was being liberated by the Soviet armies, and the fact that
originally Stalin had wanted to lease the railroads in their entirety,
and later demanded complete ownership, and most important, had it in
his power to assume full control had there not been any concluding
agreement, the compromises worked out seemed highly favorable to the
Nationalist Chinese.
To a large extent the Chinese anxieties, and the compromises they

I

made, were based on the knowledge that the Soviets would soon be launchlng an invasion of Manchuria from Siberia and Outer-Mongolia.

This

knowledge definitely influenced the Chinese negotiations up to August 8,
and even more so after the Soviets launched their invasion.

It placed

the Chinese in a position where the agreement regarding relations between
the Chinese administration and theCommander-in-Chief of the Soviet
forces in the Three Eastern Provinces was almost as desirable as the
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.

Knowing that the Chinese Communists

..

were in a position to move into this area easily and readily after the
conclusion of the Japanese war, and knowing that they could be there
far in advance of the Nationalist forces, and in all probability would
receive aid from the Soviet forces, this was extremely desirable to

.}

1:

$
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(

Chiang.

And the Soviets gave them the assurances they wanted.

this agreement gave the Soviet Commander-in-Chief full authority
in all matters related to the prosecution of the war. and was to be
expected.

If the Soviets had their forces there. and did not; assume

control, chaos and trouble would- 8urelyfollow.

There was no objection

from the Chinese as the Soviets had stated that as soon as any area ,
ceased to be a zone of immediate military operation the Chinese National Government would assume full control in the direction of public
affairs.

Once again this seemed to affirm the desire of the Soviet

Union to cooperate with the Nationalist Chinese as the government of
the country.
In summing up the final agreements made, in comparison with the

~'

!

Yalta Agreement, there was cause for Chinesedisplea,ure only on the

I

port of Dairen.

The agreements, 'as clearly written,

~eemed

to give the

Chinese what they had long desired; secux:ityin that they could act
without fear of Soviet-interference,

8S

they had been aS8ured in the

:treaty of Friendship and Alliance that the Soviets would not interfere
in the internal affairs of China, and assurances from the Soviets that
they would recognize Chinese sovereignty and

territor~al

integrity. -'

and of vital importance, considering the many years of dispute and fear
of the Chinese Communists, was the pledge by the Soviets that all aid
and support would be given entirely to the National Government as the
central government of China.
Unquestionably China benefitted because she gave up little to the
Soviet Union that the Soviet Union had not had at onetime, or could not
have taken at any times she' desi~ed. and in all probability 'held.

i

t
t

And

China had not controlled any of the areas in the agreements for several

~~MSWi\WMI_i~M&~I44dh.W• •@M!+J.f¥YMi¥Ji.
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years.

There was good and sufficient cause for Chiang to be satisfied

I

a,nd happy with the completion of the agreements.

I,
\/

Reaction to the 'Sino-Soviet Agreements

I)

On August 16, 1945, Chiang informed Ambassador Hurley that
agreement had been reached with the Soviet Union and that he was generally
satisfied with the treaty.
treaty indicated; (1)

He admitted that he thought the Sino-Soviet

an intention on the part of the Soviets to assist

in bringing about unification of the armed forces in China; (2)

an

intention to support Chinese efforts to create a strong, unified and
democratic government; and (3)
Government of China. 13

an intention to support the Nationalist

In his report to the State Department, Hurley

was to say,
The publication of these documents has demonstrated conclusively
that the Soviet Union. supports the National Government and also
that the two governments are in agreement regarding Manchuria. 14
Secretary of State Byrnes, in officially expressing the opinion
of the State Department, stated that:
I believe that the new treaty between the Nationalist Government
of the Republic of China and the Government of the U.S.S.R. and
the accompanying agreements constitute an important step forward
in the relations between China and the Soviet Uniono ••• we welcome
this development as a practical example of the continuing unity
and mutual helpfulness which should characterize the acts1gf
members of the United Nations in peace as well as in war.

Editorial comment in both Nationalist and Chinese Communist
, territory newspapers expressed approval of the Sino-Soviet treaty and

.

related agreements at the time they were made public.

Harriman confirmed

this in his statement at the Far East Hearings, "When theSino-So"iet
agreements were made public in. August they were welcomed both in China
and in the United States." 16

Harriman further stated that. "Soong told
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me in Moscow he was gratified at the results obtainecl.,,17

Acheson

confirmed both Harriman's and Hurley's statements in his testimony at the
Far East Hearings.

He

stated:

At the time the Chinese entered into this treaty with the
Russians they regarded the arrangements which they had made with
the Russians on the basis of Yalta, as very satisfactory •• o.
such statements were expressed by the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
and the Chinese Foreign Minister. 18
Yalta Commitments and American Policy
There is little doubt that the Yalta Agreement committed the
/ United States, and subsequently China, to a series of provisions
seemingly inconsistent with policy established from the very· beginning
of the war.

There can also be little doubt that these commitments were

thought to be vitally necessary to the war effort.

Seemingly they also

may have been inconsistent with the Atlantic Charter, in light of later
developments, but they did not disagree with this Charter as it was
written.

These agreements did not actually violate Chinese sovereignty,

if· anything, they protected it to a greater extent than ever

previously.

Had the American Chinese policy been successful, unquestionably
the final. agreements would have been beneficial both for China and the

Soviet Union.

Beneficial to China because it would solidify the

relationship between the two countries, and ease the tension that had
existed for some time between them.

It would have naturally been

beneficial to the Soviet Union because it· would have solved problems

...

which had been confronting them ever since their arrival on the shores
of the Pacific; their lack of warm-water ports on the Pacific, and the
easing of transportation problems to the Maritime Provinces, as the long
trip around the Chinese border would no

longer be necessary.
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The United States had long desired a strong, unified China, that
she might "become the principal stabilizing factor in the Far East."l?
A strong, unified China could have, and would have, protected her interests
against any and all aggressors, and would have been the police force
necessary to retain stability in that area o
that China had tremendous potentialo

There could be little doubt

Though China would be some time

in fulfilling its role as a great power, the United States had worked for
her acceptance with the other powers for some time o

And she would have

had sufficient por.\'er ,had United States policy been successful, to take
care of herself at the end of the

war~

There can be little question, again in view of the situation, that
the Yalta Agreement, made by Stalin and Roosevelt, would be beneficial
to both, as interpreted by Roosevelt and the United States.
Even though China was forced to concede more than the Yalta
Agreement provided for, she gained enough in exchange to counterbalance
the concessions she had made.

She was sufficiently protected, had she

been able to fend for herself as a strong, unified country.

It is clear

that China's failure to consolidate within herself, anduot the Yalta
Agreement as insinuated by some, led to

he~

ultimate downfall.

Agreement did not create the Communist Chinese o

.

The Yalta

Anthony Kubek, in his

book, How the Far East was Lost, states, "There is little doubt that Ya~ta
marked the greatest diplomatic defeat in American history.,,20

Kubek

bases his belief, to a minor extent, on quoted sources that he believes

..

conclusively upholds this belief, and, in the majority, from hindsight so
beneficial to those who are quick to criticize, and are not able to see
the situation in perspective as is necessary. in all fairness to those
concerned.
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'I

Kubek quoted Hurley from the Far East Hearings to the effect

th~t

., rurley believed,·
i,

II·
!

American diplomates surrendered the territorial integrity and '~/
the political independence of China, surrendered the principles
of the· Atlantic Charter, and wrote the blueprint for the Commu-.
nist conquest of China in secret agreement at Yalta ••• ~2l

yet doesftot include Hurley'. stacement of August 16. 22
he did not believe the same thing.

at: which time

Clearly Hurley also benefited

greatly" from hindsight in his criticism.

If he was so positive" in his

assertions six years later it would seem that he would have been able
to see the situation more clearly in 1945.
The mistake the United States made vas not at Yalta,· but in China.
The idealistic wish and desire of American policy was the fundamental
weakness.

The consistent and constant expression by the United States

to China that she must make her own decisions. and stand on her own
two feet, was simply not possible in light of the existing conditions
in China.

'that ."our policy toward China is not based on sentiment,"

that it was "based on an enlightened national self-illterest motivated
by consideratio~s of international security and well-being,,,23 as e~pressed by the State Department at the ttmeof Yalta, wassfmply not
tru~

It was based on idealism, sentiment,and considerable hope, in

light of traditional American policy. "That the United States was never
prepared to go to war over China to protect either its rights' or aid
the Nationalist Chinese Government in their internal struggle with
. the Chinese Communists, was what cl'eatedthe problems with China, not

-.
the Yalta Agreement.

American leaders knew that the vacuum created by

the defeat of Japan w~uldhave to be filled

in

order that some semblance

of balance would be restored in the Far East, and they knew if it could
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have been filled by the Chinese, it would free the United States from
assuming any responsibility in that area after the war.

This was the

. overriding hope and concern of the United States in the formulation of
. Chinese policy.
During the Sino-Soviet negotiations the Chinese had asked for
help frau

theU~.ited

States, had asked them to exert their strength of

/ opinion with the Soviets, and aid in the negotiations, aa the Chinese
clearly wished to know officially what the United States' interpretation.
of the Yalta Agreement was in order tb8tit could be used in their
I

negotiations.

All that was ever expressed officially by the United

States was that they did not think it necessary for the Chinese to go

I

beyond the limits set at Yalta.· This was not much help as even today
it is not entirely clear what was intended by the wOfding of the

I

Agreement.

decisively and 4id not do so.
;

The respon~ibility they can assume for the fin~~ ~ino-Soviet

I

:,~~

treaty is that

they may have made to obblinwhat they ultimately desired, and received
'from the. Soviets, at least on paper, the assurances of friendship and
sovereignty.

j
.~

not take a strong stand, did poot express their

it would be hard for anyone to criticize the. Chinese for anyc'oncessions

I
l

t~eydid

opinion clearly•. In light of the position they took, it would seem that

I.f

I

The pnited States had had its.·opportunitr to intervene

Harriman
.

u~timately

summed up the realistic view of the Yalta

Agreement when he stated that, .
~.

~

The postwar problems have' resulted not from the understandings
. reached at Yalta, but from the fact that Stalin failed to carry
out thos~ understandings and from the aggressive action by the
Kremlin. 4
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and,

1l
t

i,

i

I.

the loss of control over the mainland by the National
Government was due not to the Yalta understanding, but to
the fa~t that the Soviet Union broke the Sino-Soviet agreements. 5 .
.
'
Chiang Kai-shek believed the same thing, stating that:
The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and its'
various annexes together with Stalin's pledge are useful today
as the yardstick ~ith which to measure Soviet Russia's bad
, faith as demonstrated in her subsequent diplomatic and military
action. 26

The Soviet Union and the War Against Japan
At the war's end, it was clear that tithe effect of Russia's entry
,into the Pacific war •••• neither defeated Japan nor materially hastened
" ,,27
the acceptance of surrender...
The Soviet Union was not needed to
defeat the Japanese.

The Yalta Agreement need not have been made. ,It

is interesting to note though, that Soviet
surrender of

Jap;~n

historian~

would explain the

as being entirely due to the timely intervention of

the Soviet Union."
During

Ju~~,

the American position regarding the Soviet Union's

entry into the war had changed somewhat as it became" increasingly clear
that it would only be a matter of time before Japan would fall.' No
longer was the opinion almost unanimous that the Soviet armies would be
needed to bring about the Japanese capitulations.

The position of the

A~erican leaders. was now fluctu~ting between trying to figure out a way

to keep the Soviet Union out of the 'war, and having them fulfill their
~

pledge for the psychological shock it might have on the Japanese.
Ultimately, neither position was to correspond·with subsequent
events.

It would not have .been possible to keep the Soviet Union out of
'
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I

:the war, nor was the psychological shock to have any

!

~pparent

effect on

:the Japanese, as interviews after the conflict proved.
I
I
I
\

A necessarily candid report was given on September 4, 1945, by
the then Premier Prince ,Naruhike Higashi-Kuni to the Japanese Die,t:
The general conditions of the country began to show marked
signs of impoverishment and exhaustion •••• so much so that in
the days just preceeding the termination of the war it seemed
almost impossible to carryon modern warfare further for any long
period of time •••• OUr losses .in naval and aerial strength,wer2aso
enormous as to obstruct seriously the prosecution.,of the war •
. The influence of Secretary Byrnes, General Eisenhower, Admirals
King and Leahy, and others, in expressing their Opinions to the
President, apparently were able to influence him in his decisions.

In

.

.

preparing for the Potsdam Conference"Truman was to state, "my immediate,
purpose was to get the Russians into the war

again~t

Japan as soon as

possible.,,29 'But later was to change this position somewhat as he said
in early August,

)

"Stalin had said that Russia woul4 not come into the war

against Japan until she had concluded an agreement with China.
•

.of-

...

It was for

this reason that I urged Chiang to continue the talks in Moscow. 30n
Truman wanted to get a Soviet declaration of war at Potsda~in
31
case their help was needed against the Japanese.,
This position was
','

undoubtedly taken with the knowledge that theatomicbomb,wouldquickly'
'end the war. but there were others who were not certain the bomb would
work32 and a Soviet declaration of war would be insurance against such a'
, happening.
However, others, like General Marshall, thought that

'" on the already helpless Japanese
the impact of Russian entry
may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation
attha~ time or shortly thereafter. especially if we land in
Japan. 3 .
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Originally Soviet intervention in the 'acific war had been desirable of
what was then considered military necessity, but was now being considered
in the manner in which Marshall indicated.

There was also the possibil-

.

ity, until mid-July, that the atomic bomb would not work, and even. at
the last minute there were doubts that it would explode in the air when
dropped over

J~pan.

It was for that reason that military plans for an invasion of
the Japanese home islands continued to be worked out, and these plans
definitely stated that American military leaders

wa~ted

to "encourage

, Russian entry into the war against Japan,.,34 and that it wa~ worthwhile
to fulfill the Yalta pledges.

35

On July 24, 1945, during the conference,

Harriman reported that the Combined Chiefs of Staff reported to the
President· and Prime Minister Churchill, that their overall strategy
concept included, "still planning an invasion and still considered
Soviet participation in the

P~cific

war· essential."

36

However, the

feeling of American leaders, other than the military, was indicated by
a note Churchill recorded after talking with Byrnes, on July 24:

"It is

quite clear that the United States does not at the present time desire
Russian participation in· the war against Japan. u37
It should be noted that

t~e

military was not unanimous in their

desire to seek the help of the Russians.

After a June 18, meeting of the

Joint Chiefs, Admiral King was to state quite emphatically that,' in
spite of the position' of the Chiefs of Staff,
Regardless of the desitability of the Russians entering the
war, they were not, in his opinion,~ indispensable, and he did
not think that we should go safar as to beg them to come in.
While the: cost of d~feating Japan would be greater without
Russian aid, there would be no question•••• but that we handle
it alone. 38
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Ultimately his, and Admiral Leahy's opinions were correct •.
Admiral Leahy had firmly believed at Yalta that the Russians were not
needed, as he had stated that by September of 1944 he
believed that a completely blockaded Japan would fall by
its 'own weight •••• [and that] Japan was almost defeated .
Cthen] through a practically complete sea and air blockade

••••

39

.

He advised Truman of the same thing prior to and during the Potsdam
Conference •. He told Truman that, "The British and ourselves were fully
.
.
40
capable of defeating Japan without assistance ... ·
The .United States State Department had been in agreement with the
mili.taryat Yalta.

They regarded the

Sino-Soviet cooperation as necessary for peace and security
in the Far East and seek to aid in removing the existing mistrust between China and the Soviet Union and in ~ringing'about
close and fr;endlyrelations between them. 4l
If American

poli~y

were to succeed

withouta~ed iqte~ention

cooperation betw~en the Soviet Union and China was ne~essary.

then this
And it

was thought to hpve been accomplished with the Yalta ~greement, as well
as gaining the mtlitary

suppor~.of

the Soviet Union in the Pacific war.

It seemed clear at Yalta that the Soviets had no ulterior motives.

Stalin repeated to the conference what he had told Roosevelt privately:
'\)Jonly want to have returned to Russia what the Japanese have 'taken
from my country.,,42 Roosevelt agreed to this and Leahy was to say later
that,
It seemed very reasonable to me.alao.and no one was more
surprised than I to see these condit.ionsagreed to at Yalta"
labeled as some horrendou~concession made by President
Roosevelt to an enemy.43
.

Stalin desired no more, than historical precedent would allow, at that
time, "he desired to return to the position oecupied by the Tsarists at
one time, and Acheson observed at the Far East. Hearings, that,
.'
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i,

I,

the Russians took the same attitude toward these rights that
the Chinese took toward their rights in Formosa. The Russians
had lost theirs to the Japanese' by war in 1904; the Chinese had
lost theirs to the Japanese by war in 1895. 44

II

\1

!

Stalin had given Ifunqualifiedendorsement" to the Cairo

Declaration, though he said he could make no commitment 'because of the
,
45
neutrality pact with Japan.
~his declaration pledged that the powers
involved would "covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of
territorial,expansion."

There would seem to be some question of

Stalin's intentions,'except this declaration could also be interpreted
to support the position of the' Soviet Union as it was also stated in
this document that, "Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed."

There was no clarifica-

tion of this last .statement. no determination as to what would happen
to those fomer

J~panese

possessions, and. it definitely would seem to

indicate a return to others what they had also lost, and the Soviet
Union certainly ~egarded certain

I

the Japanese in

~904,

of these rights

as

~aving

been lost to

as the statement in. the Yalta Agreement indicated:

"The former rights of Russia violated by the treaeherous attack of Japan
in 1904 shall be restored ......

One fact can be stated with certainty about the Yalta Agreement
and that is that the range of feelings and criticisms are as extreme as
they could possible be •.
\0

The Far East Hearings of 1951 brought forth virtually reams of
criticism. to the extent that the final resume stated that:
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The turning point of American foreign policy in the Far East
was the Yalta Agreement of February 1945 ••••The surrender of
the principles and objectives by the State Department at Yalta
created the confusion, the crisis which confronts our Nation
today.46
During the testimony the following statements were. made by two of
the bigges't critics of the', Agreement.

General MacArthur referred to

Yalta as a great tragedy, stating that,
.~

"one of the greatest mistakes

that was ever made was tO,permit the Soviet Union to come down into
China at Port Arthur, Dairen and other places of that 8ort.,,47

II
t

1

I

I
I

General Hurley stated that,

I

'

Our diplomatics surrendered 'the territorial integrity and the
political independence of China in a secret agreement at Yalta.
We surrendered in that secret agreement the objectives for which
we had told the American people we were fighti~g.48
and, "I believe'that the verdict of history on the Yalta Agreement will
mark it as both immoral andcowardly.u49
Hurley was not as outspoken in his criticisms in 1945, and General
MacArthur was another who had taken quite a different position at that
time.

On

F~bruary

28, 1945, MacArthur. expressed his 9pinion to

Secretary Forresta1, to the effect that,
he felt that weshou1d secure the commitment of the Russians
to active and vigorous prosecution of a campaign against the
Japanese in Manchukuoof such proportions as to pin down a very
large part of the Japanese army •••• 50
Clearly he too. 'had. been able to benefit from hindsight.
Admirals King and Leahy did not testify at the Far East Hearings,
but statements by both were introduced as evidence.

Both had long

-opposed Russian participation \in the war on lIlilitary grounds, but neither
offered the criticism afterwards that others did.

And these two were

among the few who remained consistent in their views.

ISS
The final conclusions of the Senate Committee were made in light
of firm statements that the Yalta Agreement did not lIlaterially affect
the situation which arose on the Asiatic ~ontinent after World Wa~ II.
Secretary of State, in 1951, Acheson testified that the agreements.

I
I

"were in the interests. the long-term interests of China, It S1 and in
answer toa question of military connection between the defeat of China
and those concessions made to the Soviet Union at Yalta, he replied,
"l.just don't believe there is any connection at all.,,52 Admiral Barr,
Chief of the Army Advisory Commission

l
f

from January, 1948, to

May, 1949, 'testified that he did "not think the Yalta Agreement had any

t

i

in'Nanki~g

I·

considerable effect on the final fall of Chiang,uS3 and, "it was no

!

doubt a contributing factor but was not a major

caus~,China

would have

l

fallen even if the Yalta Agreement was not mad~ ...S4 Ambassador Harriman

J

stated that,
.the loss of control over the mainland by the National
Government was due not to the Yalta understandi~g, but to the
fact that t~~ Soviet Union broke the Sino-Soviet.. agreements.~S
It· is doubly .hard' to understand the position .taken by the Senate
Committee.after reading the aboVe testimony and the observations made by
the following people.

They both would seem to clearly repudiate the

.criticisms offered by MacArthur, Hurley, and .others.
Admiral Leahy stated that,

On his way back to Moscow from the San Francisco Conference,
'Ambassador Harriman discussed with me his latest estimate of ..
Soviet intentions regarding Japan'. Harriman· believed that
Russia.would come into the war, regardless of what we might do,
and that, in the end Mosc&w would exercise control over whatever
government might be established in Manchuria and Outer-Mongolia.
I had held the same opinion ever since the conditions for Russian
participation in· the Far East conflict had beenaccepted. 56
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General Marshall had pointed out to Secretary of War,
i'

Stim~on,

That even if we went ahead in the war without the Russians,
and compelled the Japanese to surrender to our terms, that
would not prevent the Russians from marching into Manchuria
anyhow and striking, thus permitting them to gain virtually
what they wanted in the surrender terms. 57
General Deane stated in his book, The Strange· Alliance, that,
I do not think that any. responsible American ever doubted that
Russia would eventually come into the war against Japan. The
Soviet Union had too many interests in the Far East to have
allowed the affairs of that part of the world to be settled with'out her participating voice, and she could hardly have claimed a'
place at the peace table without having been one of the victorious
belligerents. 58
From the above evidence it" seems clear that the Soviet Union would

have entered the war, regardless of what was done at Yalta.

Stalin h$d

intended to enter the war long before the Yalta Agreement was made.
Stalin's desires in the Far East did not suddenly materialize from thin
air at Yalta.
rights to be

I

If what he originally asked
restore~

Far East were,

t~en

Roosevel~

to verify as Soviet

were any indication of what S9Viet desires in the

certainly the Yalta

Agreemen~

cquld well be viewed

as imposing, along with the Sino-Soviet treaty 'and agreements, "legal·
'.limitationson the action )lhich Russia would, in any· case, have been in
a position to take.,,59

And,

only by.maintaining strong military forces in Japan could
have forced Russia to live up to its claims and to withdraw from thet~rritorywhich it controlled. 60

we

Another factor, apparently completely ignored by Hurley, "
MacArthur, and others, was the American people.

~enatorAlexander Wile,."

of Wisconsin, in a speech before the Senate in July of 1945,
~

indicated the feelings of the American people.at' that

clear~y

t~e:

•

I
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It does not involve any military secrets to state our intense
feelings in this matter. In millions of American homes, mothers~
fathers, and sweethearts, are waiting anxiously for news of
Russia's intentions ••••They know and we know that if Russia declared war, if her bombing fleets roared out of Vladivostok over
Japan, these acts might be the final ones to force a quick
surrender' .of the Japs
Thus ,countless American lives are at
stake in Russia's decision••••We know that whether or not Russia
enters the war she will make big postwar demands regarding Asia
at the peace table. ~huS America has everyth1ng to gain and
thousands of her boys' lives ,to lose unless Russia joins in the
Pacific struggle. 61
0

Secretary of State ,Stettinius'stated that at the time of Yalta,' "it
must be remembered that there was already a groundswell of public opinion
!demanding that our forces be returned home as soon as the war was over."62
The American people were in no mood to fight any more after the surrender
of Japan, certainly not'theSoviet Union.

Ambassador Harriman stated

this clearly:
-

.

The people of the United States were in no mood to support
such an undertaking. This country certainly ert9red in. its
rapid demob*lization-in 1945, but this is an error for which
the entire 4meric~n people' must share the respo~~ibility.63
~ ='~

It is not possible to see into the future.

I

In view of world developments since the conclusion of hostilities agains¢ Japan, especially in recent years, there is no
evidence to suggest that the absence of such arrangements,i~'e. Yalta Agreements and Sino-Soviet Treaty and agreements ~ould
,have restrained the Soviet Union from pursuing Russia's longrange traditional objectives. 64

1

How would it have been possible to realistically ask a country to
come into a conflict in which they need not have become involved except

I
..

by choice (it was clear that the Japanese would not have been in a
position to threaten them). to save the lives of American soldiers, and
'not

bewiiling to give' into wtat seemed to be,

~n

1945,

ju~t, de~irable•

-···
·l·

i.~.

. and necessary claims? This would have been expecting too much from a
country which had suffered the blunt of the German attack for three years

I

•
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while waiting for an Allied second front. a nation that had suffered
untold damage and devastation, a nation that was to fight long and hard
on her own soil, a nation that suffered over 20,000,000 casualties in
the war.

The 'United States entered the war only after being attacked:

'this is the perspect'ive. in which the situation must be viewed.
Had China been strongly united) there
raised.

wo~ld

never have been any question

Certainly had the Americans 'not been so desirous of saving

lives, while at the same time asking the Soviets to become involved in a
situation where they would lose yet even more of her boys' lives,. perhaps
the situation would be different in China today.
This certainly does not indicate that subsequent Soviet actions
since that time should be excused. ,But, up to 1945, the American people
had assumed a rather-self-centered attitude toward the war, and it is ,
l

(

not unreasonable to think that other countries also felt the same way.
The Yalta Agreement does not appear out of perspective when viewed in
terms of the situation in 1945.

The Sino-Soviet Agreement of

August 14,' 1945, clearly vindicated American policy up to that time.
, In 1945, in China, the Nationalist Government of Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shekremained. in power.

There was good reason to assume that

with the pledged support of the Soviet Union and of the United States,
it would gradually overcome the opposition of the Chinese Communists,

and consolidate its authority over a united nation.
It was thought, during the war, ,that American influence should be
.used to obtain an agreement b~ween China and the Soviet Union which
~ouldpreelude

Soviet interference in China's ,internal affairs or

encroachment upon Chinese' territory.

This was done, and while a few

,were questioning the wisdom of some of the Far Eastern Agreements made
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a~ Yalta.
I

II
Ii

those who were not motivated by purely political partisanship.
were generally willing to concede that, if these agreements
would tend to prevent postwar controversies between the major
allies, make for co-operation between Moscow and Washington, as
well as between Moscow and Nanking, and promote the rapid
pacification and recovery of a devastated sector of the globe,
the concessions by China that they involved would be justified
in China's own highest interest. 65
.
The concessions that China was forced to make were justified by

what she received in return from the. Soviet Union..

The Soviet Union did

enter the war as promised in the Far East Agreements at Yalta,

an~

seemingly the Sino-Soviet Treaty and related agreements assured
working relationship between the two countries.

a good

And the Soviet Union

was limited in its demands upon and in China, and had promised to both
aid and support the Nationalist Government, and to respect its
sovereignty.
It was not either of the two·agreements, the
Agreement, or the Sino-Soviet agreements, that
fall of National~st China.
Chinese Communists.

Ya~ta

brough~

Far East

about the down-

Neither of these two agr~ements created the

It would have been necessary for Chiang. to consoli-

date dissident elements within his own country for these agreements to
successfully work out •. And he was not able to do this.

Attemptswere

made by the United States during and after the war to bring the two
opp~sing

forces

to~e~her

in China, but they were always: unsuccessful.

The Yalta Far East Agreement was nota radical shift in American
. Chinapolicy,.as believed by t~e Senate Committee and others.
. not a radical change in traditional American policy.

It was

The Yalta Agreement

had been consistent with American policy in that it was an attempt to
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both protect China. and help establish her as a world power.

And, had

China been able to stand on her own·feet as a united country after the
war. this policy would have been successful, and they would have been
able to assume their·place as a world power. as President Roosevelt had
dreamed.
In January of 1950, the U.S.S.R. signed a peace treaty and alliance
whi~h

t

with Coamunist China,

had forced Chiang and the Nationalists off

1
1
i

the mainland 'in 1949, and had given up all the claims and rights granted
by the Nationalist Chinese·in 1945; ample proof. that the Soviet Union

I

:did not desire any trouble with a China that was able to present a
united front and stand up for her rights, though the circumstances had
changed at that

t~e.

There was very little that the United States could have done to
help the Nationalist Government.

The basic formulation of policy at the

turn of the century prevented any aid in the form of troops. which would
have been the only aid that would really have helped Chiang at that
tilne.

And it is doubtful even if that would have been enough unless

. the United States were willing to become involved in another full scale
war, which they were not.

And clearly, from subsequent events in China,

any agreements or policies formulated in 1945, would have had to be
supported by both armed forces and the Soviet Union if they were going
to be successful.

Had the United States been Willing to force the

issue in 1945 and °l946,undoubtedly the situation would ha~ebeen
. different today • but they did""not-.

This was not the fault of President

Roosevelt, who did not make this policy.:oand .President Truman, who could
not change it.
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As events quickly showed, Chiang never really had the whole-hearted
support of the Chinese people during the war.
Allied war effort was clear indication· of this.

Their contribution to the
The situation

wa~

one

which ·the Nationalist Government had to work out for themselves after
the war before any outside involvement would have helped them.
President Roosevelt had been a realist.

Without the United Nations

functioning as planned, t,here was little chance of lasting world peace.

I
f

Without the support and cooperation of the Soviet Union _there was little
chance of .tbis happening.

The United Nations would have soon gone the

J

way of the League of Nations.
this about.

President Roosevelt attempted to bring

Had he lived he might. have been successful.

did not, and in

lig~t

willing to support,

of what _the

~hat

p~ople

of the United States were

more could-have been done?
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